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Chapter I
 
OVERVIEW, ORIENTATION, METHODOLOGY
 
A. Introduction
 
The basic purpose of thi-s report is to formulate some useful and
 
interesting images of the long-term future of space, and to encourage
 
and facilitate the use of such images and scenarios by NASA in its
 
studies, planning, and public information programs. We realize that
 
NASA already makes use of scenarios in its planning funct'ions, but the
 
deliberate formulation of long'term scenarios and "images of the fut6re"
 
has usually been left to outside freelance writers. We believe it is
 
quite useful, perhaps important, for NASA to intervene in this process
 
and also to facilitate it. Some of the current relatively low interest
 
in NASA programs undoubtedly is due td the public's failure to understand
 
how exciting space development can be in the medium term (1985-2000) as
 
well as in the centuries beyond this one.
 
Of course, the extraordinarily extensive science fiction and other
 
popular literature-have already introduced a fairly broad public in this
 
country and abroad to some concepts about space. This literature and
 
its media interpretation however tend to be relatively undisciplined,
 
imaginative (in both a good and bad sense) and, with a few important and
 
spectacular exceptions, relatively unrelated to serious socio-political
 
issues. We hope that this report will help to fill this.last gap,
 
particularly in relating current issues to potential NASA programs. The
 
historical record shows that carefull'y developed medium- and long-term
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images of the future have very often helped to place current priorities,
 
problems, issues, or controversies into a more realistic and clearer
 
context, and have provided useful perspectives for examining them.
 
Long-term scenarios about space development, andeven more impor­
tant, shared images of the future of space, can contribute to a sense
 
of community, of institutional meaning and purpose, ofhigh morale, and
 
even--to use somewhat extravagant terms--of manifest destiny or of
 
''religous" mission. But it is important to achieve such goals in a way
 
which is neither aggravating nor obnoxious. Appearing to be fanatical
 
or seeking "pie in the sky" outcomes 'should also be avoided. To some
 
degree such images, if expressed inappropriately or at inappropriate
 
times and occasions, could create counterproductive impressions of this
 
kind. In reality, however, such impressions are relatively rare, and,
 
if they do occur, tend to be excused or dismissed rather readily. Since
 
it is generally understood that any professional group tends to give
 
itself a higher status and a more pervasive and important role than would
 
outsiders, this tendency is considered acceptable and even respectable.
 
Indeed, it is probably more appropriate for NASA than most other groups.
 
Such images can have a great impact on political issues--both internal
 
and external. In this regard, we believe that NASA might still try to
 
exploit the legacy of the Bicentennial celebrations of 1976, which offi­
cially continue through 1989. This fact may help to provide a plausible
 
and proper pretext for 100-or 200-year projections which are not narrowly
 
focused on improving day-to-day planning or short-term programs.
 
For a detailed discussion see Herman Kahn, "On Studying the Future,"
 
in Handbook of Political Science, Volume 7: Strategies of Inquiry, eds.
 
Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-

Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 405-442.
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In this report we develop various scenarios from the vantage point
 
of a space historian in the year 2077 or so looking back over "history."
 
We do this, first, because it is a dramatic device but also because it
 
conveniently places our discussions into a fruitful perspective. Our
 
historian then attempts to project the "next 100 years in space." If
 
NASA wished to exploit scenarios of this kind and related Images of the
 
future, it could begin with a conference (described below) in 1978, or
 
later; this could be done under non-NASA auspices. To give a sense of
 
what ismeant the next page shows a format for a hypothetical two-day
 
conference of this kind. The suggested talks, titles and speakers should
 
not be taken literally; they are illustrative only, intended to provide
 
an idea of what might be planned.
 
If such a meeting were held, we would hope that as a result of the
 
activities associated with it,many medium- and long-run possibili-ties
 
for space development would be described-and elaborated upon in a dramatic
 
and informative fashion, The audience would be both those who attend
 
the meeting, and a much broader public which would be reached through
 
the news media or any subsequent publications or presentations. The
 
meeting might well result in a variety of useful materials, such as a
 
book, pamphlets, films for schools and educational TV (and perhaps for a
 
wider distribution), illustrated wall.charts, and video tapes of some of
 
the proceedings. Some of these might be made during the meeting and
 
some as a follow-up; other information programs and various independent
 
and semi-independent products might be stimulated by the conference or
 
its ancillary activities. Alternatively, an initial meeting might be
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THE "TRICENTENNIAL" CONFERENCE ON SPACE
 
Smithsonian Astrophysics Hall
 
Washington, D. C.
 
July 2080 (or so)
 
9:00 - 9:30 am 	 Welcome 
9:30 	- '10:00 Demographic/Economic Context Bell, Kahn, Rostow
 
(Past, Present, Future)
 
10:00 - 11:00 The Early Beginnings (to 1980 - or so) Krafft Ehricke or
 
Thomas 0. Paine
 
11:00 - 11:15 	 Coffee
 
11:15 - 12:30 pm Where We have Been (in retrospect, from 2080) Fletcher or Frosch
 
12:30 - 2:00 	 Lunch
 
2:00 	- 3:45 Reports from Various Activities Hearth, other NASA
 
(e.g., lunar base, Mars base, L-5 colony) speakers
 
3:45 - 4:00 	 Coffee
 
4:00 - 4:30 PANEL: Goals for the Future of Space
 
Development
 
4:30 - 6:00 PANEL DISCUSSION OF DAY'S SPEAKERS
 
9:00 - 11:00 am Alternative Social Histories (1980-2180) Bell, Ferkiss, Gordon,

Hitch, Kahn, Toffler,
 
etc.
 
11:00 - 11:15 	 Coffee
 
11:15 	- 12:30 pm Alternative Space Scenarios (1980-2180) Frosch, Fletcher, Sagan,
 
Ehricke, Taylor, Clarke,
 
Berry, Jastrow, Dyson,
 
Feinberg, Asimov, O'Neill,1
 
Brown and others
 
12:30 - 2:00 	 Lunch
 
2:00 	- 3:45 PANEL: Critique of the Two Days: Three Speakers
 
Lessons for 1980
 
3:45 - 4:00 	 Coffee
 
4:00 - 5:30 Recapitulation and Benediction 	 Fletcher or Frosch
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held exclusively for NASA's internal purposes. (The concept of holding
 
such a conference is not touched upon in the body of this report.)
 
This report includes a number of ingredients which should be of
 
special interest to anyone interested inwriting or outlining long-term
 
scenarios. We not only furnish suggestions for new scenarios,' but also
 
provide contexts, orientation and information. Four scenarios are
 
developed at some length to illustrate how such scenarios might be
 
created. We consider one of these to-be the most reasonable and per­
suasive; the others represent limiting cases of pessimism and optimism
 
(from the perspective of a space professional).
 
As part of this activity we formulate, name, and assess several
 
other projections-ofthe future of -space development from different per­
spectives--but only in a very brief preliminary way. These also use the
 
scenario technique, and are helpful in the creation of the detailed
 
scenarios. Even their descriptive titles can be helpful to clarify and
 
stimulate discussion.
 
Although we don't consider this project to be one of NASA's highest
 
priority activities, we believe that it should have a high enough priority
 
to receive some attention at almost all levels of NASA as a potential
 
producer, receiver, writer, contributor, or advisor.
 
Since many people find that writing, reading, revising, or suggest­
ing scenarios is stimulating and enjoyable, there is no need to make it
 
an onerous or required activity. If an opportunity for voluntary par­
ticipation is made available within NASA, we expect that enough people
 
would participate at almost every level to permit this activity to be
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performed adequately with a very modest amount of official support and/
 
or encouragement. Those who feel uncomfortable with such scenarios or
 
the conscious formulation and exploration of "images of the future" need
 
not participate. The number of people who find it useful, enjoyable, or
 
stimulating should be large enough to preclude the need for any special
 
effort to induce further participation, other than providing a reasonably
 
receptive atmosphere and a minimum level of organizational and logistical
 
support.
 
To summarize and extend the discussion, we list below eight motiva­
tions or reasons for generating and disseminating long-term scenarios and
 
appropriate images of the future.
 
1. 	FUN AND SCHOLARSHIP
 
2. 	SURPRISE-FREE PREDICTIONS WHICH ARE INTERESTING IN
 
THEMSELVES AND SUPPLY UNDERSTANDING AND CONTEXT FOR
 
IMMEDIATE ISSUES AND TRENDS
 
3. 	AMMUNITION FOR BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL-ACTION
 
4. 	AMMUNITION, INSPIRATION, AND ARGUMENTATION FOR A
 
"LOBBY FOR THE FUTURE"
 
5. 	EARLY WARNING AND INCREASED SENSITIVITY TO CURRENT
 
AND NEAR-TERM ISSUES AND EVENTS
 
6. 	REFLECTION AND REINFORCEMENT OF A BASIC PHILOSOPHY
 
OF SPACE AND THE FUTURE
 
7. 	A POTENTIAL BASIS FOR A GENERAL FUTUROLOGY "IDEOLOGY"
 
8. 	POTENTIAL FOR INSPIRATION OR USEFUL GUIDE FOR LONG-

RANGE PROGRAMS
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B. 	Systematic Formulation of
 
Space Scenarios
 
In a previous report Hudson considered five basic scenarios labeled
 
respectively: Conservative, Moderate, Moderate with Breakthrough, Advanced,
 
and Sober Far-Out. The titles of these scenarios more or less conform to
 
their content. Within their context all of the scenarios were meant to
 
be relatively surprise-free. Therefore, we did not include in the five
 
scenarios anything which would surprise us enormously if it "actually
 
occurred." However, we also briefly described three other scenarios which
 
appeared to us to be less plausible; we defined and mentioned them because
 
they usefully bracket the five basic ones; two of these three less plau­
sible or "surprising" scenarios are on the pessimistic side, one on the
 
optimistic.
 
First, on the pessimistic side, is a Bleak Scenario inwhich very
 
many great difficulties appear. Outer space is uncomfortable or hostile
 
to humanity, technologically it proves unexpectedly difficult, and the
 
payoffs for success are low. Unexpected difficulties occur in developing
 
specific space technologies and economic growth and technological advance-'
 
ment on earth are much slower than was generally expected. Thus, the
 
motivation for space exploration and the needed economic surplus and tech­
nological capabilities are all much less than hoped for. Furthermore,
 
either current neo-Malthusian prophecies are fulfilled or, worse still, the
 
adventurous or entrepreneurial spirit is much suppressed. As a result,
 
Herman Kahn and William M. Brown, et al., The Next 200 Years in
 
Space (NASA Bicentennial Planning), HI-2352-RR ('Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.:
 
Hudson Institute, October 23, 1975).
 
even .ifaffluence were to be high enough andtechnology competent enough
 
-
for much greater exploitation and-colonization of outer-space , peop~e
 
would avoid these options. Thus the world suppresses the opportunity to
 
find out if there were any remarkable windfals to be foundin6uiee­
space (e.g., the equivalent of finding oil in an other%;H'e unpromising
 
area, such as in Saudi Arabia). Although this is 6n overkill' scenario,
 
several like it could be written that'would make-the outiook'for spade
 
development bleak indeed, at least during the next'century.
 
The reader should be aware of'an een more aggravatifig" possibilTty
 
which we call the Tragic Scenario. This scenario turni out worsethah

scenario ot wos * h h 
the Bleak Scenario, even if the results might be 'less 'inevitable. From
 
.... .*dht' or Wars. ma-y' ocu'r; p6 r 
mistakes which are made horrendous accidents or wars may occur; icti'al/ 
ideological/religious movements may arise which turn people adaia'ntly:''
 
against space pteje'ctstr;'br-Volubl e p'rob~fehis" are leif't unsolved ahd 'internal
 
politics or bigoted attitudes lead to' exc'essiVe n'egl'ect"or' vezraid ict
 
renunciation of the space program. Alternatvela neo=tal'thusiaii pro­
phecy is fulfilled, not because it wa's' inevi'tabl-e but badsd it b'ecdmies
 
a self-fulfilling prophecy which leads to a hostile regressin'g world"
 
Eventually, of course, society is expecWted to rebouid-in such scenarl'os
 
(though this is by no means fnevtable) but not for a verylong time.
 
At the other extreme, we visualrie a Utopian Far-Out ceneario-n
 
which nearly every space project pays 'handsome div'idends, '¢¢h' r befdr$"long
 
enormous public enthusiasm arises and relatively great risks'wtWepe's
 
lives,are,acceptedto speed up space development. Earl u es&s raise
 
morale and commitment resulting in fund ]:ng well :beoqd'.t.he hopers'of
t dthe
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early enthusiasts. Many space equivalents of the Klondike or Saudi
 
Arabian oil are discovered--either as an inevitable result of the high
 
level of activity or by luck;, in any case these "unexpected" bonuses
 
provide a great spur to even more development and activity. Extraordi-.
 
narily important spinoffs of space activities and space discoveries
 
regularly occur. The hope for more such by-products is used to justify
 
even larger investments. A keen, but relatively cooperative interna­
tional rivalry arises and adds extra zest to the "race." Finally, it
 
turns out that space is an attractive place inwhich to live. Humans
 
moving to space, or born and raised there, feel relatively euphoric:
 
they are healthier, live longer, and lead more productive and pleasur­
able lives than those who remain earth-bound.
 
Between these two extremes lie our five former surprise-free sce­
narios. These scenarios furnish some of the take-off points for the ones
 
developed in later chapters of this report. Since.they also provide some
 
useful language and imagery for discussing space futures we summarize
 
them below for this purpose.
 
1. Conservative Scenario: In this scenario space activities evolve
 
in a constrained, business-as-usual fashion forseveral decades. Primary
 
interest lies in short- and medium-run results based upon hard economic
 
and technological calculations. These calculations justify only a rela­
tively low level of exploitation, except for some very specialized activi­
ties. Even the use of the Shuttle turn§ out'to be unexpectedly low by
 
both the military and civilian agencies. Worldwide economic progress and
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technological advances are disappointing, resulting in diminished techno­
logical capabilities and greater competition for governmental funds. Con­
sequently, even funded space projects are often aborted or cut back.
 
Technological progress in many areas occurs only in fits and starts be­
cause of erratic.support. As a result, even the inadequate funds supplied
 
are used inefficiently.
 
2. The Moderate Scenario also corresponds to a business-as-usual
 
orientation. Indeed, 20th century public attitudes differ little from
 
those of the Conservative Scenario. However, the Shuttle is successful,
 
public interest in space grows gradually, and greater economic and techno­
logical progress occurs on earth. Business applications of space by INTEL-

SAT, Satellite Business Systems, and others are successful. Also, many
 
of the projects discussed in NASA's Outlook for Space (OFS) study,**
 
including some space industrialization, turn out to be reasonably success­
ful. The result is a steady, sometimes rapid, increase in the use of
 
cis-lunar space after the late 1980s. The Moderate Scenario might well
 
be a second choice for the surprise-free outcome preferred by many within
 
NASA. (The modification of this scenario, described next, may be the
 
preferred relatively optimistic scenario inNASA today.)
 
3. Moderate Scenario with Breakthrough reflects expectations that
 
are quite well grounded in current technological and political realities.
 
See Bro Uttal, "I.B.M. Reaches for a Golden Future in the Heavens,"
 
Fortune, June 1977, pp. 172-184.
 
**National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Outlook for Space,
 
SP-386, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Technical Information
 
Office, January 1976).
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Although a relatively sober projection, it has a single point of relative
 
optimism: something happens in technology, space, or public opinion about
 
the year 2000 .(or earlier) which: 1) permits a rapid dramatic reduction
 
of the cost and difficulty of transporting people and equipment into earth
 
orbit; 2) greatly improves the perceived returns from space investment;
 
or 3) makes greater public funding politically available. In any case,
 
the prospects change favorably and dramatically. Much doubt and equivo­
cation about major efforts in the exploitation and exploration of outer
 
space disappears and a considerably more rapid development results.
 
4. Advanced Scenario: This is similar to the above Moderate Sce­
nario with Breakthrough, except that increased interest, increased invest­
ment, and successes in space-oriented activities occur much earlier or
 
much more intensely. Technological progress is substantially faster.
 
This earlier and more active development of space could be brought about
 
or supported by a backlash against prior anti-technology trends; it could
 
even become a self-fulfilling prophecy--a self-reinforcing trend. It
 
could also be strongly influenced by appropriate NASA and governmental
 
information programs, such as a very persuasive analysis and widespread
 
dissemination of the implication of its successes, or by some unexpectedly
 
favorable events (e.g., early dramatic results in space industries). An
 
unexpectedly successful public relations program by an expanded National
 
Space Institute or another "Sputnik" type event could also play a central
 
role.
 
5. Sober Far-Out Scenario: We assume here a wave of revived inter­
est and relatively great early success. Resources allocated to outer
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space and the return from these resources grow so rapidly that the
 
results strongly affect events on earth. Before very long gross world
 
product is favorably affected by the events in space.' The new source of
 
economic growth stops the declining growth rates experienced in-the
 
other scenarios--thereby leading to a remarkably wealthy world and a
 
very different society, beginning early in the 21st century.
 
We consider all of these scenarios to be "surprise free" in a tech­
nical sense. It simply means that some relevant group, in this case the
 
Hudson Institute, finds, that within the assumed societal context no sur­
prising events occur--althoughthe potential range of plausible events
 
can be large. Actually, it would be very surprising if-some important
 
surprises, both furthering and hindering the exploitation of space, did
 
not occur in reality. In the Conservative and Moderate scenarios unex­
pected positive developments are assumed to be roughly balanced by unex­
pected negatives. Thus, these two cases are surprise-free, on balance,
 
though both positive and negative surprises would almost certainly occur.
 
This implies that our third scenario should offer at least one important
 
surprise that, on balance, would be quite helpful.
 
Scenarios four and five would depend upon a general revival of inter­
est by the public before they could be deemed surprise-free. This inter­
est could arise accidentally, as the result of successful projects with
 
substantial visible benefits, or might follow from a deliberate program
 
by NASA-and others that could demonstrate the wisdom of making such
 
investments.
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For convenience the titles of the eight basic scenarios are listed
 
below:
 
I. Tragic 5. Moderate with Breakthrough
 
2. Bleak 6. Advanced
 
3. Conservative 7. Sober Far-Out
 
4. Moderate 8. Utopian Far-Out
 
These scenarios have been formulated in largely technological terms
 
and then ordered on the basis of technological and economic optimism.
 
Although we wish to focus strongly upon technological and economic issues
 
and possibilities, we also find it necessary, for other than the simplest
 
treatment, to establish political, cultural, and social contexts (which
 
may also have some value in images other than space futures).
 
Our eventual aim (in other projects, particularly in our Prospects
 
for Mankind studies) is to elaborate upon some relatively detailed images
 
involving political, cultural, and social issues and their interaction
 
with technological and economic ones. Some of the technological and eco­
nomic issues from the Prospects for Mankind studies are used as inputs to
 
the scenarios in this report.
 
The Hudson Institute has completed a number of "futurological" studies.
 
Some are intended to be serious predictions of the future--particularly
 
if the scenarios have less than a 15-year time span. Those dealing with
 
longer time spans are of course progressively more speculative. For basic
 
economic and technological trends, however, reasonably accurate long­
term projections appear to be possible--at least this has often been true
 
in the past century or two. Some very basic social and cultural trends
 
may also be successfully projected in a relatively routine fashion in
 
both the medium and long run (see discussion of Long-Term Multifold Trend
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in The Next 200 Years'). However, many surprises do occur and most
 
attempts to make long-run projections--and often even short-run projec­
tions--about detailed aspects of society generally lead to grave errors-­
and usually the more detailed'the projection, the graver the errors.
 
This report portrays several long-range images of the future that
 
are intended to be plausible--and acceptable as a context for our projec­
tion. Such images give perspectiveorientation, or insight into real
 
possibilities, without attempting to be a blueprint or a map to the
 
future. We hope that many who are not familiar with this kind of an
 
approach will be 'awakened" in some unanticipated ways by this effort.
 
One possibility is that the "detailed" context will play much the same
 
role as a diagram in a mathematical proof--the diagram is not essential
 
to the proof, but is very useful in giving a concrete example which both
 
stimulates the imagination and clarifies the argumentation.
 
A context for viewing both current and future space programs should
 
be useful not only to space professionals but also to others with a less
 
than professional interest in space programs. If we have done a "good
 
job," the report (unlike a diagram for a proof in mathematics) should
 
also be entertaining. One of our objectives is to be playful, but, like
 
much play, the activity has very serious goals. It should raise many
 
issues and questions for which answers are needed, and should stimulate
 
efforts towardfinding them.
 
Herman Kahn, William Brown, and Leon Martel, The Next 200 Years
 
(New York: William-Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976).
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C. 	Some Basic Political,-Cultural
 
and Social Contexts
 
We have mentioned that our basic interests are t~chnological and
 
economic. But in pursuing technological andeconomic possibilities we
 
find it essential to have a suggestive, if simplistic, concept of the
 
likely political, cultural, and social milieu. The range of such
 
milieus is so extraordinarily large that "futurologists" find it very
 
hard to get a serious handle on them--despite all that has been written
 
in this area. Our approach is first to set forth a series of very sparse
 
political, cultural, and social contexts containing various ideas for
 
scenario components. We then order these contexts in terms of decreasing
 
attention and investment in space, though this order is not necessarily
 
rigorous for the contexts as set forth--and further, over time some of
 
the contexts could change and lead to a reordering of the list. These
 
contexts are elaborated in varying amounts of detail, from a paragraph
 
to a few pages. Because of their brevity, even the lengthiest discussion
 
is necessarily without complexity or nuances. Of course no model of an
 
advanced society which is pictured as simple, homogeneous, and/or ideo­
logically unchanging over time can be very plausible--particularly if
 
dramatic changes in its technology continue to occur. However, such
 
simplicity has many advantages for our purposes. In particular, it
 
enables us to speculate about the effects of a large variety of socio­
political trends.
 
We have characterized fourteen political, cultural and social con­
texts ,as follows:
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I. 	An Extreme Efflorescent Society--Intensive Darwinian Competition.
 
2. 	A-Relatively Cooperative and Benevolent Efflorescent Society.
 
3. 	A Technological and Growth-Oriented Utopia--a Skinner-type
 
Society.
 
4. 	A Technological and Growth-Oriented World, but "Normally
 
Developing."
 
5. 	A Competitive, Nationalistic, and Somewhat Militant World.
 
6. 	A "Small is Beautiful" (when appropriate) Society.
 
7. 	Business-as-Usual Space Development Dominated by the U.S. and
 
U.S.S.R.
 
8. 	A Triumph of Garden over Machine" in OECD Countries (or perhaps
 
just a "New Class," "No Hassle" OECD).
 
9. 	A Triumph of Garden over Machine Worldwide (or a "New Class,"
 
"No Hassle," Society Worldwide).
 
10. 	 A Low Growth "Economic Malaise" World.
 
11. 	 A Rigid Emphasis on Stability, Localism, and Risk Aversion -­
in OECD Countries. 
12. 	 A Rigid Emphasis on Stability, Localism, and Risk Aversion--

Worldwide.
 
13. 	 An Anti-Technological, Anti-Growth OECD.
 
14. 	 An Anti-Technological, Anti-Growth World.
 
Some well-known American literature extols the virgin forest and
 
the rural, agrarian or wilderness areas of the U.S. that were formerly
 
untouched and then became a refuge or earthly Garden of Eden for European
 
man. However, the U.S. is now, also, the most technological nation in
 
the world. During its history a continual struggle has occurred between
 
the pastoral, rural or wilderness ideal and the rapid, almost ruthless,
 
industrialization of the continent. Sometimes the two fought, sometimes
 
they merged into a single whole, sometimes they settled for an uneasy
 
truce. We visualize the Garden Society as a modernization of the rural,
 
pastoral ideal; a possible future society whose ideology is directed
 
toward maintaining a high quality of life, but which shows little change
 
and dynamism. A good discussion of these issues can be found in Leo Marx'
 
book The Machine In the Garden.
 
See 	Appendix A for discussion of these terms.
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The 	above list contains more cases than can be addressed seriously, and
 
probably makes more distinctions than interest the average reader, but we
 
have found such a list of possible contexts useful--particularly before we
 
decide which ones to use or emphasize in the subsequent scenarios, as well
 
as to make explicit some of the possibilities which we are not using.
 
Inwriting scenarios we tend to focus much more on the short-run pro­
jections inorder to make them more realistic, and to address the political,
 
cultural and social issues in greater detail. Nevertheless, we generally
 
cannot get as good a grip as we would like on technological and economic
 
issues. Within any of the contexts set forth above, the degree to which
 
these issues can be resolved permits the development and exploitation of
 
space to occur more or less favorably. Indeed, we treat particular issues
 
with varying degrees of optimism or pessimism to better understand the
 
range of feasible outcomes and to isolate and highlight specific issues.
 
That is, within a fixed political, cultural and social context, a substan­
tial degree of technological and economic variation is possible. We use
 
the following 12-point optimism-pessimism scale for the societal inputs:
 
1. 	Total (perhaps almost religious or manic) commitment
 
2. 	Almost total enthusiasm
 
3. 	Reasonable and prudent enthusiasm
 
4. 	Normal optimism
 
5. 	Guarded or cautious optimism
 
6. 	More or less objective neutrality
 
7. 	 Guarded or cautious pessimism 
8. 	Relatively strong pessimism
 
9. 	Very negative expectations, combined with a reasonably
 
open attitude towards results
 
10. Blind, but passive, total pessimism
 
11. Active, but not very intense, hostility
 
12. Active and intense hostility
 
The upper portion of the fourteen political, cultural, social con­
texts is likely to, but need not, reflect attitudes of reasonabl& to
 
enthusiastic optimism with regard to space technology and space econom­
ics. The lower portion is likely to be associated with a reasonable-to
 
dedicated pessimism. Although very simple, this correlation fits our
 
other objectives; thus more complex ones are possible (e.g., a blind
 
dedication to research in biology, or undersea exploration--and a nega­
tive attitude to space as a diversion of interest or resources). However,
 
it is possible to combine most of the contexts with almost any societal
 
attitude on the optimism/pessimism scale. Generally, in our scenarios,
 
the higher a context is on the socio-cultural list, the more optimistic
 
are societal attitudes, and vice versa. In our-new Moderate (but generally
 
optimistic)Scenario (Chapter VI) we deliberately construct an important
 
and influential institution which is at I or 2 on the optimism scale. '(in
 
our judgment most NASA personnel range from 3 to 6, the rest of the govern­
ment generally-from 6 to 9, as does most of the educated and lay public;
 
very few groups would have a 10 to 12 rating.)
 
We now briefly discuss the 14 political, cultural, and social contexts.
 
D. The 14 Contexts
 
I. An Extreme Efflorescent Society--Intensive Darwinian Competition
 
We assume that mankind gradually comes to take seriously the biblical
 
injunction "to be fruitful and multiply" and pursues this objective with
 
an almost manic determination and, except for knowledge and wealth, with
 
an almost complete disregard for cohflicting values (safety, pleasure,
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equality, etc.). Society increasingly sponsors intensive research in
 
biology as well as in space technologies'and develops the desi-re and
 
ability to modify human beings as well as plants and animals. in order to
 
adapt them better to local conditions, both in space and on earth. It
 
even becomes relatively ruthless about getting rid of or terminating,
 
"false starts"--species which have been initially successful but were
 
then found to be less competitive or adaptable than later "designs." If
 
there should be success in creating a high level of artificial intelli­
gence, an important decision might ultimately be needed as to whether the
 
injunction "to be fruitful and multiply" includes sufficiently intelli­
gent computers and robots. Even the eventual replacement of man by machine
 
cannot be ruled out (assuming that a sufficiently creative intelligence
 
can eventually be designed into self-reproducing machines). Whether this
 
occurs or not, many kinds of cyborgs and other kinds of man-machine combi­
nations of extraordinary intimacy and competence are likely to arise.
 
In addition to research in biology, cybernetics, and automation
 
this context assumes huge investments in space development and an extra­
ordinary amount of activity as long as the drive "to be fruitful and
 
multiply" continues.
 
2. A Relatively Cooperative and Benevolent Efflorescent Society
 
Once again mankind decides to be fruitful and multiply--to fill
 
every acceptable niche and corner of the universe with life of one sort
 
or another and particularly with preferred forms of human life. But the
 
culture avoids ruthlessness and maintains great concern for other values
 
(safety, art, happiness, etc.). The people are less willing to take big
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risks, pay exorbitant prices, "discard" as many experiments, or to be
 
callous with somewhat less competitive variants. Nor are they as willing
 
to pursue ge6etic adaption as intensively as in the first context.
 
Some Darwinian selection and competition occurs but with much alle­
viation of this process and a strong emphasis on a cooperative and bene­
volent society which cares for and protects its progeny. However, there
 
is still great emphasis on biological adaptation and on genetic design
 
to facilitate such adaptation.
 
3. 	A Technological and Growth-Oriented Utopia--A Skinner-type
 
Society
 
For 	simplicity it is assumed that basic behavioral science theories
 
similar to those addressed by B.F. Skinner in such works as. Walden Two
 
and Beyond Freedom and Di'gnity are found to be feasible; in principle,
 
can be applied worldwide; and are especially useful for societies living
 
in outer space. Therefore, on earth and in space, societies soon develop
 
inwhich almost all individuals are relatively well balanced, highly
 
motivated, basically cooperative and "law abiding." At the same time
 
high levels of initiative, courage, daring, and dynamism are maintained
 
and even, but only where needed, a useful level of aggression and compet­
itiveness. Many technological growth enthusiasts would opt for this
 
society--at least as we describe it here. Of course, whether it could
 
really work out in an attractive form is at best an open issue. That is,
 
it may be completely impractical; or it may only be practical in a society
 
like "1984" or "Brave New World," rather than in the kind of democratic,
 
individualistic, pluralistic society which most people would prefer.
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Our version of Skinner's Utopia not only accepts controlled ways of
 
raising people, but assumes great advantages are inherent in genetic manip­
ulation, chemistry, surgery, behavioral modification and so on. Also,
 
an intense process for monitoring immigrants into the society would exist
 
(but presumably for positive reasons unconnected with the concept of "big
 
brother watching you"). Thus, in this scenario the kinds of people that
 
are desired for various places and roles in space--and to a great extent
 
on earth--are "created," but in a positive sense.
 
We add that the above society has more than a touch of the efflores­
cent world views, but does not take them as intensely or seriously as in
 
contexts I and 2. In fact this context includes many of the attitudes of
 
the "more humanistic societies" described below. In this context society
 
does not seek population growth as an end in itself. It does seek rapid
 
economic growth, but also a high standard of living and a high quality of
 
life as it defines these. It also sets exceedingly great value on knowl­
edge--especially science and technology. But growth of population is
 
desirable only as necessary to fulfill these values rather than as an
 
end in itself.
 
While this culture is not hostile to population growth it has great
 
confidence and dynamism and a very reasonable faith that it can deal with
 
any likely increase in population, certainly from the viewpoint of eco­
nomics and technology, and also from many other points of view. They
 
would consider somewhat foolish the "threat" that the world could be
 
overwhelmed by excessive population growth.
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4. A Technological and Growth-Oriented World, but "Normally
 
Developing"
 
In this society we assume that the kind of intense domestic and
 
foreign problems associated with nation states in the 18th, 19th and
 
20th centuries become solved, particularly the problem of wars and other
 
destructive competition between large nation states. The nation-state
 
retains a dominant role, but mainly because there is no obvious replace­
ment and not because it retains a high level of loyalty and dynamism.
 
There still exists some destructive competition, some destructive con­
flict, much neuroticism, some problems with crime, terrorism and outlawed
 
behavior--as well as all the usual kinds of deviates--but all on rela­
tively low and diminishing levels. Space development somewhat parallels
 
the turbulent early growth of the United States (but without the Civil
 
War) rather than within the kind of utopia described in Context 3. But
 
it is more like the growth of the United States than the violent events
 
which occurred during the rise and fall of the Spanish and Portuguese
 
empires.
 
5. A Competitive, Nationalistic, and Somewhat Militant World
 
This context assumes that, politically, the world doesn't improve
 
much over its current state; in fact, it deteriorates somewhat. This
 
occurs in part because some new nations (e.g., China and Brazil) as well
 
as several European nations become very powerful and enter the "space
 
race"--that is, there is very little coordination between these various
 
competitive national efforts. Rather there is a serious attempt by some
 
nations--or groups of nations--to seize certain preferred regions of space
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and exploit them for benefit of the homeland on earth. As a result prob­
lems arise among the various competing countries and groups and between
 
colonizers and colonized--and also eventually between those "colonies" or
 
populated regions of space that manage-to throw off the "yoke" of the home
 
country and the other actors in the system. It can be considered somewhat
 
as a "replay" of the developments in the 16th through 20th centuries when
 
the West expanded in an extraordinary fashion and colonized almost every
 
other country in the world (except for Ethiopia, Iran, Thailand and per­
haps China). There are, of course, huge differences since there are no
 
native or indigenous peoples involved. Further, even the initial space
 
colonies would have a high standard of living and certainly be much more
 
technologically oriented than the homelands. Therefore, a better parallel
 
might be that of the early Mediterranean world inwhich the Persians,
 
Egyptians, Greeks, Phoenicians, Romans (and later Carthaginians) fought
 
among themselves while colonizing the entire Mediterranean world (a large
 
part of which is now the Middle East and'Southeast Europe). In this par­
allel there were many cases inwhich the colonies became independent and
 
powerful very early, as well as those inwhich the problems of an indige­
nous populati.on were on the whole relatively easy to deal with.
 
6. A "Small is Beautiful" (when appropriate) Society
 
This is the first context in which we don't have aggressive attempts
 
to exploit outer space--rather it is only promoted by those who are pro­
fessionally interested and by adventurers tempted by the fact that "space
 
is there." A negative attitude is usually displayed towards aggressive
 
promotional attempts, but not a hostile one. Therefore, when obviously
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good ideas arise or if an extremely persuasive case is made, space projects
 
are pursued, but the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt is on the
 
advocates who are a small minority. The underlying concept of this con­
text is that more often than not "less is more," at least until a satis­
factory case can be made to the contrary. However, another version of this
 
context could attain a high level of activity in space--for example, in
 
order to remove many "polluting" activities from earth (e.g., nuclear
 
power). It is conceivable that satellite solar power stations might soon
 
become desirable in order to reduce environmental problems on earth. We
 
believe this is unlikely to occur, primarily because terrestrial energy
 
problems are unlikely to be sufficiently severe--but it is possible that
 
they may be judged to be sufficiently severe by the people concerned.
 
Because space could become a relatively open frontier with a high level
 
of industrial activity, this context is placed above Context 7.
 
7. Business-as-Usual Space Development Dominated by-the U.S. and
 
U.S.S.R.
 
it is assumed in this context that within the next 30-40 years these
 
two countries obtain a lead on the rest of the world that is so large and
 
successful that itaccelerates their economic and technological growth on
 
earth. In addition, their early advantages in space tend to expand almost
 
without a visible limit. This situation creates a problem of "the haves"
 
and "the have nots" similar to that which dominated international politics
 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One could also imagine some
 
political friction between the "blig two" and the latecomers. To continue
 
the historical parallel there could be some groups like the French who
 
were a little late but still did moderately to reasonably well in the
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competition for colonies; and then groups like the Germans and the Italians,
 
and for a while the Japanese, who were too late to acquire many colonies,
 
since almost all of the good ones had been preempted by others--and they
 
resented it greatly.
 
Despite the competition among various powers the Americans and the
 
Soviets tend to stake out, where possible, huge preferred regions in space
 
for their own use. They do not use them very intensely initially, but
 
enough to maintain their claims. Compared with Context 6 above, this
 
could result in a less rapid development of outer space, but still not
 
slow,'as the competition between the great powers spurs on their desire
 
to take over valuable "space property." One result is that exploratory
 
activities in space tend to maintain a relatively high level.
 
8. 	A Triumph of Garden over Machine in OECD Countries (or perhaps
 
just a "New Class," "No Hassle" OECD)
 
This context assumes that almost all the OECD countries (but none of
 
the others) soon adopt an ideology which has been espoused by the New
 
Class, in particular, and a relatively high percentage of the upper­
middle class in general. The thrust of this ideologywhile not always
 
anti-technology ahd anti-growth, includes the New Emphases (listed below).
 
These are pursued with such intensity that it almost amounts to a "no
 
growth" society. -It contains many nuances which encourage groups who are
 
anti-technology and anti-growth oriented. The ideology itself is not
 
committed to the "no growth" concept and does not completely prevent
 
* See 	Appendix A for a description of the New Class. 
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space projects. Indeed space development could still proceed with reagon­
able intensity in an optimistic version of this context, but its growth
 
rate 	is at least a factor of two slower than that in any of the above
 
contexts. The New Emphases mentioned .above for this society are:
 
1. 	RISK AVERSION
 
2. 	LOCALISM
 
3. 	COMFORT, SAFETY, LEISURE AND HEALTH
 
4. 	PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY
 
5. 	LOSS OF NERVE, WILL, OPTIMISM, CONFIDENCE, AND MORALE
 
6. 	PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (INCLUDING EQUALITY
 
OF RESULT)
 
7. 	HAPPINESS AND HEDONISM
 
8. 	GENERAL ANTI-TECHNOLOGY, ANTI-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
 
ANTI-MIDDLE-CLASS ATTITUDES (E.G., "SMALL iS BETTER"
 
AND "LIMITS-TO-GROWTH" MOVEMENTS)
 
9. 	MANY MODERN FAMILY VALUES
 
10. 	 GENERAL DE-EMPHASIS OF (OR EVEN HOSTILITY TO) THE
 
THIRTEEN TRADITIONAL LEVERS
 
II. 	INCREASING SOCIAL CONTROL AND "OVERALL PLANNING" OF
 
THE ECONOMY OF THE "WRONG" SORT
 
12. 	 ADVERSARY REGULATORY ATTITUDES
 
13. 	 INNER SPACE (OMPHALOSKEPSIS) AND/OR CONCERN WITH SELF
 
GENERALLY, PERHAPS EVEN AN EMPHASIS ON MYSTIC OR
 
TRANSCENDENTAL VALUES
 
9. 	A Triumph of Garden over Machine Worldwide-(or a "New Class,"
 
"No 	Hassle," Society Worldwide)
 
This 	context is similar to the one above but instead of growing com­
petition from the Soviets, from an emerging Brazilian giant, and others,
 
the 	non-OECD world quickly adopts much the same ideology as the OECD
 
nations. Thus a malaise in space development, or at least a lack of
 
dynamism, continues for much longer. However, a competitive spirit
 
eventually reappears and creates an increasingly dynamic attitude toward
 
space development. The timing of this change to an eventual great com­
petition--especially from the non-OECD world--would determine the nature
 
of the optimistic or pessimistic variations.
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10. 	 A Low Growth "Economic Malaise" World
 
In the industrialized countries recently emerged upper-middle-class
 
elites often feel that further economic growth increasingly interferes
 
with their standard of living and their quality of life. Furthermore,
 
a sub-group, which we have called the New Class, not only feels this with
 
great intensity but has disproportionate influence because they tend to
 
control both the popular and prestigious media, in addition to great
 
influence in education, government and several religious groups.
 
The basic historical analogy to this context iswith the Portuguese
 
and Spanish empires which initially expanded with great speed and success
 
but tapered off relatively soon and more or less stagnated from that
 
point on. 'Our future version of that world would depict the current world­
wide economic malaise continuing for some decades. This greatly depletes
 
the resources that would otherwise be available in the early 21st century
 
for space development. However, in an optimistic outcome of this case,
 
the development of space itself, after 50 to 100 years, would help to pull
 
the world out of its malaise.
 
I. 	A Rigid Emphasis on Stability, Localism, and Risk Aversion-­
in OECD Countries
 
The press and popular magazines tend to suggest that the New Class
 
will "triumph" soon. -We believe that this is very unlikely within ten
 
years, but could happen before the end of the century. If they do prevail,
 
a modern version of past societies run by aristocratic, educated elites
 
could occur--such as the Confucian era in China. An'extreme rigid objec­
tion to change has characterized such societies, especially changes which
 
interfere with established institutions or customs. For example, prior to
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the 20th century in China, a country which had a thousand-year-old tradi­
tion of ancestor worship, it was very difficult to build a railroad or a
 
highway without disturbing or destroying cemeteries. To do so it became
 
necessary, literally, to call out the troops. In this context we imagine
 
that the OECD countries have many figurative "cemeteries" which are not
 
to be disturbed. We emphasize, however, that we are visualizing a general
 
attitude that is basically hostile to innovation and implies an enormous
 
reduction in technology applied to large new projects including, almost
 
inevitably, most proposed new space developments.
 
12. 	 A Rigid Emphasis on Stability, Localism, and Risk Aversion--

Worldwide
 
We assume that the rest of the world follows the OECD countries and
 
visualize the social context in the above scenario becoming pervasive,
 
worldwide. This is not plausible today, because of the "revolution of
 
rising expectations" in the Third World countries. While many Third
 
World intellectuals pay lip service to the New Class ideology, they are
 
most unlikely to follow it in practice. In a mild version of this con­
text an extreme amount of lip service is given which does affect Third
 
World growth rates and technological advancement. In a stronger version
 
much more than lip service is given--but this would be very unlikely to
 
occur much before the turn of the century.
 
13. 	 An Anti-Technological, Anti-Growth OECD
 
In this context the slowdown in anticipated space activities is­
quite dramatic. -People no longer acquiesce passively when other groups
 
push space efforts; rather they take a relatively active opposing role.
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Some of the more extreme attitudes are applied to proposed space projects.
 
People object to the potential destruction of lunar "landscape," the pos­
sible loss of lives and treasure in outer space, and potential effects on
 
the upper atmosphere. They are especially hostile to new problems that
 
might be created and the unknown risks that inevitably accompany any
 
major innovations and therefore new activities in outer space,
 
The slowdown cannot be permanent since the Soviet Union or the newly
 
emerging economic powers, such as Brazil, eventually take an active
 
interest in space and their activities begin to swamp the efforts of the
 
OECD world. This may in turn arouse counter-efforts or it may not, but
 
in neither case does it lead to a long-term neglect of space development.
 
However, activities in space supported mainly by the Soviets and by the
 
new emerging powers would be substantially below that which would occur
 
if the OECD world chooses to pursue these objectives.
 
Here again competition from the rest of the world eventually would
 
make the basic OECD posture intolerable--but this change may come very
 
late.
 
14. An Anti-Technological, Anti-Growth World
 
In this context it is not just the OECD countries which become
 
enamored with the new attitudes, but the world as a whole. As the poorer
 
countries become more wealthy they gravitate toward the culture models
 
of the OECD world and settle for the new "traditional" lifestyle of these
 
countries. The low economic growth of this "stagnant" world is a matter
 
of apprehension only among a dwindling number of people with "reactionary"
 
laissez-faire attitudes that are anathema to the dominant culture.
 
Chapter II
 
THE BASICJNTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
 
'A. Watersheds of History
 
Except possibly for some religious events, the two great watersheds
 
of human history have been the agricultural revolution, which started in
 
the Middle East's Fertile Crescent some 10,000 years ago, and the indus­
trial revolution, which began in Holland and England about 200 years ago.
 
Of course, many are now arguing that the second half of the twentieth
 
century has seen or is seeing another watershed. Some would emphasize
 
the introduction of nuclear energy and explosives; some would emphasize
 
the ability of man to leave the earth; some would emphasize the peaking
 
of growth rates in world population and gross world product; some would
 
emphasize the universalization of the industrial revolution; while finally
 
some would emphasize almost the opposite--the emergence of physical or
 
social "limits to growth."
 
In any case, in much the same way that the agricultural revolution
 
earlier spread around the world, the industrial revolution is now also
 
spreading and causing a permanent change in the quality of human life.
 
However, instead of taking 10,000 years, this second diffusion process
 
is likely to be largely completed within a total span of about 400 years,
 
or roughly by the mid or late 22nd century. What we call the super­
industrial and post-industrial economies are now emerging, to be followed
 
eventually by corresponding changes in society and culture as a whole.
 
Various authors have developed and expanded notions of "post-indus­
trial" economy, society, and culture. Preeminent among these in the depth
 
and sophistication of their analysis are Daniel Bell, The Coming of
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This last may be accompanied and followed by an era of space exploration
 
and space exploitation which may introduce an equally startling change
 
in human history. In fact, it is one of the purposes of this report to
 
use the scenario technique to explore, dramatize, and illustrate some of
 
the possible interactions of the development of a solar economy, society
 
and-culture together with likely events on earth--in particular how such
 
developments in outer space might affect the "post-industrial culture"
 
on earth and be affected by it.
 
In order to characterize the nature of some changes that will occur,
 
it is useful to distinguish four kinds of activities: primary, secondary,
 
tertiary, and quaternary.
 
Post-industrial Society; A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic
 
Books, 1973), and, with a very different manner and emphasis, Peter Drucker,
 
The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
 
We distinguish here among:
 
Economy: economic and technological activity 
Institutions: laws and organizations 
Culture: style, values, national character and attitudes 
Society: the whole 
Super-industrial Economy refers to large size and scale of modern
 
enterprise and the importance of its impact on the external social and
 
physical environment.
 
Post-industrial Economy refers to a future very affluent economy
 
which meets its industrial and material needs with a small percent of
 
its work force and economic effort. The term is deliberately chosen to
 
be neutral; it does not describe the corresponding society.
 
Presumably the economy emerges first; then the institutions and
 
the culture change; finally (hopefully), a harmonious society evolves.
 
Post-industrial is often at the same time Super-industrial. Thus,
 
the United States is a post-agricultural society (since less than five
 
percent of its inhabitants are engaged seriously in agriculture) but it
 
is also a super-agricultural society in terms of the variety of its
 
products and the scale of its activities.
 
-33-

Primary activities are extractive, principally agriculture, mining,
 
forestry, and fishing. One can think of'a corresponding pre-industrial
 
society and its culture as one mostly organized to "play games with and
 
against nature." In earlier days for everyone ip the city there were
 
generally twenty in rural areas who supported the city dwellers by follow­
ing some primary activity.
 
Secondary activities have mainly to do with construction and manu­
facturing. The corresponding society and its culture is mostly organized
 
to "play games with and against materials." It is primarily an urban cul­
ture and has been characterized in our time by a nation-state political
 
system with all of its well-known characteristics.
 
Initially the emerging post-industrial economy will be characterized
 
by a service economy, emphasizing what we call tertiary activities. These
 
are services which help primary and secondary activities. Conventionally
 
they include transportation, insurance, finance, management,-many govern­
mental activities, much education and training. This results in a society
 
and culture whose major activity is "games with and against organizations."
 
Such a society is characterized by organizational and professional plural­
ism in the distribution of power and prestige. It is probably more sub­
urban than urban, and may have more transnational than national corporate
 
activities.
 
The term "playing games with or against nature" and other uses of
 
game metaphors refer to the extensive literature of gaming, simulation
 
and role playing and should be thought of partly in a literal sense and
 
partly metaphorically. The idea simply is that the major roles and
 
activities of the individual in a primary society are preoccupied with
 
activities which can be characterized as "playing games with and against
 
nature" rather than as in the other cases "with and against materials,"
 
"with and against organizations" or "with and against communities." The
 
basic inspiration for this terminology comes from Daniel Bell.
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Early in the 21st century, we should expect a partial transition
 
(i.e., in the rich OECD countries at least) to a different kind of service
 
economy that can be called a "quaternary" or truly post-industrial economy,
 
Here the primary, secondary, and tertiary activities will constitute only
 
a small part of human endeavors; more and more people will do things for
 
their own sake, and ends will become more important than means. Such a
 
society can be characterized as playing games with and against people,
 
with and against communities; and perhaps-with and against oneself. It
 
is in many ways reminiscent of pre-industrial culture. These quaternary
 
activities could include many "mundane" activities such as:
 
Reading, writing, painting, acting, composing, musicianship,
 
arts and crafts--particularly if done for their own sake.
 
Tourism, games, contests, rituals, exhibitions, and performances.
 
Gourmet cooking and eating, an aristocratic and formal style of
 
life, epicurean and family values (including visiting, enter­
taining and "togetherness").
 
Hunting, fishing, hiking, camping, boating.
 
Acquisition of non-vocational skills.
 
Improving property (If caused by some non-economic motives),
 
such as by gardening, upkeep, interior decorating, and the use
 
of home-made artifacts.
 
Conversation, discussion, debating, and politicking.
 
Many other cultural and social activities.
 
Most welfare and social security.
 
Other "recreation," including the search for change, broadening
 
experiences, adventure, excitement, and amusement.
 
But also such significant activities as:
 
Many publicworks and public projects done more for interest
 
than for economic or research reasons (e.g., some space activi­
ties, some underseas exploration, much protection of the environ­
ment, monumental architecture).
 
-35-

Ritualistic and aesthetic activities (perhaps creating special
 
structures and environments) including the evoking of images
 
or feelings of splendor, pride, pomp, awe, and communal, ethnic,
 
religious, or national unity or identity; oneness with nature
 
and the universe, and various "explorations in inner space."
 
The creation of taboos, totems, demanding religions, traditions,
 
and customs; arbitrary pressures, constraints and demands;
 
moral and social equivalents of war; some other pressures and
 
risks, including those involved with some of the more bizarre
 
forms .of "discretionary behavior."
 
Finally, the concept includes non-tertiary services to these
 
and other quaternary activities.
 
If a transition occurs to a society principally engaged in these
 
activities--a transition which could largely be completed some two hundred
 
years hence--it would probably mark the third great watershed of human
 
history. Future society would look back at what happened in these cen­
turies of industrialization as mankind's most effective and pervasive
 
transformation--a journey from a world basically inhospitable to its few
 
dwellers to one fully commanded and enjoyed by its expanded multitudes.
 
B. The Difference Space May Make
 
Nevertheless, we suspect that many of our readers will be a little
 
unhappy with the above story. It ends too soon. Does mankind really wish
 
to "stagnate" in a kind of total quaternary society? Does it really wish
 
to give up permanently its games with and against nature, games with and
 
against materials, games with and against organizations? Our guess is
 
that future man will reply, "not completely," though very likely, at least
 
for a time, many will largely enjoy this post-industrial culture. Inother
 
words, we expect that most people will be quite happy living in and sup­
porting this quaternary culture, but there will be many who will not enjoy
 
it and others who cannot afford it--or at least want more economic progress
 
or technological advancement than is implied in an early transformation
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to a quaternary culture. These people will find that this kind of cul­
ture is lacking in excitement, challenges; and opportunities. Indeed
 
life will be, to many, a bit boring. Many ambitious people will undoubt­
edly want to contribute to larger goals than establishing and reinforcing
 
the even tenor of even a rich, comfortable and, in its own terms, inter­
esting life. We suspect that space will become a major focus for many
 
of these people. The existence of such a-frontier, of such an area of
 
activity, of such a locus of dynamism, initiative, and entrepreneurship
 
should be very healthy for both the quaternary society that is developing
 
on earth and for those who may wish to "progress" faster--either as a
 
society, a family, an individual or as an industry or professional group.
 
We expect that space activities will, first psychologically and cultur­
ally, and then materially, play a central role in making earth a better,
 
more interesting place in which to live.
 
At least three possible space perspectives seem important to us:
 
(1) Space doesn't make crucial or dramatic differences within the next
 
100 years; (2) it has an essential role in changing the world from a
 
neo-Malthusian to a hopeful--perhaps even post-industrial--orientation;
 
(3) it complements and enlarges post-industrial development but is not
 
essential to it. However, it does improve the context for the develop­
ment of a superior post-industrial society on earth and may create quite
 
a different society in space. Thus, post-industrial society does not end
 
man's future but begins a base from which to move into the solar system
 
and then, possibly, into interstellar space. Whether or not the latter
 
occurs, the openness, the opportunities, and the challenge of outer space
 
can be a sustained profound influence on an otherwise excessively static
 
or introspective earth society.
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Although this study will emphasize the possibility that actual
 
income and resources from space will be important to the earth, that
 
space will generate many economically and technologically profitable
 
activities, and that exploitation of space can have a major positive
 
influence on the world's economic and technological future, we do not
 
find such outcomes inconsistent with the view that the third perspective
 
is appropriate and useful. Furthermore, the first two perspectives may
 
have basic flaws.
 
We believe that NASA should tie its "official" central image of the
 
future of space to the third perspective. Of course, the current neo-

Malthusian popularity is so strong that a claim by NASA that space devel­
opment could make the kind of difference suggested in the second perspec­
tive could be politically helpful to those who oppose a limits-to-growth
 
image. Also, if the nec-Malthusian position was otherwise correct, and
 
space could make the crucial difference suggested tn the second perspec­
tive,a powerful argument would exist for supporting rapid, intensive
 
space development0 In any event it appears to us to be both morally and
 
scientifically wrong, and also counterproductive, for NASA to support the
 
neo-Malthusian perspective, even indirectly. For encouraging widespread
 
support of space activities and for developing a solid commitment and high
 
morale among those engaged in NASA activities, we would assert that the
 
third perspective is quite sufficient. Perhaps paradoxically, itmay also
 
help to exploit the first two perspectives, neither of which is incompat­
ible with the third. Moreover, NASA would not be advancing an argument
 
which may be easily countered or weakened.- In order to clarify this last
 
point, we now sketch out some of the important elements of what we call our
 
surprise-free Moderate Scenario that are not dependent upon space developments.
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C. The Basic Sutprrse Free Earth-Centered Scenario
 
We believe that any projection of the future should begin with a
 
reasonable--or not unreasonable--surprise-free scenario which unfolds
 
over time at least some of the simplest "data" that can measure or set
 
limits to economic, demographic, and technological trends. It is impos­
sible, of course, to get much agreement among futurologists that any par­
ticular set of data is preferred, because such a strong divergence of
 
views exists--a divergence which, in part, reflects a genuine uncertainty.
 
But it is usually possible to get a fair amount of agreement that one's
 
choice is'not stupid, ridiculous, wildly optimistic or pessimistic, etc.
 
However, even such agreement might be irrelevant. For example, the
 
average economic growth rate per capita for today's most developed coun­
tries has, over the last 200 years, been roughly 2.0 percent. Overall
 
this increase is about a factor of 50, from about $150 per capita to about
 
$7,500 per capita. Yet if, in 1776, a serious 200-year projection had been
 
made using the 2 percent figure almost all intelligent and knowledgeable
 
people probably would have laughed. After all, the world had scarcely
 
changed at all in average income since the beginning of recorded history.
 
If such projections were based upon a I percent or a 3 percent growth
 
rate (neither of which now, in retrospect, appears any less plausible
 
than 2 percent) the outcome over the two centuries changes radically--by
 
about a factor of 7--that is, to $1,000 per capita or $50,000 per capita,
 
respectively.
 
With a proper recognition of the astonishing effect of small changes
 
in average growth rates upon the long-term outcome, and therefore of the
 
low probability of making good estimates over extended periods, we must
 
still begin somewhere. We choose what we consider to be a surprise-free
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projection adapted (and slightly modified) from our book, The Next 200
 
Years. The population and economic projections are shown below in
 
Table 1. They were arrived at after as much deliberation as can reason­
ably be given to such considerations and are, of course, arbitrary to
 
some degree. They were chosen as much for convenience and general accept­
ability as for a serious prediction and estimated in terms of a smooth
 
curve (i.e., no attempt to include the effect of business cycles). Thus,
 
the actual GWP in 1975 was probably about $6.3 trillion. We call this a
 
10/20/200 world because it asymptotically approaches the values: 10 bil­
lion population, $20,000 GWP per capita and $200 trillion GWP.
 
The population projections will be found reasonably consistent with
 
those made by the United Nations. They assume that the world population
 
stabilizes after about a century. (If it doesn't, some serious problems
 
may arise; but the most recent trends clearly suggest that it will.)
 
More controversial, however, is the assumed growth in GWP which increases
 
the average per capita income about a factor of 10. That is, our surprise­
free world.becomes rich, even by today's U.S. standards. The factor of
 
10 represents an average growth rate over 200 years of only 1.5 percent
 
in per capita income--a rate which would be a disappointment currently
 
for any growth-oriented nation. Indeed, our estimates use an average per
 
The modifications are partly due to recent data and events which
 
have altered our views a little and partly to make the projections more
 
acceptable. The principal change is the projection of a 10-billion world
 
population, rather than 15-billion. The GNP/capita over time is roughly
 
the same.
 
Although few people are'likely to object to a population limi~t
 
many (including the authors) would think that a limit to GWP is not rea­
sonable even in an earth-centered context. Our assumption of a GWP limit
 
mostly reflects a mathematical convenience; at the end of the 200-year
 
period the world economies are still growing, but slowly, at about .25
 
percent annually.
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Table I 
SURPRISE-FREE PROJECTION OF WORLD POPULATION AND GWP 
FOR-THE BASIC 10/20/200 SCENARIO 
POPULATION GWP (AVERAGE) GWP/CAPITA (AVERAGE) 
YEAR (BILLIONS) ($ TRILLION) ($ THOUSANDS) 
1975 4.0 (2.0) 6.6 ( .1) 1.75 (2.8) 
2000 6.0 *(1.3) 20 (3.6) 3.3 (2.3) 
2025 7.7 (.7) 43 (2.6) 5.6 (1.9) 
2050 8.8 (.4) 74 (1.8) 8.5 (1.4) 
2075 9.4 (.2) 106 (1.2) 11.0 (.97) 
2100 9.7 .) 135 (.75) 14.0 (.66) 
2125 9.9 (.04) 156 (.47) 16.0 (.43) 
2150 9.9 (.02) 172 (.29) 17.0 (.27) 
2175 10.0 (.01) 182 (.18) 18.0 (.17) 
GROSS WORLD PRODUCT AND GWP/CAPITA IN 1975 DOLLARS. THE
 
FIGURES IN PARENTHESES GIVE PERCENT CHANGE PER ANNUM.
 
THE 1975 GWP IS USUALLY ESTIMATED AT $6.3 BILLION AND THE
 
GROWTH RATE WAS MUCH SMALLER THAN 5.1 FOR THAT YEAR. WHAT
 
APPEARS ABOVE IS THE CALCULATED RESULT OF A SMOOTHED OUT
 
PROJECTION WHICH CORRECTS FOR THE RECENT RECESSION.
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capita growth rate of more than 2 percent (and less than 3 percent) for
 
less than the next 50 years. For the second 100 years it is substantially
 
less than 1 percent. In this light the end result can hardly be termed
 
optimistic--yet it has often been so labeled.
 
Probably the principal reason for the "optimistic" label is a wide­
spread belief that came into vogue in the late sixties and was greatly
 
intensified after the appearance in 1972 of the book The Limits to Growth"
 
which coincidentally was followed by a food shortage (1972), the energy
 
and raw materials crises (1974), and worldwide two-digit inflation. All
 
this supported the belief that the world was simply too small to sustain
 
nations with growing populations and growing economies much beyond their
 
present size. It is not surprising that adherents of that view would be
 
taken aback by a claim that the population could more than double while
 
the per capita income increases 10-fold without unduly straining the
 
capacity of this "small" world. Yet this is a very moderate projection.
 
Inorder to make our surprise-free, moderate-growth projections
 
palatable itwas necessary to attempt to demonstrate that the principal
 
prevailing concerns could indeed be resolved. This was done by spelling
 
out plausible solutions to each of the major physical problems related
 
to this burgeoning world, those concerned with population stability,
 
energy, minerals, food, and environmental purity. The essence of our
 
arguments are presented below to help convince the readers of this report
 
that the position is at least plausible. Those who already accept this
 
position may wish to skip the rest of this chapter.
 
Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Uni­
verse Books, 1972).
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1. Population
 
Our view of the approaching stability of the world's population is
 
based, first, upon data showing that in recent years the birth rates for
 
most nations for whichwehave statistics have showna substantial decline.
 
Indeed, such data, among other considerations, has led most demographers
 
including those of the U.N. to project continually declining future birth
 
rates for the world. Secondly, there is the widespread and growing formal
 
interest of citizens, institutions, and governments in the control of
 
population growth. This kind of interest leads t6 many kinds of actions
 
that tend to reduce population (some of which might even be considered
 
outrageous--the recent reports of the forced sterilization program in
 
India, for example). Third, are the rapidly developing technologies for
 
aiding in birth control. These technologies have been more effective in
 
the more developed nations but over time undoubtedly will diffuse more
 
deeply into the others. Finally, and possibly most important is the
 
historical trend which is generally termed the "Demographic Transition."
 
This trend which is unrelated to any of the other factors mentioned above
 
has been observed for many decades in the industrialized countries.
 
Although there may be occasional exceptions or shortrterm anomalous
 
fluctuations in the predicted trend, the Demographic Transition is a
 
general theory of population growth which is based upon the data available
 
for societies which evolved from a pre-industrial to a fully industrialized
 
or post-industrial status. The generalized result is presented in a sche­
matic form in Figure 1. It indicates how such societies tended to move
 
from a slowly growing population, in which both birth rates and death rates
 
are high; through a rapidly growing phase as death rates dropped relatively
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Figure 1 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
High­
'.:.... ........ 
F' Med Ium--
~D 
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SOURCE: 
Pre Onset mature Super, Post 
STAGES OF INDUSTRIALIrZATION 
Adapted from Michael Drake, Historical Demography: 
Problems and Projects (Milton 'Keynes, Great Britain: 
Open University Press, 1974); and Ansi'ey J. Coale, 
"The History of the Human Population," Scientific 
American, September 1974, pp. 40-51. 
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sharply over time after the modern society began to develop, with an in­
creasing capacity to sustain the health and safety of its population;
 
finally, reaching once more a slowly growing, or perhaps stable, state in
 
which the birth and death rates are both low and may be approximately equal.
 
This experience has been common to the U.S., U.S.S.R., Germany, and Japan
 
to name but a few examples. Many demographers believe it to represent the
 
general pattern for the future. Although this result cannot be known to
 
be true for the future it certainly should be plausible to use it as a
 
basis for projecting future population.
 
2. Energy
 
To justify a surprise-free projection in which the Gross World
 
Product increases almost 30-fold it is clear that much more energy will
 
be needed than is consumed currently. How much more? To answer this ques­
tion our first assumption is that the conventional wisdom is partly correct,
 
the world has moved into a new era in which energy no longer will be cheap.
 
This assumption might be wrong; if so, it implies that the solution will
 
be less difficult than-is expected. But if energy prices stay as high or
 
perhaps become somewhat higher than current ones, in real terms, then we
 
need to know where the energy will come from in such large amounts and
 
whether we could afford it at the higher prices.
 
In response to these concerns we first examine the expected future
 
demand for energy. With the assumption of continued high prices it is
 
natural to ask what effect conservation practices and engineering redesign
 
might have upon demand. Enough information is already available to
 
suggest that with sufficient incentive and enough time rather astonishing
 
changes can be anticipated which will utilize energy much more efficiently
 
than currently. Most energy consumed today is utilized at less than 1/10
 
of its physical potential. Therefore, given the incentives for efficiency,
 
our growing technological capability, and up to 200 years to solve the
 
efficiency problems, we assume that we would eventually utilize energy
 
at least four times more efficiently than we do today. More particularly
 
we assume twice today's efficiency in 50 years, three times as much in
 
100 years (see Table 2). With these efficiency parameters a calculation
 
of future demand can be projected. In Table 2 this demand- is taken to be
 
in proportion to GWP/EFF.
 
We then need to look at the potential future sources of energy: the
 
principal hydrocarbons (oil, gas, coal, oil shale, tar sands), the nuclear
 
sources (fission--with and without breeders--and fusion), the geothermal
 
alternatives (steam and hydrothermal reservoirs, hot dry rock, geopres-"
 
sured aquifers, magma outcrops, etc.) and the many forms of solar energy
 
(collectors for buildings, solar thermal electric, photovoltaic, ocean
 
thermal systems, wind energy, and the use of plants and organic wastes).
 
Other sources of energy exist (tides, ocean currents, waves, etc.) which
 
we ignore because they are quite limited and we find that we have a super­
fluity. The potential of the above principal energy sources is found to
 
be so large that there are several, each of which, independently, can
 
provide the total projected energy requirements of the world for far more
 
than 200 years. This is well known, of course, for the "inexhaustible"
 
resources: geothermal, solar, and fusion energy. It is less well known
 
for fission energy and for hydrocarbons because of the tendency to confine
 
our attention to proven reserves under present technology and economics
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Table 2
 
ESTIMATES OF WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION
 
(Q = 1018 BTU)
 
CUMULATIVE
 
POP a GWPa GWP/ ANNUAL CONSUMPTION
 
YEAR' (BIL.) ($ TRIL.) CAPa EFF.b CONSUMPTION (FROM 1975)
 
1975 4.0 7 1,750 1.00 .25 Q -­
1985 5.0 11 2,300 1.15 .35 3 Q
 
2000 6.0 20 3,300 1.4 .50 10
 
2025 7.7 43 5,600 2.0 .80 25
 
2075 9.4 io6 11,000 3.0 1.25 80
 
2125 9.9 156 16,000 3.5 1.6 150
 
2175 10.0 182 18,000 4.0 1.65 230
 
aHUDSON INSTITUTE STUDIES. 
bRELATIVE OVERALL EFFICIENCY ASSUMED FOR PRODUCTION, CONVERSION AND
 
UTILIZATION OF ENERGY COMPARED WITH 1975.
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rather than potential resources with likely future technology and eco­
nomics. With the latter perspective we could, in principle, extract
 
uranium from low-grade sources, including sea water, and combined with
 
breeder or near-breeder reactors the potential would increase much more:
 
than 1000-fold over current-estimates based on present reactors and known
 
reserves which might last only a few decades. Or by including the solid
 
hydrocarbon fuels with the conventional oil and gas the potential long­
term resource becomes-very large compared to current oil and gas reserves
 
"(see Table 3). Even here we have not included all the fossil fuels, only
 
the principal ones. If fossil fuels obtainable from the eastern shales
 
of the U.S. and the lower-grade oil shales were added they would increase
 
the total potential shown in Table 3 several-fold.
 
Moreover, it should be stressed that even if all of these alternative
 
resources were to be two or three times more expensive than energy is cur­
rently--an extremely unlikely conjecture--then as the efficiency of energy
 
utilization also increased by a factor of 2 or 3 over that of present
 
practices, the cost of energy per unit of "work" accomplished would not
 
increase at all. L.t appears to us to be likely that the effectivd cost
 
of energy (the average cost to accomplish most'required tasks) will
 
diminish substantially over the long term.
 
In contemplating either the potential new sources of energy or its
 
more efficient utilization, we are not conjuring up hopeful unknown tech­
nologies which will appear in the distant future as breakthroughs which
 
will solve our problems. Although this could and probably will happen it
 
is not required for the argument. Rather oui calculations rest on a set
 
of technologies which currently exist or which are promising enough today
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Table 3
 
RESOURCES OF PRINCIPAL FOSSIL FUELS
 
(Q = 101 8 BTU)
 
PROVEN RESERVES POTENTIAL RESOURCES
 
U.S. WORLD U.S. WORLD
 
a
OIL .3 3.7 2.9 14.4
 
NATURAL GASa .3 1.0 2.5 15.8
 
COAL (INCL. LIGNITE)b 15 95 30 170
 
SHALE OIL b 12 19 150 2000 
TAR SANDSC -- 1.8 .2 10 
TOTAL 27.6 Q 120 Q 185 Q 2200 Q
 
YEARS OF WORLD CONSUMPTION
 
AT CURRENT PROJECTIONS 53 114 170 1000
 
aEXPLORING ENERGY CHOICES: 
 A PRELIMI'NARY REPORT (WASHINGTON, D.C.:
 
FORD FOUNDATION ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, 1974).
 
bDONALD A. BROBST AND WALDEN P, PRATT, EDS., U.S. MINERAL RESOURCES,
 
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 820 (WASHINGTON, D.C.:
 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1973).
 
cU.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE, "OIL SHALE--AN ACE IN THE HOLE FOR NATIONAL
 
SECURITY," BY P. A. PETZRICK, IN SYNTHETIC FUEL LOAN GUARANTEES, HEAR­
'INGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON H.R. 12112,
 
94TH CONG., 2ND SESS., 1976 [NO. 56], APPENDICES 2: 586-587.
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to be in active research and development. Of the many under development
 
no singleone iscrucial to the argument. However, it is extremely implau­
sible to expect them all to fail to produce energy in the future, even at
 
2 to 3 times current costs.
 
3. Minerals: Non-Energy
 
Although the debate on the future availability of raw material
 
resources at tolerable prices includes renewable resources such as timber
 
and water, the critical focus usually falls upon non-renewable minerals-­
especially the industrial metals. Our discussion is limited to this
 
category.
 
First, it is advisable to question the label, non-renewable, when
 
applied to industrial metals. Unless recycling were to be forbidden,
 
these metals (except uranium and thorium for fission reactors) are not
 
only renewable but in most cases the industrial process converts them
 
from low-grade ores below ground into high-grade ores above ground. Of
 
course, there will be some losses in the form of highly dispersed solid
 
wastes or liquid effluents with low metal concentrations that end up in
 
the ocean. But these can be kept quite bmall if the economic incentives
 
to recycle them are adequate--or if the principal waste deposits are
 
viewed as future mining sources when the technology and economics have
 
become appropriate. Even now we can expect the amount of these wastes
 
to be consistent with the economics of additional supplies--after environ­
mental factors have been properly included in the economics. But these
 
are minor considerations. The valuable scrap.and other wastes are already
 
being recovered in various recycling arrangements which appear almost
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certain to become steadily more efficient. The principal reason for
 
.expecting a growing demand for minerals is not for replacing waste, but
 
rather because of. the world's expanding population and income. Will
 
there be sufficient resources of the industrial metals to meet demand?
 
To respond to this question we examine present demand for two impor­
tant categories of.these metals. The first is that of the five clearly
 
inexhaustible ones--inexhaustible because they constitute such a large
 
fraction of the earth's crust that there is no conceivable way to use up
 
the enormous quantities that are available. (None of these five are so
 
uniformly distributed that they would ever need to be extracted from ores
 
of average grade.) The second category which is termed probably inex­
haustible lists the next seven metals, in the order of their current
 
demand in the U.S. These two lists and the data on relative demand are
 
given in Table 4.
 
First, we observe from the table that the five clearly inexhaustible
 
metals constitute over 95 percent of the total demand. Second, if our
 
judgment that the second group is probably inexhaustible is plausible
 
then over 99.9 percent of the current and probable future demand for
 
industrial metals can be reasonably satisfied. Thus, the overall problem,
 
if any, would be reduced to that of the .1 percent of remaining demand
 
(by weight) which includes all other metals. The crux'of the problem
 
then appears to depend upon whether a sufficiently convincing case can
 
be made that the seven metals termed, probably inexhaustible, are plau­
sibly categorized. We will run through the justification quickly. For
 
more detail the reader is referred to Chapter 4 of The Next 200 Years and
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Table 4
 
RELATIVE CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTANT
 
INDUSTRIAL METALS (1968)
 
CLEARLY INEXHAUSTIBLE 

IRON 

ALUMINUM 

SILICON 

MAGNESIUM 

TITANIUM 

SUBTOTAL 

PROBABLY INEXHAUSTIBLE
 
COPPER 

ZINC 

MANGANESE 

CHROMIUM 

LEAD 

NICKEL 

TIN 

SUBTOTAL 

TOTAL 

U.S. WORLD
 
85.70% 89.83%
 
8.22 4.47
 
1.05 	 .71
 
.21 .09
 
.02 .01
 
95.20% 95.11%
 
1.38 1.35
 
1.23 .97
 
1.19 	 1.76
 
.50 .45
 
.25 .20
 
.15 .09
 
.03 .03
 
4.73% 4.85%
 
99.93% 99.96%
 
SOURCE: H. E. GOELLER AND ALVIN M. WEINBERG, "THE
 
AGE OF SUBSTITUTABILITY," SCIENCE, FEBRUARY
 
20, 1976, P. 683.
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our primary basic reference,the prestigious U.S. Geological Survey publi­
cation, U.S. Mineral Resources.
 
Copper which has the greatest demand of the 7 in the second category
 
is also the one which appears to be most vulnerable to "exhaustion."
 
Still if we consider the estimated potential resources from conventional
 
mining we find that they come to about 1 billion tons of copper. To this
 
we might add at least 3 billion tons which appear to be available from
 
ocean nodules, the mining of which is expected to start within a decade.
 
This 4 billion ton total comes to an average of 800 pounds per person in
 
the projected stabilized world population. This is half again the amount
 
of copper per capita that the U.S. has produced throughout its history.
 
By this measure it might be adequate. Still we have a considerable cush­
-ion in the following: 6 billion tons are dissolved in sea water which
 
might become a producing source in the future and 60,000 billion tons is
 
in the top 5,000 feet of the earth's crust--most of it dispersed in rock
 
formations but a substantial portion is in much higher than average con­
centrations, at least 10 times the average, that can be produced at some­
what higher than present costs (perhaps $4/lb with current technology) if
 
needed. Perhaps more important, however, is the consideration that almost
 
all of the present uses of copper have available substitutes, generally
 
aluminum. With minor exceptions copper is a metal of convenience or
 
decoration. Its principal uses are as a conductor of heat and electric­
ity. Aluminum is now a direct competitor for both purposes. Recently
 
Donald A. Brobst and Walden P. Pratt, eds., United States Mineral
 
Resources, U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 820 (Washington,
 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).
 
thin glass fibers have also come to threaten to replace copper in tele­
phone cables--and almost certainly will be successful. If inexhaustible
 
aluminum and glass can replace it functionally, only sufficiently compe­
titive prices will enable copper to remain an important metal in the long
 
run.
 
For zinc the estimated potential resources are about 1,000 times the
 
present annual consumption. Its three principal uses are for die-casting
 
alloys, galvanized sheeting and for brass products. These three consti­
tute about 73 percent of the demand for zinc. There are ready substitutes
 
for the first two uses which constitlute 50 percent of present demand;
 
magnesium, aluminum or plastics for die-casting., and aluminum sheeting
 
for galvanized steel now compete in price. Brass for the most part is
 
an optional alloy and often is decorative rather than functional. Thus,
 
of the current uses of zinc considerably less than the remaining 27 per­
cent would be essentially dependent on zinc. Given the huge resource
 
base, and assuming more efficient recycling will become desirable, it is
 
difficult to become concerned about the exhaustion of zinc.
 
Manganese and chromium are quite plentiful, although the higher
 
grades, as in most ores, are not necessarily distributed as users would
 
prefer. For lead the potential resources not only appear to be nearly
 
1,000 times the current annual consumption but all of the present princi­
pal uses of lead (batteries, gasoline additives, ammunition) may well
 
disappear, indeed, one of them (tetraethyl lead) is being phased out now.
 
Moreover, in its main use, as a battery material, it is very efficiently
 
recycled at present.
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Nickel has very large resources, only the highest grade ores are
 
competitive at present and these are threatened by the potential of the
 
ocean nodules. For tin the world's resources are estimated at about 150
 
years of present consumption, at least half of which at present is in
 
tinplate for cans. Many of the uses for tin, including tinplate, can be
 
met by steel, aluminum or plastics. With such substitutes and improving
 
recycling the more essential uses for tin should be easily met by the
 
current known resource base.
 
Space buffs will quickly observe that in our discussion of mineral
 
sources we have used only earth resources. As will be indicated later
 
the moon and the asteroids are potential huge mineral resources and even­
tually are expected to furnish a large part of the requirements for space
 
processing, very possibly during the 21st century. Indeed, very many
 
technological advances or breakthroughs can.be expected during the next
 
200 years which will tend to alleviate some of the more naive concerns
 
about exhaustion of mineral supplies. However, it is important not to
 
depend on unforeseeable advances ifwe are to make our case convincing.
 
4. Food
 
Our approach to the matter of adequate food supplies is to argue
 
that present agricultural knowledge would permit food production with
 
conventional farming to increase at least 20-fold over present world
 
production. This isan argument that it can be done, not that it will
 
be. What will happen is strongly dependent on social and political
 
trends as well as on economics and technology.
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The potential for increasing food supplies through conventional
 
agriculture is shown in Table 5. The estimated increase is based on
 
increasing (1) the amount of farmland, (2) the number of crops per
 
year, and (3) the yield per crop--by employing current technologies for
 
fertilizing, irrigating, obtaining high-yield seeds, and protecting crops
 
and soil through pestici.des, proper cultivation, and modern storage.
 
Today there are also a number of unconventional techniques for food.
 
production which are very promising. They include low-cost greenhouses,
 
hydroponics, soilless agriculture, scientifically controlled growth
 
chambers, agri-industrial complexes, genetic innovations, and artificial
 
foods--such as single-cell proteins made in factories. All of these are
 
in limited commercial production today and each has a potential for vast
 
expansion which can only make the food supply problem less difficult.
 
Table 5 suggests that conventional agriculture can supply at least
 
20 times as much food as is produced today and if needed more than 100
 
times as much. How much food will be needed? If our projected stable
 
world population is to have consumption standards equal to those in the
 
U.S. today then a 10-fold increase in production would be required. Thus,
 
it appears to be well within the world's agricultural potential.
 
5. Environment: Near Term
 
To assure acceptable standards of environmental purity and aesthetic
 
landscapes in the near term it appears necessary to make two kinds of
 
technological improvements. The first is to design all new installations
 
to meet the standards set by society. This appears to be within today's
 
engineering capability although in some cases an adequate design may
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Table 5
 
POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED FOOD PRODUCTION
 
CONSERVATIVE OPTIMISTIC
 
1. 	INCREASED AGRICULTURAL LAND
 
HARVESTED FACTOR OF 2.5 4
 
2. 	MULTICROPPING FACTOR OF 1.5 2
 
3. 	AVERAGE YIELD PER CROP:
 
IMPROVED USE OF
 
FERTILIZER FACTOR OF 1.5 2
 
IRRIGATION FACTOR OF 1.5 2
 
HIGH-YIELD VARIETIES FACTOR OF 2 2.5
 
OTHER INPUTS FACTOR OF 1.2 1.4
 
MULTIPLICATIVE TOTALS 	 -FACTOR OF 2b 110
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require research, development and testing that may take from 10 to 20
 
years. The phenomenal response of the developed world to the rather
 
sudden pressures for improved environmental standards has thrust these
 
problems upon the.existing institutions rather rapidly and not all of
 
them find it-feasible to react as quickly as society would like. However,
 
in principle, the new factories, mines, farms, dams, etc., only have to
 
be designed to meet the new standards and usually that is expected to be
 
feasible although sometimes the costs and regulatory difficulties can
 
cause some serious protests and delays.
 
The more difficult problem is that of retrofitting existing instal­
lations and changing traditional practices in.order to comply with the
 
desired new standards. This poses a much more costly problem and in many
 
cases will delay full compliance for a lengthy period. Such problems
 
stand out in municipal systems for waste disposal, and sewage processing,
 
and in rural farming systems which create a vast amount of water pollu­
tion through uncontrolled runoff. In many, if not most instances, both
 
the municipal systems and the farms.(or farming practices) need to be
 
completely redesigned. Many large municipal sewage collection systems,
 
for example, use the same pipes for their sewage and the storm drains.
 
As a result, the sewage treatment plant may be quickly overwhelmed by
 
any sizable rainfall forcing the entire runoff to be diverted into the
 
receiving waters at such times. The long-,erm. solution may require a
 
complete restructuring of the existing~collection system--an extremely
 
expensive and awkward process which in many localities could require the
 
excavation-of nearly every street.
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Thus, the prognosis is that new industrial installations, new towns,
 
new structures will generally be able to meet the environmental standards,
 
although the battle to determine what these standards should be and how
 
they should change over time can be expected to be a continuous and often
 
raucous one. As for the retrofitting, some has already occurred, some
 
will occur in the near future, but many of the very difficult large-scale
 
problems are likely to be resolved relatively slowly requiring perhaps
 
25 to 50 years, or even more in some instances.
 
Over the long term of our perspective even these retrofit problems
 
appear to be susceptible to solution. The technology required for pollu­
tion control is in its infancy today. It is difficult to believe that
 
after a hundred or more years the ability to control pollution adequately
 
will be beyond our capability. The unfortunate legacy from the past has
 
been the prolonged lack of concern with these problems, not the lack of
 
an inherent ability to deal with them.
 
Of course we are implicitly assuming that technical progress will
 
be sufficient to reduce the principal disturbances to the envitonment
 
that otherwise would follow increases in population, food and industrial
 
production. Considerable skepticism exists--especially among anti-growth
 
advocates--about the inherent ability of technology to accomplish this
 
end at less than prohibitive costs. Our investigation has led us to the
 
conclusion that, despite the strong interaction among these key sectors,
 
continued growth is feasible far beyond the limiting assumptions in this
 
chapter while, on the average, the environment is steadily improved.
 
This feasibility is found to depend only upon the continuation of tech­
nical innovation and an adequate desire within societies to accept the
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associated costs. These costs may be large but are unlikely to be so
 
large as to restrain a reasonable rate of economic growth over the long
 
term.
 
6. Environment: Long'Term
 
Unfortunately we cannot have the same kind-of confidence that long­
term or remote environmental dangers can be avoided, or corrected- if they
 
should occur. If we 'consider the possibility that a catastrophic irre­
versible process might be unwittingly set into motion, there is no way
 
to estimate its likelihood. The recent concerns about the destruction of
 
the ozone layer, the potential for atmospheric overheating from excessive
 
carbon dioxide emissions or the triggering of climatic changes by exces­
sive thermal emissions are examples of some surprises which have arisen
 
out of mankind's expanding impact on natural processes. Although the
 
ozone layer effect appears to be better understood and under reasonable
 
pontrol the potential for climatic changes is still obscure.- The greatest
 
threats, however, may lie in phenomena which have not yet been observed
 
or have not yet occurred. Imaginative scenarios have suggested mutated
 
viruses against which there is no natural defense, thermonucl'ear catas­
trophes--both direct and indirect--and possible contamination by "bugs"
 
imported from other planets.
 
Such potential problems may plague us from now on. We need to worry
 
about these possible surprises and learn how to become aware of them
 
early on in order to monitor them while solutions are sought. Of course,
 
there is no reason to anticipate an inevitable catastrophe of our own
 
making. More likely, in our judgment, are potential catastrophes that
 
can be averted by appropriate action once the possibilities are noticed,
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But attention to the formulation of possible problems and methods of
 
obtaining timely evidence to cope with them probably will, and certainly
 
should, be formally institutionalized. Debate on these long-range issues
 
would thereby be stimulated and the scientific community made sensitive
 
to the conceptual problems. We anticipate that within 50 years our ability
 
to understand long-term environmental processes will have greatly--perhaps
 
awesomely--increased. In 100 or 200 years our ability not only to under­
stand but to control such processes could become quite impressive.
 
The urge for economic growth is so strong in most of the world today
 
that worries about unknown possible long-term catastrophes will not be
 
sufficient to change the course or even alter it much. Attempts to
 
justify a no-growth concept on this basis appear to be highly unrealistic.
 
What might be feasible is the establishment of a permanent study group,
 
perhaps under U.N. auspices, to formulate not only the technical approaches
 
to these problems but the ways to cope with such problems if international
 
cooperation is required--as may well be the case for those involving cli­
matic changes, for example. International cooperation is not always
 
attainable. Perhaps under catastrophic threats itwould be. Some advance
 
thinking in this area would not be amiss.
 
7. Socio-Economic Projections
 
To return to our surprise-free scenario we have found that a reason­
able physical basis exists for projecting a larger, but stabilizing, popu­
lation in a growing world which can cbpe with the problems of energy,
 
materials, food and environmental disturbance. This implies that the
 
more important future problems will be the less tangible ones which are
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related to social and political changes, such as changing concepts of an
 
equitable distribution of wealth or income.
 
Although realistic long-range socioepolitical projections are more
 
tenuous to make--that is, very unlikely to be correct--they also tend to
 
appear reasonably plausible, since generally only the clearly implausible
 
can be ruled out. (Even this is suspect since the implausible seems to
 
have happened regularly in recorded history.) Our choice, which we also
 
take pains to describe as plausible, conceives of a growing world (de­
scribed earlier in terms of population and GWP) that becomes relatively
 
much more egalitarian in income distribution over the next 200-year
 
period. This result (Figure 2) shows, for example, that the present 50
 
to I income disparity between thewealthiest nations and the poorest ones
 
shrinks to about 9 to 1 over this period. The implication is that all
 
nations become industrialized or post-industrialized during that interval
 
and that poverty as we now know it is eliminated. Although economic aid
 
might be a factor in this transition we argue that more traditional forces
 
are better able to accomplish this change. The gap closes in part because
 
the population of the wealthier nations are unwilling to work as hard as
 
those of the poorer ones. As they come to depend increasingly upon the
 
labor of the poorer nations they are gradually forced to offer them a
 
greater share of the income. Other relevant factors in this economic
 
change are projections of an increasing ability to transfer technology,
 
growing tourism, increasing national security, and relatively stable
 
governments.
 
Thus, our surprise-free scenario depicts a rather benign world,
 
relatively free of violent conflict, growing moderately at first but
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Figure 2 
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slowing down substantially over time with wealthier countries usually'
 
growing less than the poorer ones. It is a stable world with relatively
 
stable nations and boundaries. Customs change as the affluent devote
 
more time to leisure and artistic pursuits. The less affluent strive
 
harder to attain the model of the affluent.
 
Our subsequent scenarios will be variations of this one and will be
 
explored for their potential impact on the development and exploration
 
activities in space.
 
,FrCEDINO PAGE BtANK. NOT I 
Chapter III
 
POTENTIAL 21ST CENTURY SPACE DEVELOPMENTS
 
A. Some Early 21st Century Technologies
 
As will be discussed in more detail later it is possible that most of
 
the developed world could become relatively hostile to science and tech­
nology. By blaming it, for example, for the dangers that it has unleashed
 
(nuclear Weapons, pollutants, hazardous chemicals, etc.) it can be claimed
 
that technology is sure to create more harm than good and should either be
 
stopped or severely controlled. Whatever the outcome of any such restric­
tive attempts it appears clear that enough momentum exists in current tech­
nological efforts that a surprise-free projection into the early 21st
 
century would very likely include the developments shown in Table 6. Some
 
remarks are in order about this table.
 
1. The recent interest and anticipated expenditures for the development
 
of alternative energy sources almost guarantees the achievement of inexpen­
sive and inexhaustible supplies early in the 21st century. The oil embargo
 
of 1973 will be long remembered as a particular vulnerability that must be
 
eliminated. Energy may not become cheap again, but it certainly need not be
 
expensive. Indeed, the technological community can not rest until this is
 
true. Because there is no fundamental reason why clean energy from rela­
tively inexhaustible sources need be expensive, and because a large number
 
of alternatives are being simultaneously pursued on a worldwide scale,
 
among knowledgeable observers only a very pessimistic conservative or a
 
neo-Malthusian advocate would be apt to dispute this conclusion. Moreover,
 
by coupling new energy alternatives with efficient utilization practices
 
it may even be possible that the effective price of energy may become quite
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Table 6
 
SOME EARLY 21ST CENTURY TECHNOLOGIES
 
1. INEXPENSIVE AND INEXHAUSTIBLE ENERGY SOURCES
 
2. POLLUTION-"FREE" INDUSTRIES PLUS IMPROVED RECYCLING
 
3. LARGE ADVANCES IN DRILLING AND MINERAL EXTRACTION
 
4. 	LARGE-SCALE UNCONVENTIONAL AGRICULTURE AND ARTIFICIAL
 
FOODS
 
5. 	SUBSTANTIAL MATERIALS PROGRESS IN FIBERS, FOAMS,
 
COMPOSITESi CERAMICS, CRYSTALS, POLYMERS, ADHESIVES
 
6. ULTRASENSITIVE SENSORS (SEE TABLE 7)
 
7. HUMAN-MACHINE COMMUNICATIONS
 
LARGE 	IMPROVEMENT FACTORS IN HARDWARE BY YEAR 2000
 
" OPERATING SPEED ........... lO,-103
 
* 	STORAGE CAPACITY ........... Io5-io1O
 
* 	RELIABILITY ......... i..... . 03--?
 
* INFORMATION TRANSFER RATE.. Io3--Io5
 
SOFTWARE IMPROVEMENTS
 
* 	DATA COMPRESSION .......... 2--OO0
 
* PROGRAMMER PRODUCTIVITY ... 10--1O0
 
VOICE COMMUNICATION ....... ?
 
• AUTOMATIC PROGRAMMING ..... ?
 
8. 	AUTOMATION: IMPROVED MACHINES
 
TELEOPERATORS
 
ADVANCED ROBOTS
 
INTELLIGENT ROBOTS
 
9. IMPRESSIVE ADVANCES IN GENETICS AND MEDICINE
 
10. "EXPONENTIAL GROWTH" IN SPACE-BASED COMMERCIAL VENTURES
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inexpensive--or even cheap--once again. The effective price, of course,
 
means the energy cost to perform the required task--heat the building,
 
drive 100 miles, make a ton of steel, light up the office, launch a
 
satellite, etc.
 
2. Pollution-"free" industries and improved recycling are obviously
 
symbiotic. A major trend in industrial research today is to convert pol­
lutants into resources. Sulfur is more and more being recovered in the
 
form of useful by-products rather than emitted in noxious fumes. Low
 
levels of metallic compounds in liquid wastes are now being recovered,
 
thereby reducing Pollution and recycling the valuable minerals. Urban
 
wastes are being transformed into fuel and mineral resources. These few
 
examples illustrate recent technological trends which we anticipate will
 
soon revolutionize the curreht concerns about the ability of science and
 
technology to reduce pollution and recycle effectively. By any reasonable
 
historical measure the response to society's demands for an-improved envi­
ronment hasbeen rapid and effective. Clearly as long as society demands
 
it (and is willing to pay the costs involved) this trend will continue.
 
3. Within the last three years at least six novel or revolutionary
 
design concepts for new drill bits have 'been announced. Yet the bit is
 
only one part of the drilling process that is being improved. Other
 
improvements in exploration and extraction industries are being made through
 
the use of processed LANDSAT data, new downhole sensors, the application of
 
computers to the mapping of geophysical structures, and the development of
 
technology for deep sea mineral recovery. Currently there is little doubt
 
that progress in the extractive industries will soon make exploration for
 
-68­
petroleum possible at almost any ocean depth, as well as the recovery of
 
the mineral bearing nodules on the deep sea floor. The recent concern
 
about adequate supplies of energy and minerals from secure sources has
 
been coupled with powerful advanced technoiogies to effectively guarantee
 
extraordinary progress in extractive industries over the next decade or
 
two--perhaps for much longer.
 
4. We observed earlier in discussing future world food requirements
 
that many avenues to unconventional agriculture and artificial foods have
 
been opened and are now commercial, although many are not yet on a large
 
scale. But the trend seems clear. Single-cell protein is being widely
 
used as a supplementary animal food and is now manufactured on a large,
 
scale. The industry has predicted that within a dedade the purity of the
 
product will meet existing standards for human consumption and at no more
 
than half the cost of competing protein rich foods (e.g., soybeans).
 
Scientifically controlled growth chambers now exist on a commercial scale
 
with yields in vegetable crops from 10 to 100 times greater than that from
 
conventional-agricultural land. These chambers are capital intensive year­
round 247hour operations. Their principal competitive determinant appears
 
to be related to a single technical problem: how efficiently can energy
 
be converted into the light frequencies which produce photosynthesis. This
 
is the kind of problem in which a major breakthrough can occur in any year.
 
We would be surprised if it hadn't happened by the year 2000. The nutrient
 
film technique developed in England by the Glasshouse Crops Research Insti­
tute is used to grow vegetables in thin polyethylene troughs, without soil.
 
This technique has been spreading rapidly and its application to cereals is
 
currently under investigation.
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Iowa State University researchers have found a way to increase soy­
bean yields from 30 to 60 percent by a carefully controlled application
 
of foliar spraying. Standard Oil Company of Indiana is now commercially
 
producing tortula yeast, a food made from petroleum-that has twice the
 
protein value of beef. Michigan State University scientists have found
 
a chemical in alfalfa which increased the yield of a number of greenhouse
 
crops from 10 to 40 percent and which may be applicable to conventional
 
farming.
 
There are a few examples of a very long list of promising new
 
approaches to food production. The sum of the unconventional approaches
 
to food production could become a major factor in food supplies even before
 
the next century.
 
5. Partly in response to the requirements of the aerospace and other
 
high technology industries and partly because of recent rapid advances in
 
diagnostic instruments and computer aided analysis and design, unusually
 
rapid advances have been announced in a wide variety of materials--some of
 
which are indicated in Table 6. Fibers of graphite, plastics and glass
 
are now stronger than high tensile steel. An "endless" parade of new foams
 
are being used to provide improving rigidity and insulation (against heat,
 
electricity, or shock) with a minimum of material. New ceramics are pro­
viding both extreme hardness and toleration of extremely high temperatures.
 
The Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1976.
 
The Wall Street Journal, September 24, 1975.
 
The New York Times, April 17, 1977.
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Crystals of very high purity and uniformity in structure provide unusual
 
properties which made possible such devices as microcomputers, lasers,
 
and most recently light "pipes" for communications. Production of poly­
mers has become a huge growth industry--especially in pla tics--that is
 
projected to continue for a long time. Lastly, a remarkable array of
 
adhesives have effectively challenged the older techniques of bonding
 
with welds, rivets and other fasteners.
 
The progress in materials has been so remarkable that in some
 
instances we may reach the theoretical limit to such material properties
 
as strength, hardness, and bonding by the end of the century. However,
 
the potential for composites, geometric designs, and new materials with
 
unusual properties appear to be almost endless. Progress in theoretical
 
understanding of the properties of materials is becoming even more rapid
 
with the aid of new analytical instruments combined with high speed com­
puters. These improved materials have already contributed immensely to
 
the development of space vehicles and satellites and are expected to make
 
possible not only much lower propulsion costs but much greater effective­
ness in a given payload weight.
 
6. The astonishing improvements which have been made and which are
 
expected to be made in sensors (see Table 7) will have a tremendous impact
 
on science and technology. In some cases, as can be seen, sensors have
 
approached or reached the theoretical limit (minimizing noise levels, for
 
example). In most cases, however, the potential for improvement is either
 
open ended or very far from any such limits. Thus the kind of progress
 
shown in Table 7 can continue well into the 21st century, or beyond.
 
These kinds of improvements hold an immense potential for serving mankind
 
in general and space development in particular.
 
-- 
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Table 7
 
SOME FORECASTS FOR ULTRA SENSITIVE SENSORS
 
MICROWAVE RADIOMETERS
 
NOISE TEMP. (OK) 

APERTURE (METERS) 

RADIO TELESCOPE:
 
SENSITIVITY AT 1-GHZ 

RADAR RESOLUTION, FROM EARTH
 
ORBIT (METERS) 

SPACE TELESCOPE:
 
APERTURE (CM.) 

LASER ABSORPTION SPECTROMETER,
 
ABS. COEFF. 

MULTI-SPECTRAL IMAGERS,
 
RESOLUTION (MICRO-RAD.) 

SOLID STATE CAMERA (CCD)
 
RESOLUTION (NO. OF ELEMENTS,
 
MILLIONS) 

PHOTON SENSITIVITY
 
(MICRO-JOULES/M2) 

ELECTRON SENSITIVITY
 
(MICRO-JOULES/M2) 

X-RAY TELESCOPE (20-300 K.E.V.)
 
SENSITIVITY 

X-RAY SPECTROMETER (20-300
 
KE.V.) SENSITIVITY 

SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNETIC
 
SPECTROMETER, INDEX 

MAGNETS (KG. PER KILOGAUSS) 

GRAVITY GRADIOMETER 

1970 

2000 

1 

1 

5 

50 

4 

100 

1 

4 

1.5 

1.5 

1 

1980 1990 2000 
300 30 30 
2 10 40 
.02 .01-.001 
31 2 1 
200 350-450 
10 12-100 102-104 
25 10 7 
1.1 5-7 11-30 
.8 .3 .2 
.02 .01 .008 
.2 .03 .006 
.2 .01 .001 
7-8 25-50 90-250 
.5 .1 .o4 
.01 .001 .001 
SOURCE: 	 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, A FORECAST.OF
 
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1980-2000, SP-387 (WASHINGTON, D.C.: SCIEN-

TIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION OFFICE, JANUARY 1976). THIS
 
TABLE ISAN ADAPTATION AND PARTIAL SUMMARY OF SOME OF THE DATA
 
AND FORECASTS PRESENTED.
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7. Progress In computers,, already awesome, is expected to continue
 
through this century, at least. Table 6 shows some current projections
 
for hardware as well as for software which is more difficult to project.
 
The degree to which the computer will change society can only be immense.
 
Very likely the impact of present computer technology on the world is
 
far from being understood since there has not been sufficient time for
 
the full impact Lo be felt--a process which would take at least several
 
decades more even if computer development itself were stopped. However,
 
in a few decades computers themselves will be a thousand, or even a mil­
lion, times more effective--depending on the applications. Today it is
 
probably not possible to understand, even qualitatively, the way that the
 
world's societies will be affected by the applications of computers over
 
a century or more.
 
8. Some of the potential applications of computers to automation
 
can be understood--to a degree. Microprocessors are destined to appear
 
in our automobiles, appliances, telephones, wrist radios, as well as our
 
factories and commercial establishments. For remote maintenance (such as
 
in outer space) teleoperators will probably become common. The recent
 
Viking landers are probably the world's most advanced robots to date.
 
This can only be the beginning of robotry. That such robots can become
 
much more "intelligent" is not doubted in the sense of machines with
 
limited learning capabilities. Whether they can eventually become intel­
ligent in the human sense is an ongoing, unresolved debate among scien­
tists specializing in the field.
 
9. Perhaps the most spectacular scientific advances have and, in
 
the near teri, will continue to occur in microbiology. The implications
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for genetic understanding and the potential application to genetic
 
control, and the prevention and cure of diseases--physical, emotional,
 
and mental (if these are proper categories)--is truly exciting. Certainly,
 
there is a reasonable chance that all bacterial and viral diseases.can be
 
prevented or rapidly cured before too long--perhaps even by this century's
 
end. Progress in this field has been intimately associated with progress
 
in the sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology, and in the technologies
 
of computers, analytical instruments, sensors, and pharmacology. The
 
remarkable integration has led to astonishing advances which appear to be
 
only the beginning of much greater discoveries and applications to come.
 
10. For future progress in space development--especially for manned
 
operations in space which are currently visualized as space laboratories,
 
permanent space bases, space industries, colonies inorbit or on planetary
 
bodies, and space explorers--all of the above technological developments
 
are very important. The results of the expected growth in space indusr
 
trialization can be vastly different depending upon whether the annual
 
growth rate is 2, 5, 10, or 20 percent. The 2 percent figure is barely
 
interesting: the 20 percent figure would soon spawn results like those
 
of science fiction. (To mention exponential growth alone leaves obscure
 
the major element--the doubling rate. This will depend upon many factors
 
in addition to the technologies. Some of these will be incorporated in
 
our subsequent scenarios and, by their effect on the doubling rate, lead
 
to vastly differing outcomes.)
 
The progress which has occurred in space technology in the past and
 
that which might be expected to occur over this century under reasonable
 
optimistic conditions (adequate funding and/or good luck) are illustrated
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in Table 8. The data for this table have been taken from NASA sources,
 
principally from the 1975 Outlook for Space study. These projections
 
generally are based upon careful evaluations by competent scientists and
 
are as likely to be understated as overstated. Where a range is given
 
in the projected progress the principal consideration is the available
 
funding. For example, to achieve the major reductions in launch costs
 
would perhaps require $10 billion for the development of a large capacity
 
reusable unmanned vehicle. The principal implication to be drawn from
 
the table is that some astonishing space developments are likely to occur
 
within thi-s century--developments that might even surprise technological
 
optimists who are not specialists in space technology.-

B. 	Space Industrialization (SI)
 
To many space scientists the industrialization of space, in the
 
sense of manufacturing operations conducted in or beyond near-earth orbit,
 
is certain to happen. Because of its embryonic nature its early growth
 
rate is highly uncertain. Research and development on processes for
 
future SI installations has been pursued in space as well as in earth
 
laboratories for several years. The three Skylab launches were the first
 
extensive manned R&D operations conducted in space that focused upon the
 
SI concept. The results of these and subsequent efforts led Grumman's
 
G. Harry Stine to claim that a third industrial revolution is about to
 
start.
 
j. Harry Stine, The Third Industrial Revolution (New York: G. P.
 
Putnam & Sons, 1975). Also, for a recent NASA study on the SI potential
 
see Rockwell International, Space Division, Space industrialization,
 
Final, Part 1: Technical Report, SDA77-AP-0076 (Rockwell International,
 
July 15, 1977).
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Table 8
 
PROGRES'S IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY,PAST AND PROJECTED
 
SYSTEM 	 1960 1975 1990 2000
 
1. LAUNCH VEHICLE: PAYLOAD 	 6
 
CAPACITY 	(LBS) 25 250,000 10 2 x 106
 
(REUSABLE) (REUSABLE)
 
2. 	COMMUNICATION
 
SATELLITE 	(CHANNELS) 15 15,000 100,000 106
 
(LOW ORBIT) (SYNCHRONOUS) (SYNCH) (SYNCH)
 
3. 	COMM. (MARS TO EARTH)
 
105 
 107 109
BITS/SEC 	 8 

.1 250 105 5 x 105
4. 	MAN DAYS/MISSION 

5. 	 RESOLUTION 5 .1 .05 .02
 
(KM) (LOW ORBIT) (LOW ORBIT). (GEOSYNCHRONOUS-ORBIT)
 
6. 	DATA STORAGE 15 PAGES 2,000 BOOKS 1/2 LIBRARY 10 LIB. OF
 
ABOARD SPACECRAFT (.5 MEGABITS) (@300 PAGES) OF CONGRESS CONGRESS
 
(20 GIGABITS) (8,000 GIGA­
-BITS) 
7. 	ENERGY STORAGE
 
(KW HRS/LBS) .02 40 800 1200
 
5 x 108 1010 - 1012
8. 	ACTIVE CIRCUITS/IN.3 4 120,000 

9. 	SPACE-BORNE COMPUTER 6
 
SPEED (OPERATIONS/SEC.) .002 x 106 .5 x 106 30 x 106 100-1000 x 10
 
10. 	 COST OF LAUNCHING
 
($/LB TO EARTH ORBIT) 10,000 250 25-50 10-30
 
11. 	 POSITION ERROR
 
(METERS) 	 1,000 50 .1 .02
 
10-4  -6 -8
12. 	 FAILURES/HR/M. BITS 10-2 10 I0-7-I0
 
THIS DATA IS ADAPTED FROM VARIOUS NASA SOURCES--PRIMARILY FROM THE REFERENCE
 
GIVEN ON TABLE 7.
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Why industrialize space? The answer must be essentially economic.
 
There must be important commercial operations which can be done only in
 
space or which'can be done better in space. That is, the space environ­
ment has a number of exploitable advantages that are unavailable or very
 
costly on earth. The principal ones now known are listed in Table 9.
 
These advantages can be impressive. They may make possible a very
 
large array of new products and processes of great commercial value.
 
Designs already exist, for example, for Solar Satellite Power Systems
 
(SSPS) which can 'beam microwave power to earth in essentially unlimited
 
quantities from the inexhaustible and constant sun. This power is readily
 
converted to electric power without polluting the air or water. The esti­
mated cost at present is not competitive but, as we shall see, this could
 
change relatively soon.
 
High vacuum industries on earth are among thd most rapidly growing
 
sectors, a trend which is almost certain to continue as high vacuum is
 
employed in nearly all electronic as well as many other high technology.
 
industries. Providing and maintaining vacuum in industries is expensive.
 
In space, however, very high vacuums unattainable on earth are trivially
 
easy to arrange and can be "permanent."
 
Weightlessness may be the most interesting, perhaps the most impor­
tant property of space. It is the one continual property of every space
 
orbit for which no parallel exists in daily human experience (beyond free
 
fall which generally lasts less than one second). Space scientists are
 
attempting to visualize the implications of the weightless environment
 
and design prbcesses which can use its advantages. Still this science,
 
or art, is at best embryonic and is likely to remain so throughout most
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Table 9
 
TEN ADVANTAGES OF OPERATING IN SPACE­
1. 	SOLAR POWER (10 x RATE ON EARTH) PLUS U-V, X-RAYS, ETC.
 
-
2. 	UNLIMITED HIGH VACUUM (10 8 to 10-14 MM. HG. IN 300
 
MILE ORBIT)
 
3. 	AVOIDS PRESENT HAZARDS [E.G., QUAKES, STORMS (WIND,
 
RAIN, HAIL.... ), UNPREDICTIBLE TEMPERATURE CHANGES
 
(DAILY, SEASONAL,...), LIGHTNING, FLOODS, VOLCANOES,
 
INTRUDERS (HUMAN, INSECT OR MICROBE), CORROSION, POLLU-

TION, ETC.]
 
4. 	WEIGHTLESSNESS FACILITATES
 
A. 	SOME MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES
 
B. 	CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE LIGHTWEIGHT STRUCTURES
 
C. 	RELIABILITY OF OPERATIONS
 
5. 	POTENTIAL RAW MATERIALS ON MOON AND ASTEROIDS
 
6. 	GOOD "VIEWS" OF EARTH AND OUTER SPACE FOR COMMUNICATION,
 
OBSERVATION, POWER TRANSMISSION, AND OTHER APPLICATIONS
 
7. 	INFINITE HEAT SINK NEAR ABSOLUTE ZERO
 
8. 	LITTLE OR NO ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL OR "LOCALISM"
 
ISSUES
 
9. 	MAY BE ENJOYABLE, HEALTHFUL, STIMULATING OR OTHERWISE
DESIRABLE
 
10. 	 RAPIDLY IMPROVING-TRANSPORTATION AND INCREASI NGLY
 
USEABLE AND AVAILABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
 
INANY CASE A TRUE FRONTIER
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of the century, even as it develops rapidly. Accordingly we have a great
 
deal to look forward to because this phenomenon already promises to yield
 
some exciting products and processes in future orbiting industries.
 
Many materials behave differently in a weightless condition. Liquids
 
form perfect spheres which can be solidified, maintaining sphericity. Sur­
face tension, usually a minor force compared to gravity, becomes a dominant
 
one in space, making the contacts between liquids and solids act in "pecu­
liar" manners. Gases behave differently. Hot air does not rise in zero-G,
 
making it difficult to start a fire. A lit candle quickly snuffs itself
 
out. Weightlessness means that structures a mile long can be made of thin
 
metal foil without bending or breaking. Tiny bearings can control massive
 
rotors.
 
These and many other novel properties of space have spawned a large
 
array of potential applications for SI which is expected to take a large
 
forward step after the space shuttle begins commercial operations in 1980.
 
The early shuttle efforts, naturally, will concentrate upon R&D. However,
 
there are already some indications that production of high -purity pharma­
ceuticals and of silicon wafers for electronic circuits are likely to be
 
among the earliest commercial developments. A longer list of some of the
 
more promising early SI activities is shown in Table 10.
 
Perhaps the key point in Table 9 is the tenth one--that the transpor­
tation costs to space and back have dropped rapidly and can be expected
 
to do so in the future. Indeed, as projected in Table 8, about a factor
 
of 10 reduction in transport costs is possible by the end of the century.
 
This projection is based upon a continued growing effort in space activi­
ites, represented by an expanding budget. As the transportation costs
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Table 10
 
A SUGGESTIVE, BUT HARDLY EXHAUSTIVE, LIST OF
 
SPACE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES
 
1. 	VACUUM CAST ALLOYS AND VACUUM WELDS
 
2. 	HIGH-PURITY BIOLOGICALS AND NOVEL PHARMACEUTICALS
 
3. 	OPTICAL SYSTEMS - PARTICULARLY FOR LOW G - AND THIN
 
FILM 	SURFACES
 
4. 	LARGE SHEET CONSTRUCTIONS
 
5. 	LARGE-SCALE VACUUM BASED SYSTEMS 

SUPER-CONDUCTING)
 
(E.G., CRYOGENIC,
 
6. 	SPECIAL ELECTRONIC MATERIALS, INCLUDING PURE CRYSTALS
 
7. 	PROPULSION FUELS (AND SPACE CRAFT COMPONENTS) FOR
 
FURTHER SPACE DEVELOPMENT
 
8. 	 ULTRA HIGH STRENGTH FIBERS 
9. 	PRODUCTS UTILIZING SPECIAL MINERAL FINDS: CE.G., WATER,
 
TITANIUM, ALUMINUM)
 
10. 	 POWER STATIONS FOR SOLAR ENERGY CONVERSION
 
I]. 	3-DIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED-CIRCUIT "CHIPS" FORMED FROM
 
ZERO VACUUM MELTS
 
12. 	 DELICATE INSTRUMENTS FOR ZERO-G USE (WHICH COULD NOT
 
STAND HIGH STRESSES OF EARTH FABRICATION AND/OR LAUNCH)
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drop the number of viable Sl products can increase very rapidly--at
 
least up to the point where transportation is no longer the dominant
 
factor. With the Space Shuttle the cost of transportation after 1980 is
 
expected to be about $300 or $400 per pound for a round trip. This cost
 
represents a substantial improvement but is still high. It will prevent
 
the commercialization of many products and will restrict much required
 
R&D until the next generation transportation system arrives.
 
We have projected far future space transportation costs along three
 
modes: optimistic, moderate and pessimistic. These 200-year projections
 
are given in Figure 3. After 200 years the optimistic view projects a
 
cost of $.50/lb. to near-earth orbit, about three times the cost of the
 
minimum energy required--at current prices for electric power. The most
 
conservative projection ends up at $6/lb., only a factor of three better
 
than what is believed to be feasible during this century. The actual
 
path that these transportation costs follow may be the most important
 
technical factor affecting the future developments in space.
 
The number of human beings involved in space industrialization will
 
be strongly affected by transportation costs. The utilization of people
 
requires the transport of housing facilities, food, air, water, and
 
various paraphernalia for maintenance, communication, etc. As long as
 
transportation is very expensive the SI effort must depend upon a very
 
high degree of automation, including the use of compact teleoperators
 
for maintenance adjustments, and/or process changes. The paucity of
 
human attendants will reduce the operating flexibility substantially,
 
but it will be a necessary phase of the evolving SI process.
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Figure 3 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS TO NEAR-EARTH ORBIT
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OF POOR QUALITY 
Table 11
 
APPLICATIONS SUMMARY AND RISK ESTIMATION
 
RISK .	 RISK 
CATEGORY 	 CAIEGORY" 
APPLICATIONSPERSONAL APPLICATIONS 	 GOVERNMENT 
- Personal Comtrunications Wrist Radio I COMMUNICATIONS
 
- EmergencylRescue Wrist Beacon 
- VotrngPoning Wrist Set I
 
- Personal Navigation Wrist Set. - Electronic Mall Transmltsion I
 
- VolingtPolling Wrist Set 	 - Border Surveillance II
 
CIVIC APPLICATIONS 	 - Nuclear Materials Locator I
 
- Disaster Comunictions Wrist Radio 

- All-Aircraft Traffic Control I OBSERVATION
 
- UrlsnlPoica Wrist Radio I - High Resolution ResourcesiPollution Oservtory II
 
. Car Spe d-Limit Control I - Water Level and Fault Moverment I
 
- Library Data Sharing I
 
Indictor 

- Atmopheric Temperature Profile Sounder III
 
INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS - Forest Fire Detection I
 
- Ocan Resources Location 

- Burglar AlarmlIntrusion Detectlon I I 
Vehicle I PackageLxt& 1 SUPPORT 
- 10Hotqraphic Telewnlfermncing lIn 
SAdvanced lnV.recast 
 I- Passiv Coastal Anti-Collision Radar II
Advanced rocst I Night Illuminator II
Adanced Rsurces/Pollutioni Obsrvation I -Energy Delivery and Distribution 15concepts) IV
 
INTRATIONAL APPLICATIONS - Energy Consumption Monitor I
 
I - Aircraft Laser Beam Poering IV 
I - Nuclear Waste Disposal 	 I I 
-Nion-Nato "Mat Llne' 
- Multinational Air Traffic Control Radar 

- Small Terminal Intelsat Netork I SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS
 
- Earth Resources DateSharing I - Astronomiical Super-Telescope IV
 
- Energy Distribution Relay IV - Interplanetary T V. Link II
 
- U.N. Truce Observation Satellite I - AtmosphericTemperature Profile Sounder III
 
- Ocean Resources and DynamIcs Sensor I
 
. Walbr Level and Fault Movement Indicator
 
I-IV ARE 	LOW TO HIGH, RESPECTIVELY.
 
SOURCE: 	 I. BEKEY, H.L. MAYER AND"M.G. WOLFE, ADVANCED SPACE SYSTEM
 
CONCEPTS AND THEIR ORBITAL SUPPORT NEEDS (1980-2000),
 
VOLUME I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, ATR-76(7365)-i, VOL. I (EL
 
SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA: THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, APRIL
 
1976), P. 27.
 
C. Other Commercial Opportunities
 
An interesting study was produced recently by Bekey, Mayer, and
 
Wolfe of the Aerospace Corporation 	offering a large number of conceptual
 
designs for new space concepts that might be commercially feasible during
 
A summary of their 	potential non-military applications is
this century. 

These concepts have been examined sufficiently
given in Table 11 above. 

to sketch out the engineering designs and to permit very rough cost esti­
mates to be made. 	 Each concept was assigned a risk rating from I to IV
 
(low to high) and a time frame for 	installation. Of the 42 initiatives
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given in the Aerospace Corporation report, four have been. selected for
 
illustration and are presented'below as Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7. The list
 
of potential practical developments in space can-be expected to grow con­
tinuously, perhaps even exponentially if the future funding of space
 
development -inthe U.S. at least keeps pace with the national income. If
 
the space budget is sufficient to permit an advanced transportation system
 
which can deliver payloads to orbit at, say, $50/lb. or less, then the
 
development of commercial space-based services and products might become
 
attractive enough to private investors to enable them to take much more
 
initiative in their development and installation.
 
D. Future Space Program: Near Term
 
Any national space program must reconcile its many specific options
 
wi'th the available budget. NASA, which has been enduring a gradual
 
budgetary squeeze for several years, has had to cut back and stretch out
 
a'number of its programs despite an enviable record of successful launches
 
and accurate cos't projections. Nevertheless every space engineer's hope
 
is that a logical space development program can be designed with a
 
gradually (or rapidly) increasing budget. One e'll conceived and well
 
presented perspective on NASA's future program, for example, is given
 
in a paper by Jesco von Puttkamer in the Journal of the British Inter­
planetary Society. This paper describes an evolving program in con­
siderable conceptual detail, a program which gradually expands Man's
 
occupancy of space from near-earth orbit to the outer planets, developing
 
Jesco von Puttkamer, "Developing Space Occupancy: Perspectives on
 
NASA Future Space Programme Planning," Journal of the British Interplane­
tary Society 29 (1976): 147-173.
 
Figure 4
 
ADVANCED RESOURCES IPOLLUTI ON OBSERVATORY (CO-I) 
* PURPOSE 
To provide high quality, multispectral earth resources, mELowxING RADAR
 
and pollution data.
 
* RATIONALE 
Integrated ERTS-like system, real-time data distribution /
 
to worldwide users, active sensors needed. I
 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTIONActive and passive sensors, large aperture, high, medium, 
and Iow resolution imaging obtained in multispectral
region and radar. Data disseminated by laser link 
through relay satellite. 
* CHARACTERISTICS 	 \0 SWATH 
SWEIGHT 30. 000 ib 
" SIZE 10 x60 ft X10 . SWATM I 
•
eRAW POWER 12 kW MUWISPECTRAL 	 0. 
o ORBIT 	 500 nmi sun synch. RESOLUTION 
oCONSThLAfONSZE I .WSWT 
* RISK CATEGORY I (Low) 	 MUL715KCTRAL 
* 1ME FRAME 1985 	 RSLT 
* IOC COST (Space only) 350 M 
o 	PERFORMANCE RD 
Multispectral resolutions varying from <10 to <100 ft RESOLUTION - ftobtained worldwide. 	 .SLT N-= 
o COVERAGE EVERY 6HOURS 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 	 \ \ 
" TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and tug

" ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Shuttle attached manipulator, servicing stages

* SUBSYSTEMS Guidance and navigation; attitude control: transmitter
 
" TECHNOLOGY Large radar antenna; high power tubes and modulator; LSI data processor
 
*OTHER 	 None 
SOURCE: I. BEKEY, H.L. MAYER AND M.G. WOLFE, ADVANCED SPACE SYSTEM CONCEPTS AND THEIR ORBITAL 
SUPPORT NEEDS (1980-2000), VOLUME III: DETAILED DATA - PART I: CATALOG OF INITIATIVES, 
FUNCTIONAL OPTIONS, AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS AND GOALS, ATR-76(7365)-l, VOL. III (EL 
SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA: THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, APRIL 1976), P. 10. 
Figure 5 
COASTAL ANTI -COLLI SION PASSIVE RADAR (CO-9) 
* PURPOSE 	 2 SATLUTS. ur APART IN SYNCHRONOUS EQUATORIAL ORBIT 
Inexpensive and lightweight radar for all surface 
vessels - navigation; collision avoidance. 
* RATIONALE 	 EACHi0 P ASED xARRAYS.100X0 It. EACH
 
Conventional radar too expensive and interference PULSED100 kW AVERAGE POWER
TRANSMniTMRS
 
prone. Pleasure craft usually denied radar benefits. XBAND
 
* CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
Illuminate seacoasts with scanning microwave beams
 
from space. Scanning receiving antennas on boats
 
obtain range and angle data on hazards.
 
a CHARACTERISTICS 
" WEIGHT 2,.000, 00 lb 
SIZE 1,0 x 10,000 ft 
o RAW POWER 	 3MW 
"ORBIT Synch. Equat. I 
" CONSTELLATION SIZE 2 CH 9 M 
" RISK'CATEGORY II (Medium)
 
" TIME FRAME 1995
 
Q IOC COST 10 B
 
o 	 PERFORMANCE 2 EFc. RW. 2A.E 
Relative location of all objects >100 m within,.UMNATOR M 
12 nmi range. 100 x300 ft accuracy in 500 sector. 
3 x 0. 5 ft antenna in vessel. Unlimited number of 
users. 
o BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
o TRANSPORTATION LIV and large tug or large SEPS
 
. ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly in orbit
 
o SUBSYSTEMS Structures; attitude control; antenna; power

" TECHNOLOGY Large adaptive microwave antenna; high power transmitters; prime power source.
 
* OTHER 
SOURCE: 	 I. BEKEY, H.L. MAYER AND M.G. WOLFE, ADVANCED SPACE SYSTEM CONCEPTS AND THEIR ORBITAL
 
SUPPORT NEEDS (1980-2000), VOLUME III: DETAILED DATA - PART I: CATALOG OF INITIATIVES,
 
FUNCTIONAL OPTIONS, AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS AND GOALS, ATR-76(7365)-i, VOL. III (EL
 
SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA: THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, APRIL 1976), P. 18.
 
Figure 6 
ATMOSPIERICTEMPERATURE PROFILE SOUNDER (CO-11) 
* 	PURPOSE 
To measure actual profiles of temperature In the 
mWAVE 3D ft VI ANTENNJAatmosphere. 
* RATIONALE 	 -- -- -" 
Weather prediction requires knowledge of temperature - ­profiles, as well as other phenomena. PULSED C02 LAUB
 
. 4-WlOPT"C$ 
* 	CONCEPT DESCRIPTION Pulsed laser vibrationally excites C02 or H20 molecules. 
Subsequent rotational transitions in the millimeter wave 
spectrum show temperature dependence which is
 
measured by ratio of energy in several lines.
 
* CHARACTERISTICS 	 cC oVISRAnONAL.Y EXCrDt M,R n~w1A,A
WEIGHT 	 4000 lb YRODfATIONAL TRANSTONS 
* SIZE 30-ft dia antenna 	 80 
o* RAW POWER 	 5kW 
* ORBIT 	 600-nmi polar
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 4 
o RISK CATEGORY III (Medium) 
o TIME FRAME 	 1990 
IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 250M 	 13Mali 
SURFACE
 
* 	PERFORMANCE 
Entire atmosphere measured, with resolution of 300 fthorizontally and 100 ft vertically, every four hours.
 
Emission lines and signal strength imprecisely defined
 
at present. 
o BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and tuglUS
* ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated service unit/Shuttle-attached manipulator
* SUBSYSTEMS 	 Antenna, laser, attitude control
* TECHNOLOGY 	 Laser, power dissipation, antenna, pointing, sensitive heterodyne receiver 
* OTHER 
SOURCE: I. BEKEY, H.L. MAYER AND M.G. WOLFE, ADVANCED SPACE SYSTEM CONCEPTS AND THEIR ORBITAL
 
SUPPORT NEEDS (1980-2000), VOLUME III:. DETAILED DATA - PART I: CATALOG OF INITIATIVES, 
FUNCTIONAL OPTIONS, AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS AND GOALS ATR-76(7365)-, VOL. III (EL 
SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA: THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, APRIL 1976), P. 20. 
Figiure 7 
PERSONAL COMMUN ICATIONS WR IST RADIO (CC-9) 
* 	PURPOSE
 
To allow citizens to communicate through exchanges 2 f oI ANTNN /'QAI
25 REM8& 

by voice, from anywhere. 7kW POWEN. 3 BANo kuM
WMQCHANXILMBEA 
W0USERS'CHANEL 
* 	RATIONALE
 
Mobile telephones are desirable, but should be wrist
 
worn. Uses include emergency, recreation, business,
 
rescue, etc.
e 	 CNCPT DESCRIPTION 
Multichannel switching satellite and wrist transmitter- f
 
receivers connect people anywhere to each other directly
 
or to telephone netwoiks. Analog or vocoded voice used na.l
 
* CHARACTERISTICS 
* WEIGHT 16,000 lb 	 a' 
* SIZE 	 200 ft dia antenna 
COVERD* RAW POWER 	 21 kW 
* ORBIT Synch. Equat. 	 C)
* CONSTELLATION SIZE 1 
* 	 RISK CATEGORY I (Low
* TIME FRAME 	 1990 
o IOC COST (SPACE ONLY) 300M 
o PERFORMANCE E - 2POWER - 25 m 
25,000 simultaneous voice channels, each shared by BnrM UF
 
up to 100 users: 2.5 million people communicate by U00nIuou d
 
normal voice. vEcoN F
 
TIEMPROME ADORM,. 
* BUILDING BLOCK REQUIREMENTS 	
__ j 
* TRANSPORTATION Shuttle and largeltandem tug or SEPS 
o ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS Automated or manual servicing unit; assembly on orbit 
o SUBSYSTEMS 	 Attitude control; antenna; processor; repeatero TECHNOLOGY 	 Large multibeam antenna; multi-channel repeater: LSI processor, multiple-accesso OTHER Wris transceiver, LSI technology 	 techniques 
SOURCE: I. BEKEY, H.L. MAYER AND iG. WOLFE, ADVANCED SPACE SYSTEM CONCEPTS AND THEIR ORBITAL
 
SUPPORT NEEDS (1980-2000), VOLUME III: DETAILED DATA - PART I: CATALOG OF INITIATIVES,
 
FUNCTIONAL OPTIONS, AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS AND GOALS, ATR-76(7365)-1, VOL. III (EL
 
SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA: THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION, APRIL 1976), P. 32.
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the required transport, communication, manufacturing systems, and space
 
colonies as they are needed. Many of the costs of 20th century subsystems
 
are estimated by von Puttkamer, although the full required annual space
 
budgets are not projected. His concepts and schedules would be compatible
 
with the early developments of our Optimistic Scenario and in part with
 
our Moderate Scenario.
 
Perhaps the most prolific designer of potential space industrial sys­
tems has been Dr. Krafft Ehricke of Rockwell International. A good review
 
by Ehricke of his contributions is available in recent Congressional Hear­
ings entitled Future Space Programs 1975. Ehricke offers a complete
 
package with philosophical justifications, original space concepts, trans­
portation system requirements, engineering designs, and cost estimates.
 
Many of'his concepts are explicitly or implicitly included in the Opti­
mistic Scenario, Many other excellent contributions by other space scien­
tists are found in the above reference; these have furnished us with con­
siderable guidance.
 
Probably the single most useful guide to NASA's future course is its
 
Outlook for Space report.* This thorough 1975 study examines the techno­
logical options and the socio-political milieu in which NASA expects to
 
operate over the balance of this century. It appears that NASA's near­
term program will be oriented more heavily toward earth applications
 
satellites and R&D for future space industrialization and that this trend
 
will probably continue for some time. This does not imply that space
 
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, Future
 
Space Programs 1975, A Compilation of Papers prepared for the Subcommittee
 
on Space Science and Applications. 94th Cong., Ist sess., September 1975,
 
Committee Print, 2: 59-65. (See, also, footnote on p. 74.)
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Outlook for Space,
 
SP-386 (Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Technical Information Office,
 
January 1976).
 
science and exploration will be ignored, but that their share of the
 
budget will be under some stress--an experience which can be quite painful
 
when the budget is not expanding. Over the very long term, however, there
 
appear to be many important factors which will determine the nature and
 
size of the space development effort. These are considered in the next
 
section.
 
E. 	Future Space Program: Long Term
 
The major factors which we believe will affect the pace of future
 
space developments are listed in Table IZ.
 
The first factor or "key" is that future space technology must be
 
successful. The main specific item is a sharp reduction of the costs of
 
sending men and materials into orbit. As mentioned earlier many scien­
tists believe that straightforward R&D can reduce transport costs by
 
about a factor of 10 by the end of this century. This outcome "requires
 
no great breakthroughs in basic propulsion systems. It is based upon the
 
use-of hydrogen-oxygen engines, larger reusable vehicles, and evolving
 
designs optimized through computer-assisted analysis. The estimated
 
factor of 10 would probably apply only to automated "freighters" whose
 
acceleration would not be limited by the presence of human beings. During
 
the balance of this century manned operations in space projects will prob­
ably be minimized. In any event the bulk of the payloads sent to space
 
will not be human beings for several decades. The above transport costs
 
can be greatly reduced if and when metallic hydrogen becomes available as
 
a fuel or if practical techniques are developed to transmit high levels
 
of power to the vehicle from the ground or from space during its ascent.
 
Both of these developments are conjectural at present.
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Table 12
 
KEYS TO LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE
 
1. SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY
 
DECLINING TRANSPORTATION COSTS TO NEAR-EARTH ORBIT
 
EFFICIENT SPACE TUG ENGINES
 
ORBITING SPACE BASES AND PROFITABLE INDUSTRIES
 
RELIABLE "INTELLIGENT" ROBOTS
 
LUNAR COLONIES
 
PLANETARY SPACE STATIONS AND COLONIES
 
2. 	TOURISM
 
"INEXPENSIVE" SAFE TRANSPORT
 
SPACE HOTELS, HOSPITALS, CONVENTION CENTERS
 
EXCITING JOURNEYS
 
3. POSITIVE HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
 
PHYSICAL--MENTAL--EMOTIONAL
 
LONGEVITY
 
4. 	INTERACTIONS WITH EARTH
 
INCREASING PRIVATE INVESTMENT
 
NATIONAL ENTHUSIASM
 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
 
5. 	QUALITY OF "FRONTIER-LIFE"
 
FAVORABLE SOCIAL DYNAMICS
 
BENIGN POLITICS
 
RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH
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Without going into detail about the other items on the technology
 
list we can, with considerable confidence, assert that the indicated
 
developments are likely to be successful. The history of space tech­
nology, indeed of high technology generally, supports this conclusion in
 
addition to the fact that the path toward such solutions is reasonably
 
well understood. Space scientists are confident that the near-term goals
 
can be met, but they cannot know whether the desire to-attain these tech­
nological goals is sufficient to create the funding. The space "freighter"
 
or a VTOVL-SSTO-HLLV (translated: Vertical Take Off and Vertical Landing,
 
Single State To Orbit, Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle) as indicated earlier,
 
might require about $10 billion just for the R&D. With such a large
 
investment it is clear that a large-scale launching program must be con­
templated, else the capital requirements could not be amortized without
 
making the launch costs prohibitive. The full array of vehicles required
 
for an advanced space transportation system would need to include space
 
tugs for transferring payloads to new orbits or to other planetary bodies.
 
Also, landing systems will be required if these payloads are to be deliv­
ered to planetary surfaces. These additional vehicles generally would be 
smaller than the freighter. Preliminary designs for many of them have 
already been drawn. 
Space tourism appears to be an inevitable follow-on to the indicated
 
technological developments. Once the costs of space launching have been
 
sufficiently reduced and safety is sufficiently assured the interest in
 
space travel or tours undoubtedly will lead to an accommodating industry.
 
This industry, initially, could only cater to the wealthy as a space tour
 
even around the year 2000 might cost roughly $100,000 for a few days,
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perhaps a week, in orbit. However, if transportation costs continue to
 
fall and personal income continues to rise as we have .projected, then
 
space tourism beginning in the 21st-century can become a unique industry
 
that appears to have a potential to continue growing for well over the
 
interval of this study; that is, beyond 2176, the U.S. Quadricentennial.
 
Indeed, the onset of a space tourist industry would increase the
 
utilization of space vehicles and thereby help to reduce the unit trans­
portation costs. Increasing tourism would soon create a need. for other
 
space facilities: hotels, hospitals, even convention centers and museums,
 
eventually. As transport costs drop, tours will undoubtedly be extended
 
to visit lunar installations, space industrial facilities, and space
 
colonies. Tours might become a month long rather than a few days--espe­
cially while high launch costs tend to preclude repeat visits.
 
Over time the expected number of space tourists is strongly scenario
 
dependent. We offer some projections in Figure 8 that may be orienting-­
not because they are "correct" but because they indicate the vast differ­
ences that are possible as we move from an optimistic to a pessimistic
 
future from a space development point of view. The great spread between
 
these projections are related mainly to two factors: the average per
 
capita income and the projected launch costs in dollars per pound. In
 
the Pessimistic Scenario about .1 percent of the world's population
 
annually would tour outer space, even after 200 years. In the Optimistic
 
Scenario almost anyone who wants to tour can do so after about 150 years
 
and more than 10 percent do so, annually. Indeed, after 2100, the many
 
purposes of space travelers makes the term, tour, inappropriate in the
 
latter case.
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Figure 8 
SPACE TOURISTS/YEAR
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Perhaps the most critical of the "Keys" in Table 12 is that related
 
to the health of human beings spending long periods of time in space;
 
particularly for people who would live "permanently" in space colonies
 
and, of course, for those born in space. Currently, so little is under­
stood about potential health problems and solutions to them that we can­
not confidently project whether living in space will, on balance, be
 
beneficial or deleterious to a person's health. Even if the effect is
 
small, the difference between a net health benefit and a net health
 
deficit can be enormous to any program inwhich people occupy space
 
installations.. If the net benefits are positive there would be no limit
 
to the numbers of people who might over time prefer to live in space.
 
If the net effect upon health is negative, then, except possibly for a
 
few eager space buffs, working or living in space will require a sacri­
fice. This should entitle a person to some extra compensation but even
 
so it is unlikely to be attractive on a large scale--at least once the
 
novelty of living in space has worn off.
 
The health aspects of living in space will have physical, mental and
 
emotional components. The measurement of the total of these effects may,
 
in fact, become very difficult. .Suppose the body tends to become physi-.
 
cally weaker and of different proportions but the mental capacities
 
improve and the emotional reactions vary depending upon local space cul­
tures and individual proclivities. How do these get added to a net posi­
tive or negative result? Also, longevity might be different in space.
 
However, it is not unlikely that by the time substantial numbers of people
 
are living, in space--perhaps after 2025--that the average life expectancy
 
on earth might by then have increased to 100 years, or more. In that case
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longevity in space might not become established until the 22nd century,
 
except possibly for the results of animal experiments--which might not
 
be-convincing.
 
During the next 50 years the life sciences are expected to experi­
ence a radical transformation, as they are in a state of "exploding"
 
progress currently. Certainly, after that much time, much more accurate
 
statements could be made about a person's state of health and of the
 
effect of space travel or space living upon this state and upon the aging
 
process. Whenever such assessments can reliably be made they could prove
 
crucial to space developments requiring the long-term presence of many
 
people. Our more optimistic projections specifically assume at least­
small net health and/or longevity benefits; in the more pessimistic pro­
jections the health effects are at best uncertain.
 
The fourth key to space development is related to the driving forces
 
on earth. These are on three levels. First; commercial space activities
 
must be profitable. Whether financed by private investors; quasi-public
 
institutions, or governments, they will have to become profitable if they
 
are to receive the infusions of capital required for.continual growth.
 
For prolonged rapid growth the required capital flow can become enormous;
 
as can the annual value of space production. The potential growing dis­
parity of these results for three scenarios is illustrated by the projec­
tions of Table 13.
 
These are mind boggling numbers, especially those of the Optimistic
 
Scenario. But even the end result of the Pessimistic Scenario might
 
leave today's space agencies at a loss for projects. on which to spend such
 
funds. Moreover, because of technological advances an investment should buy
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Table 13 
PROJECTED ANNUAL INVESTMENTS AND
 
PRODUCTION IN SPACE
 
($ TRILLION)
 
2000 2025 2050 2076 2100 2125 2150 2176
 
#1 B .015 .045 .075 .14 .20 .30 .4 .5 
PESSIMISTIC P - - .003 .01 .03 .10 .3 .5 
SCENARIO T .015 .045 .078 .15 .23 .40 .7 1.0 
#2 B .03 .11 .35 0.7 1.2 2 2.8 3
 
MODERATE P - .01 .05 0.2 .4 1 2.8 6
 
SCENARIO T- .03 .12 .40 0.9 1.6 3 5.6 9
 
#3 B .10 1.0 5 20 50 90 200 500
 
OPTIMISTIC P .02 .4 4 30 180 900 3,600 12,000
 
SCENARIO T .12 1.4 9 50' 230 990 3,800 12,500
 
B = BUDGETS AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
 
P = ANNUAL ECONOMIC PRODUCTION, IN SPACE
 
T = TOTAL, (B + P) 
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much more after 200 years than today. Transportation costs alone are
 
projected to decrease by about a factor of 30 even in the pessimistic
 
case.
 
The second driving force is national enthusiasm. Whether or not
 
the profitable commercialization of space is rapid,nmany aspects of space
 
exploration and development are known to be extremely important for basic
 
sciences. In addition, we can anticipate many valuable spinoffs.from the
 
technological developments, as well as new services to society. National
 
pride in these accomplishments will be.a significant factor. It probably
 
accounts for much of the current wave of interest in science fiction that
 
in the U.S. is being expressed through books, movies,- and television. A
 
growing national interest and pride in space accomplishments'will be
 
required if the public funding of these activities is to increase over
 
time in real terms. Prolonged national enthusiasm appears to be a pre­
requisite-for an optimistic outcome.
 
Finally, and, potentially of great importance over the long term, is
 
a requirement for international cooperation. Space development will be
 
very expensive, at least for several decades. Without cooperation each
 
interested nation would have to fall back on its own resources, a path
 
which would effectively prevent most of them from participating and which
 
might greatly impede those which do. Competition is often desirable in
 
many enterprises on earth. Cooperation often tends toward a stagnating
 
bureaucratic monopoly. However, for space development such an outcome
 
appears unlikely for at least many decades. The value of a cooperative
 
effort is currently being demonstrated by the existence of the ESA (Euro'
 
pean Space Agency) and by its joint venture with NASA in the Spacelab
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program. Moreover, without such cooperation the persistence of competi­
tion, growing competition, could lead to unduly great difficulties in
 
resolving potential conflicts of interest in many extraterrestrial regions.
 
Eventually unresolved questions of who owns or has prior rights to 
certain preferred regions of space may become a constant irritant to 
international relations. All of the preferred regions of space are not 
yet known, but we can guess at a few. For exampTe, at least four of the 
five La Grange points are of potentially very special importance because 
these are the only stable space points in cis-lunar space (stable with 
respect to the earth-moon axis--see Figure 9). The four points are L, 
L2, L4, and L5 (L3 is omitted only because we are unaware that someone 
has yet conceived of a special use for it). Other special points or 
regions would be the poles of the moon where nearly perpetual sunlight 
might be available and where water is most likely to be found in nearby 
craters; and the moon's "equator" (the line around the moon's surface 
which lies in the plane of the moon's orbit about the earth). This 
"equator" should be the most valuable for launches into cis-lunar space-­
especially for launching of lunar materials, destined for any of the 
La Grange points, with an electromagnetic accelerator constructed on 
the moon's surface. Even the earth's large but unique Geosynchronous 
Orbit, a circle with about a 160,000 mile qircumference, might in time 
become crowded. Can segments of this circle be claimed for national 
rights? 
Perhaps of even greater importance would be the need to feel that
 
over the long term space installations and satellites would be safe from
 
military threats. Orbiting manned space stations crossing over enemy
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LA GRANGE POINTS OF THE EARTH-MOON SYSTEM
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territory during periods of overt hostility might become particularly
 
stressful places to be "trapped" in--especially if any deliberate damage
 
to space satellites had already occurred. While space warfare might be
 
preferable to terrestrial warfare, it can hardly but create an atmosphere
 
restrictive to peaceful developments in space--especially, manned space
 
installations.
 
One specific area inwhich international cooperation or space law
 
may become very important is related to space debris. The tendency to
 
assume that space outside the earth's envelope is so large that man-made
 
debris may be ignored has certain limits. Natural processes will always
 
provide regular cleaning services to some extent. For example, gaseous
 
emissions are swept away by the solar wind when not otherwise captured
 
by atmospheric envelopes. Objects orbiting within 250 miles of the
 
earth's surface generally will be captured in less than a decade, or
 
perhaps much less, the time depending on the geometry of the orbits and
 
the sizes and shapes of the objects. Perhaps the most dangerous kinds
 
of debris are those of small but greater than microscopic size--e.g.,
 
orbiting remnants of explosive bolts or small bits of debris produced
 
by random collisions among uncollected orbiting objects. These bits of
 
millimeter- or centimeter-sized objects might accumulate to dangerous
 
proportions in long-lived orbits if their formation is not effectively
 
prohibited by appropriate space law. The contemplated future transport
 
of raw materials from the lunar surface to various earth orbits must be
 
accomplished without "leakage i especially if, as has been visualized by
 
O'Neill and others, the raw materials are to be catapulted into space
 
and,subsequently collected. It is not too early to attempt to visualize
 
all the kinds of space debris which might become dangerous and to devise
 
ways to ameliorate the potential threat. Certainly the principle of keep­
ing space--especially cis-lunar space--safe from collision with man-made
 
debris must soon become an essential part of space ethics.
 
Thus, although it appears that international cooperation in develop­
ing space would be rewarding for all concerned, history alone would sug­
gest that such cooperation is at best temporary. But history itself is
 
an unreliable guide to the degree of future international cooperation or
 
its effect upon the outcome of space developments. However, history has
 
shown that competing nations are often willing to make great sacrifices.
 
Then, and often only then, are the pressures great enough to cut red tape,
 
to accelerate their programs, and to take the risks required to prevail.
 
Cooperative ventures, on the other hand, usually need to achieve a con­
tinuing consensus, sometimes there is a reluctance to spend more than'(or
 
even as much as) the original commitment, and much haggling may occur
 
over proper sharing--especially if there is an overrun or change of plan.
 
Furthermore, no single nation may get great credit for a successful out­
come and the psychological potential for exhilaration tends to be dimin­
ished.
 
The above characterization is often but not always true. Coopera­
tion can cause high morale when it creates something important that most
 
people approve of. One can imagine for example a very large multi­
national effort to build a cooperative lunar facility that is enthusias­
tically supported by the participants, even while some of the subsidiary
 
Gerard K. O'Neill, The High Frontier: Human Colonies in Space
 
(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1977).
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component efforts remain competitive. A cooperative lunar effort could
 
also exist during any ongoing competition for leadership in earth-orbiting
 
space facilities. Thus, future space programs might achieve many of the
 
advantages of both cooperation and competition. Of course, the particu­
larly useful cooperative projects would be those which might not other­
wise be feasible.
 
It might also turn out that cooperation in large space projects
 
helps to resolve some conflicts on earth, perhaps because it refocuses
 
attention on new important areas; but to expect this outcome may be
 
wishful thinking. In the Moderate Scenario discussed later (Chapter VI)
 
we describe a lunar.venture which starts cooperatively and then, after
 
the cooperative context is severely eroded, finds that unexpected bene­
fits ensue.
 
It is also important to distinguish between minimal passive coopera­
tion and high levels of active cooperation. A tacit agreement to avoid
 
violence in space is a minimum level of passive-cooperation which should
 
be relatively easy to achieve. Investing huge sums in a joint lunar
 
space station would be a high level of active cooperation.
 
Hostile competition or even war can sometimes be conducive to space
 
developments.. Certainly, this has been true in the past (e.g., ballistic
 
missiles, anti-missiles, reconnaissance satellites,...). In the future
 
one can at least imagine, for example, a protracted war totally restricted
 
to battles in space. In this circumstance if both (or all) sides are
 
making "all-out" efforts to win, they would need to be accompanied by
 
mobilizations to acquire the maximum capability for exploiting the mili­
tarily useful resources of space. By way of analogy, much historical
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exploration and development.has been motivated by the search for military
 
bases abroad and their associated strategic considerations. Thus it seems
 
possible that space development might, paradoxically, be the recipient of
 
future benefits from either excellent cooperation or vigorous competition.
 
The last of the "keys" appears to be the most difficult to analyze.
 
It is related to assumed evolving and growing space cultures--people
 
organized into "societies" living in space. Initially, such societies
 
may have fewer than 10 people, and eventually grow to 100,000 or more.
 
the social and psychological effects of pr6longed living in space in any
 
of a variety of habitats, none -of which is presently well understood even
 
in physical terms, will have to be discovered through experience. It is
 
not at al-l clear that there are special preparations nor a selection
 
process that can be devised on earth which could assure the viability of,
 
such social systems in space. If the societies grow very large then
 
they are likely to develop internal political systems whose nature could
 
be completely foreign to our past experiences.
 
We now find only great uncertainty in the conjectures abqut the
 
processes of making psychological, social, or political adjustments.
 
Whether learning can effectively be transferred from one troubled society
 
to another or to its successor -inorder'to improve its prospects--or
 
indeed whether any troubled societies in space will actually emerge in any
 
important sense--appears to be almost completely a matter of conjecture.
 
-A"solution" contemplated by O'Neill for large space colonies to be
 
located near the L-5 La Grange point is to construct them so that they
 
appear and feel almost identical with the earth environment--at least
 
during a normal social mode--complete wi-th wind, rivers, clouds, trees,
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animals, plants, houses, and with the earth's gravity. Whether this
 
would be desirable or even feasible cannot be known for sure. It is an
 
interesting and "conservative," if expensive, concept which like any
 
other would have to endure thorough subsequent reality testing.
 
Any "solution," of course, would also have to be sustained through
 
a period of assumed rapid growth. If these societies are economically
 
viable then over time they would be expected to increase in size and
 
number, perhaps very rapidly. 'Based upon our past experiences this
 
process alone can be expected to bring additional socio-political chal­
lenges, the satisfactory resolution of which would have to evolve rela­
tively peacefully.
 
The societal problems presented here appear to be quite beyond our
 
primitive analytical'powers. We will assume that acceptable solutions
 
or resolutions are possible, postulating lesser or greater degrees of
 
difficulty according to rather arbitrary standards. Naturally, in the
 
most optimistic scenario any such problems will be overcome with the
 
least difficulty.
 
This chapter, which is largely devoted to the future of technology
 
with an emphasis on space, might appear to some critics as an indulgence
 
in "mindless" technological optimism. We would take strong issue with
 
any such accusation since we find little to Support arguments that the
 
contemplated developments cannot occur, although our judgments about
 
timing might be in error--in either direction. This is not an argument
 
O'Neill, The High Frontier.
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about the degree to which the results or consequences of such new tech­
nology'will be good or bad, on balance. That involves value or philosoph­
ical issues or judgments which are generally outside the scope of this
 
study. Rather, for those interested in space futures we are attempting
 
to make a persuasive case which will develbp a sense of technology's
 
potential for changing economic standards, qualities of life, and resolv­
ing important issues. Most of the future technologies that we have
 
described appear to be solidly "in the cards" that are yet to be dealt.
 
Indeed, some very interesting "wild cards" are possible--or even very
 
likely--that cannot now be imagined.
 
For those who have been relatively pessimistic regarding long-term
 
technological prospects, our portrayal might help to reduce such pessimism
 
and restore.some confidence in the future. Still, we have also looked at
 
the pessimistic side and found many approaching potential problems for
 
future societies, especially technological problems which relatively
 
careless societies might have to cope with. Readers interested in our
 
views in this area are referred to Chapter VIII of The Next 200 Years,
 
entitled "From Present to Future: The Problems of Transition to a Post­
industrial Society."
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Chapter IV
 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
 
PART I: THE TRIUMPH OF THE MACHINE? (1976-2000)
 
A. The Explosion of Technology
 
Although itwas not easy for national leaders in the developed coun­
tries to realize it during the 1970s, in part because of the economic
 
shocks (inflation, energy crisis, unemployment, material shortages, food
 
shortages, etc.), individual technologists were becoming aware of the
 
very rapidly growing analytical and industrial power in their fields-­
although they may not have been too aware of the parallel growing power
 
in other areas of science and technology.
 
The last to understand the new phenomenon was the New Class. Its
 
influence in the developed countries had peaked in the late '70s and sub­
sequently faded out over the next decade. By 1990 only scattered remnants
 
of its ideology remained influential. The major reason for the decline
 
was the growing general awareness that, contrary to previous conclusions,
 
competent management coupled with innovative technology could provide
 
economic growth and a generally improving quality of life--as measured by
 
health, safety and environmental purity.
 
The futurologists soon became aware of the knowledge explosion which
 
they believed "started" in the '60s (actually it was the '50s) and which
 
became a popular intellectual term in the decade of the '70s. But then,
 
because of the natural lag between new knowledge and its application, the
 
real tide of innovative technology (except for microcomputers which became
 
popular in the mid-'70s) was not to become widely observed until' the '8 0s-­
and the crescendo swelled from then on.
 
-1,08-

The technological ground swell was greatly aided by magnificent in­
ventions and developments in basic sciences, electronics, communications,
 
lasers, space exploration, and a growing array of powerful new scientific
 
instruments. Nearly all of the rapid progress in technology, in one way
 
or another, usually quite directly and impressively, was related to the
 
solid state electronic computer. In the amazing sequence of computer
 
development each new computer was itself assisted by the previous genera­
tion of computers in a scientific marvel of "bootstrapping.'
 
B. 	The Early Space Program in the U.S.
 
The development of the U.S. space program after the brilliant Apollo
 
moon landings (which, were it not for the exceptional progress in comput­
ers during the early 1960s, could easily have resulted in disaster and
 
aborted the space effort) nevertheless sank to its lowest funding level
 
just as the first Space Shuttle became operational in 1980. In that year
 
NASA's budget (in $1975) sank to $2.9 billion, its iowest level since the
 
lunar landing. The government's (that is, the public's) inability to
 
appreciate the future potential of the space program had led it to adopt
 
a wait and see attitude--while Congress allowed the inflation of the 1970s
 
to further erode NASA's real buying power--until the visible space bene­
fits became so overwhelmingly clear that it was impossible for the public
 
to continue to ignore it. The early budget history of the U.S. is~given
 
in Table 14.
 
Although this wrinkle in U.S. space program history was to be subse­
quently regretted, in-the sense of opportunities lost through short-sighted
 
delays, it also set up a psychological basis from which nearly exponential
 
growth was to occur for a very long time to come.
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Table 14
 
FEDERAL BUDGET 1961-1977
 
TOTAL NASA NASA 
FISCAL FEDERAL APPRO- APPROPRIATION 
YEAR BUDGET* PRIATION* (ACTUAL $) 
1961 $201,437 $1,758 $ 964
 
1962 212,814 3,269 1,825
 
1963 183,380 6,485 3,674
 
1964 230,511 8,863 5,100
 
1965 235,691 8,927 5,250
 
1966 268,566 8,520 5,175
 
1967 291,959 7,945 4,968
 
1968 291,780 7,023 4,589
 
1969 285,874 5,822 3,995
 
1970 294,568 5,185 3,749
 
1971 311,142 4,359 3,312
 
1972 313,531 4,183 3,310
 
1973 329,775 4,066 3,408
 
1974 341,339 3,306 3,040
 
1975 412,099 3,231 3,231
 
1976 (ESTIMATE) 385,105 3,353 3,555
 
1977 (ESTIMATE) 388,429 3,313 3,697
 
IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 1975 DOLLARS.
 
The technological heart of any space project, naturally, was the
 
electronic computer. NASA in its OFS study had stated quite clearly:
 
Without the speed and accuracy of automated data handling
 
the space ventures...would be neither practical nor possible.
 
Use of the computer now pervades all NASA activities, so much
 
so that it is surprising that its necessity was not foreseen
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in most of the science fiction written about lunar and plane­
tary 	exploration before it actually began.*
 
With 	this recognition, and with the near certainty of continuing rapid
 
increases in the power of computers and instruments, NASA recognized
 
'
that applied scientific progress was "exploding i (see Tables 7 and 8,
 
Chapter Il). Indeed, those who looked carefully also saw that the power
 
of basic theoretical science was also to be developing with continuously
 
increasing rapidity. An immense (and rapidly growing) problem-solving
 
capability with a competence that was not previously suspected except by
 
a few avant-garde technophiles was being made possible by the improved
 
sciences, the new instruments, and the leverage provided by the amazing
 
computer. With these forces working in cooperation a new set of closely
 
integrated technological marvels was to be witnessed by the world--some
 
of the greatest of which were to be in the developments in space--in its
 
science, exploration, earth applications, travel and industrialization.
 
C. 	The Earth-Centered Context
 
As the stage was being set for the burst into space after the turn
 
/ 
of the century there were a number of interesting developments "on the
 
ground" that, coupled with space information systems, were to be "arrang­
ing the chairs." We will mention a few of these here for orientation.
 
I. Energy Supplies
 
The conventional wisdom (i.e., the myth) of the early 1970s that
 
the world was running short of energy--usable, relatively inexpensive
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, A Forecast of Space
 
Technology, 1980-2000, SP-387 (Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Tech­
nical Information Office, January 1976), p. 3-3.
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energy--which so frightened the nations of the developed world at the
 
time (and gave such megalomaniacal fantasies to the OPEC countries) had
 
disappeared by 1984. It wasn't even that energy self-sufficiency had
 
been achieved anywhere. Rather, it was.by then clearly apparent, even
 
by former believers in the limits-to-growth philosophy, that such immense
 
reservoirs of energy were about to become available in natural gas, in
 
coal, in shale, in uranium and thorium; in geothermal and solar sources;
 
(and even in conventional petroleum sources--the location and extraction
 
of which had undergone a major revolution in a mere decade); in conserva­
tion by more efficient conversion to electric power, by utilization of
 
formerly wasted heat, and by new designs for efficient utilization of
 
energy; that most of the newly rich OPEC countries deeply committed to
 
industrial development programs found themselves with unforeseen worries.
 
Their market clearly would slip rapidly away unless the price of oil was
 
reduced by about 1/3 to about $10 per barrel, delivered in the U.S. The
 
decade 1985 to 1995 saw the development of inexpensive reliable solar
 
cells and a myriad of ways of adapting them to autos, trucks, homes,
 
buildings, factories, farms and central power stations--in addition to
 
the obvious implication for their potential use in space transportation
 
systems or for their application to space-based-electric generators which
 
could even supply power to the earth, if necessary.
 
Also, the anti-nuclear-power movements of the '70s had diminished
 
considerably by 1985 as the ability to control the nuclear fuel cycle
 
had become well understood technically and communicated to the public.
 
New designs promised with some confidence a steady improvement in the
 
efficiency and safety of fission reactors. Indeed, it was recognized
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that economics alone would demand this--else the fission reactor would be
 
displaced by the improving cost-effectiveness of its competitors. (Also,
 
by the late '80s the gaseous-core nuclear reactor had become the potential
 
future champion in nuclear-fission engines for space transport that
 
promised to be hard to beat. Still there was the coming competition from
 
nuclear fusion engines to "worry about.") -
Even though the economics of fusion power for earth-based systems
 
was still in doubt great strides in the technology of fusion systems
 
"popped up" every year--seemingly out of nowhere, if one's information
 
came only from news media sources--and the prospects were exciting not
 
only for inexpensive inexhaustible fusion power after 2005, but for
 
highly efficient fusion-powered engines for space transportation by 2010.
 
Also geothermal energy, the "orphan" of-the energy prospects in the
 
early '70s, had not only "surprised" the world by capturing a large share
 
bf the commercial electric power market so rapidly but the development of
 
the geothermal zones of the Gulf Coast furnished copious quantities of
 
natural gas in addition to the electric power. Moreover, it became
 
expected that this resource, worldwide, would develop a 200-year reserve
 
of natural gas. Although the initial production of this gas was only
 
barely competitive, the improvements after the turn of the century were
 
to reduce its production costs by more than half.
 
These developments were somewhat depressing to commercial interests
 
which had large investments in the solid fossil fuels. Although the
 
William M. Brown, "100,000 Quads of Natural Gas?," HI-2451/3-P
 
(Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson institute, October 1976).
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technologies associated with these energy sources had made good progress-­
especially in-situ conversion processes--their competitive prospects were
 
dimming by the year 2000. Still these technologies and the solid fossil
 
fuels would be available for as long as they were needed to facilitate
 
the transition to the cleaner abundant energy supplies.
 
2. Resources
 
To a surprising extent the worried world of the early 170s had come
 
to think of natural material resources--especially the metals--as finite
 
and exhaustible, as if they were soon to be dispersed in the sea or thinly
 
scattered over the land within uncollectable buried trash. By 1985, despite
 
a booming world economy, such images had disappeared except as amusing
 
anecdotes. In a mere 15 years technologically oriented efforts had:
 
(1) doubled the estimated recoverable resources of most for­
merly sensitive metals such as copper, lead, mercury and
 
silver;
 
(2) started mining the nodules of the sea in commercial quan­
tities;
 
(3) developed "inexhaustible" alternatives for the major uses
 
of copper, silver, mercury, chromium, lead, zinc, and
 
tungsten--at least for most of their commercial uses in
 
that year;
 
(4) developed and demonstrated recycling systems that were
 
soon to be at least 99 percent effective for recovering
 
the valuable metals from liquid wastes;
 
(5) reduced the relative amount of metals required in industry
 
by creating more efficient designs and steadily increasing
 
the use of new plastics, ceramics, glasses, and composites
 
as substitutes;
 
(6) found several new methods for extracting metallic minerals
 
from sea water, more than one of which seemed almost cer­
tain to become economic early in the 21st century; and
 
(7) probed the lunar surface and a few of the asteroids with
 
extraordinarily promising results for the 21st century and
 
beyond, when minerals from these sources would be useful
 
for a burgeoning space industry.
 
3. Environment
 
Every major developing country made very substantial progress in
 
improving air and water quality during the '75-'90 period and moreover
 
in many cases had developed ways of changing pollutants into assets. For
 
example:
 
(1) Solid wastes were turned into foods, fuels, fertilizers,
 
and mineral sources.
 
(2) SO2 pollutants became a major source of commercial sulfur
 
or sulfuric acid.
 
(3) Coal ash increasingly was used for road surfacing, concrete
 
blocks, fertilizer, a source of minerals, and desirable land­
fill projects.
 
(4) Nuclear "wastes" were increasingly providing valuable iso­
topes for industries and medical research; processes to
 
recover and return 99.99 percent of plutonium and other
 
actinides to the fuel cycle were developed and successfully
 
tested.
 
(5) Programs for the utilization of most of the formerly wasted
 
heat from power stations and manufacturing plants were
 
steadily reducing energy wastes.
 
(6) The recovery of low-level metallic wastes down to 1 ppm was
 
to become routine in all the important industries.
 
(7) Biological "pesticides" were replacing chemical ones at an
 
increasing rate.
 
By 1985 the potential utility of most of these processes had only
 
just been developed and their future utility was generally (and rightly)
 
believed to be even brighter. In the decade before 1985 many people had
 
considered the space program as a way to get rid of nuclear wastes; that
 
is,using space as an unlimited trash receptacle. Although this solution
 
was possible, others on earth were soon found to be much more feasible.
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4. Food 
Although the medium-term (2000-2025) prospects for adequate food
 
supplies were generally perceived to be very bright, the shorter term
 
needs before the year 2000 were to remain marginal or dangerous for a
 
few of the less developed countries with massive populations that were
 
dependent upon good weather and/or the good will of the food exporting
 
countries. Although their position was not secure itwas to improve
 
more or less steadily after the early 170s. Moreover, itwas realized
 
by most people in the world that, basically, the most important require­
ments for agricultural progress in the poorest countries were adequate
 
incentives for the farmer and protect'ion from a crippling bureaucracy
 
and its regulations. Effective agricultural and economic assistance was
 
to become readily available for needy regions where more and more govern­
ments helped rather than hindered the flow and utilization of such assist­
ance. As early as 1985 there were at least 30 models of developing coun­
tries that had been responsive to the emerging ethic--that aid was avail­
able to all who would accept and employ it effectively.
 
Space-based systems played a growing role in nearly all of the above
 
developments. This role was interesting, if somewhat obscure, during the
 
'70s; but by the early '80s these systems were offering such valuable
 
information to those institutions that were learning to utilize it that
 
the number of customers for NASA's programs increased at a phenomenal
 
rate. The U.S. government soon realized that an interesting source of
 
revenue was at hand and, as a result,the receipts from sales of informa­
tion from satellite systems grew rapidly--as is shown by Figure 10 for
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the period 1970-2000. This income together with a growing demand for
 
Space Shuttle services in'the '80s led to the growing NASA budgets after
 
1982. By that time it had become quite clear that NASA's information
 
from earth applications satellites was a great bargain and could be
 
sold at substantially higher prices, where that was-a desirable course
 
for the U.S. government.
 
D. Improved Space Vehicles
 
I. For Launch to Near-Earth Orbit (NEC)
 
Designs for advanced launch vehicles which could greatly reduce
 
transport costs had been sketched since the early '60s and many of the
 
promising alternatives were discussed in the 1975 OFS study. However,
 
budget constraints forced NASA to postpone any serious large-scale effort
 
until 1983. Nevertheless, enough of a useful technological base existed,
 
thanks in part to the efficient use of computer-aided designs, that when
 
the upturn in the budget occurred in the early '80s NASA was quick to
 
respond with projects for two major vehicles:
 
(1) The second-generation completely automated shuttle which became
 
operational in 1989 and reduced transport costs by about a factor of 2
 
(initially to about $150 per pound and later in that decade--after further
 
improvements--$100 per pound). It became the first vehicle to take tour­
ists to space on a commercial basis.
 
(2)*The 1/2-million-pound payload SSTO HLLV which became operational
 
in 1996 and was soon delivering non-human" payloads to.space at $18 per
 
pound and which (by 205) was-sending materials into space at the rate of
 
2 billion pounds annually. (About haif were U.S. payloads up to this point
 
in time, but this fraction was to be gradually reduced as the space capa­
bilities of other countries were increasing rapidly.) Indeed several coun­
tries (Japan, England, France, and Germany) had placed orders for one or
 
more of these vehicles and would take delivery by 2010.
 
During the late '90s radical designs were being worked on for new
 
SSTO vehicles which were again to reduce launch costs (to $8 per pound by
 
2025), in part because of the availability of metallic hydrogen as a fuel.
 
The economics of space transportation in terms of the cost for launching
 
inanimate objects into NEO for the 1976-2076 period--and the current
 
projections to 2176--appear in Figure 3 (page 81).. It must be remembered
 
that the costs for human transportation, which because of the G-restric­
tions and other required amenities, were to remain greater than average
 
"freight" costs by factors ranging between 2 and 4.
 
2. Propulsion Systems for Orbital Transfer Vehicles
 
Before the Space Shuttle became fully operational in 1980, the first
 
vehicle considered for transporting satellites from NEO to more distant
 
orbits was the Interim Upper Stage, a relatively inefficient system whose
 
chief virtues were its reliability, its low cost to develop and manufac­
ture,and its availability when the Shuttle became ready for routine use.
 
However, the costs in using this transfer vehicle were relatively high;
 
since it used solid propellants it was an inherently heavy and non-reusable
 
system. Therefore, before the Shuttle became operational NASA contractors
 
had developed a modified orbital transfer vehicle, the Spinning Solid
 
Upper Stage. This non-reusable vehicle was still encumbered with solid
 
propellants but was considerably more efficient for many purposes. These
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two vehicles clearly constituted a stopgap arrangement for orbital trans­
fers, mandated by the tight budgets of the '70s.
 
To complete the Space Transportation System (STS) many concepts and
 
preliminary designs for the required new orbital transfer vehicles existed.
 
These advanced "space tugs" only needed the caress of new funding to
 
enter into serious competition for the future STS. They started to pour
 
out of the design boards during the early '80s and by the end of the
 
century an imposing array of new alternatives from the Solar Sail to the
 
Fusion Engine were available or in development (see Table 15).
 
E. Space Industrialization
 
Prior to the Space Shuttle era one of the more difficult concepts
 
for the public to accept as a coming reality was that of "floating
 
factories" in space. Naturally, the earth-centered mind had difficulty
 
envisioning a steel mill or copper smelter in orbit. This is quite
 
understandable--particularly if one had visited any such installation
 
on earth. However, the MISS (Made In a Space Station) concept had pene­
trated the minds of space technologists frequently enough that by 1980
 
the detailed plans for early ventures in space manufacturing and con­
struction were well along and indeed some preliminary notions had been
 
tested, in principle, during the earlier space flights of the '70s.
 
Still, after the first successful Shuttle-based experiments were
 
reported by the news media in 1980, it took a few years for the public
 
to begin to adjust to the approaching reality--that space could become
 
increasingly and relatively rapidly industrialized--even though an orbit­
ing steel mill was not a likely prospect for a 20th-century venture.
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Table 15
 
SPACE TUGS IN OPERATION OR IN
 
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE 2000
 
PROPULSION CONCEPT" YEAR DEMONSTRATED
 
1. IUS AND SSUS (SOLID PROPELLANT) 
 1980
 
2. SOLAR SAIL 1982
 
3. CHEfMICAL (F2-N2H4) 1983
 
4. ION ENGINE (Hg) 1985
 
5. CHEMICAL (F2-H 2 ) 1986
 
6. COLLOID THRUSTERS 1987
 
7. E-M ACCELERATOR (MPD) 1988
 
8. BEAMED ENERGY 1991
 
9. NUCLEAR FISSION 1992
 
10. ADVANCED METASTABLE CHEMICALS 1996
 
11. ADVANCED NUCLEAR FISSION 1997
 
12. NUCLEAR FUSION (Ist GENERATION) 2000
 
IUS: INTERIM UPPER STAGE
 
SSUS: SPINNING SOLID UPPER STAGE
 
E-M: ELECTRO-MAGNETIC
 
MPD: MAGNETOPLASMODYNAMIC
 
CHEMICAL SYMBOLS--Hg: MERCURY
 
F: FLUORINE
 
N: NITROGEN
 
H: HYDROGEN
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Perhaps the completion and operation of the first space station in 1983,
 
followed by the construction of the 100-meter-diameter antenna in 1984--.
 
both highly publicized and well-photographed events--were among the more
 
significant experiences which affected the public's space imagery. Through
 
television they were able to become "sidewalk superintendents" of these
 
milestone events and were thereby easily able to bridge a gap which other­
wise would have required a quantum jump in imagination.
 
The early prototype MISS products soon became highly valued collec­
tors' items. The first crystals, alloys, whiskers, silicon chips, glasses,
 
castings, and ball bearings from the space laboratories indeed became
 
prized museum pieces. But more important was the spreading knowledge of
 
the special properties and commercial uses of MISS products and processes-­
and of the potential for large space structures.
 
Having witnessed the construction of the first relatively simple
 
installations in the form of modular depots, habitats, R&D laboratories,
 
etc.; the elaboration of the more complex space stations to come could be
 
more readily depicted and accepted. Thus, the psychological stage was
 
set for a flurry of new interest in the development of Space Industriali­
zation (SI). Shortly afterwards, in the '80s, when it became understood
 
that excellent profits might also result from many of these ventures and
 
that the potential for future growth was very large (some claimed "un­
limited"), the fancy of many investors was ensnared and the first boom
 
in Space Industry stocks was on. Of course, there were some foolish
 
enough to make naive investments, and in those days some unscrupulous
 
commercial promotors existed who preyed upon emotional outbursts of this
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type. But the few cases of incompetence or fraud did not seriously de­
tract from the reality of the impending developments. The first major
 
commercial SI facility was completed in 1991. It was nearly completely
 
automated, yet about 60 people had to live in space just to operate and
 
maintain the facility. Its first products were biological materials of
 
great purity unavailable from earth-bound processes (vaccines, hormones,
 
enzymes) and processed silicon "chips" for computers. This facility was
 
followed only five years later by one more than 10 times as large,operated
 
by about 150 people. Soon after that production in space as a concept was
 
to become routinely accepted. A "steel mill" in space was expected to be
 
only a matter of time--at least it could no longer be a startling surprise.
 
The space technologists, of course, were thinking more about high-tech­
nology processes involving computers, lasers, robots, space vehicles,
 
colonies and lunar supplies.
 
F. 	Lunar Program
 
By the early '90s there were enough space tugs available to establish
 
and 	supply a manned lunar base. The first arrivals (from a joint U.S.
 
in 1992 to set up a permanent
and U.S.S.R. project) landed on the moon 

station for scientific and exploratory purposes. Two colonies were set
 
up, one on the far side of the moon to permit optimum astronomical obser­
the near side for a general research laboratory and
vations, the other on 

exploration center. By the end of 1993 twenty people were living on the
 
moon 	and supplies were being delivered regularly for developing their
 
underground habitats and their surface operations. These first colonists
 
(15 men, 5 women) were an extremely capable group which, within a year,
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had found sources of water on the moon that-in some places could be
 
reached by wells less than 500 feet deep. This discovery made it certain
 
that the moon would soon become an extremely important link in future
 
space programs.
 
In principle, the moon could soon provide essentially all the mate­
rial needs of its inhabitants and become a relatively inexpensive source
 
of materials for space structures and of propulsion fluids for space
 
vehicles. By the end of the century there were 275 colonists and the
 
observatory was in its 4th year of operation. During the next. quarter,
 
the industrial program for developing lunar resources was to make possible
 
the construction of the first large colony in space at the L-5 "point."
 
A major goal of the 20th-century lunar colonists was to establish
 
the feasibility of using the moon for many purposes other than scientific
 
observations. Although the anticipated scientific rewards related to
 
astronomy, geology, and astrophysics alone were believed to be sufficient
 
to make the venture worthwhile, the huge long-term payoff depended upon
 
the successful solution to a number of problems such as (1) finding water;
 
establishing a "nearly" closed-cycle ecology; demonstrating the feasi­
bility of living comfortably for years at 1/6-G and returning to earth
 
without deleterious health problems; establish the feasibility of mineral
 
exploration and mining; and successfully resolving the sociological prob­
lems which tend to arise in any new environment, but which could be espe­
cially severe when the change is as sudden and as encompassing as that
 
posed by the airless "barren" moon where each lunar day is 14 times longer
 
than an earth day.
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If the satisfactory resolution of these problems could be achieved
 
then the feasibility of colonizing not only the moon but the "whole solar
 
system" might be established, in principle. That this lunar .feat was
 
essentially accomplished by the year 2000, less than 50 years from the
 
time that the first small earth satelli-te was launched,provides a stunning
 
perspective on the great technological transition that characterized the
 
second half of the 20th century. (During that time, paradoxically, many
 
citizens, and even some national institutions, were actually demanding a
 
return to a simpler way of life on the grounds that there would be insuf­
ficient energy and materials available at reasonable costs to support for
 
long the ordinary earth-centered activities of human civilization.)
 
G. 	First Tourists
 
After the second-generation Shuttle became operational in 1989
 
(officially the last year of the Bicentennial celebration), a prior plan
 
was 	carried out to demonstrate the utility of this vehicle by introducing
 
the 	public to the concept of commercial space tours. This tour was a
 
very well publicized three-day voyage to near-earth orbit which included
 
a rendezvous with the recently completed international Space Station,
 
within which the "tourists" were accommodated. The passengers for this
 
voyage were NASA's director, the governor of Texas, 2 Senators, 6 Con­
gressmen, the French ambassador and 12 other VIPs, together with Marion
 
Scott and Elizabeth Welsh, the best-known movie actor and actress in the
 
U.S.
 
The special two-hour videotape documentary of the event became a
 
tremendously popular worldwide sucess--in large part because the enthu­
siasm emanating from the famous actors was vividly conveyed by their
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spontaneous behavior during the voyage. Inaddition their subsequent
 
"orchestrated" television appearances further stimulated public interest
 
in space projects--especially space tours. By means of this single event,
 
for the average citizen the potential of space ventures was transformed
 
away from its prior "fictional aspects"and could be perceived as a
 
growing set of real activities with great commercial promise. Of course,
 
the social utility of the space program, as it became recognized, made it
 
increasingly popular. This utility was achieved mainly through the use
 
of earth-application satellites and advanced COMSATs, but also because of
 
scientific advances made possible by space probes and planetary-exploration.
 
For example, Future Space Developments became a subject taught in schools
 
around the world. However, the realization by average-citizens that per­
haps they, too, or certainly their children, might safely visit outer
 
space--perhaps even stroll on the moon--was crucially important in creat­
ing favorable public attitudes. Outer space, more and more, became a real
 
world which anyone might experience, in principle; and for those who had
 
a sufficiently strong desire, the possibility now existed to actually go
 
up there--at least once.
 
Indeed by the end of the century a new company, International Space
 
Tours, Inc., announced that 1200 people would "tour outer space" that year
 
in the first.commercial system 1i.censed for that purpose. The cost that
 
year was to be $150,000 for a one-week tour confined to near-earth orbit.
 
Still, the demand for seats was at least ten times the capacity of the
 
system--even at that price. Itwas a good start for-a fledgling business,
 
one that was destined to become one of the world's largest.
 
H.. International Cooperation
 
The Apollo moon landings in large measure had been driven by the.
 
need felt by the Uhited States to recover its (Sputnik) shattered image
 
as the world's leader in science and technology. The Americans assumed
 
it was a race and gave it the resources required to win--even though the
 
Soviet Union denied it was entering the contest. The enormous prestige
 
that the Americans gained around the world from the successful program
 
soon after frittered away as the gloomy national malaise of the '70s set
 
in. The flood of socio-political problems during and after the Vietnam
 
involvement turned the public away from "large" space budgets. The con­
ventional wisdom of the '70s claimed that, instead of billions of dollars
 
for "a few moon rocks,"the money should be allocated for social purposes.
 
The one-sided space race had indeed ended. As NASA's budget declined and
 
its world-renowned capability eroded during the decade of the '70s, NASA
 
wisely attempted to stretch its resources through promoting cooperation
 
in space ventures with the rest of the developed-world, including the
 
U.S.S.R. The cooperation effort was publicly announced but was not trusted
 
by many Americans,who tended to see the Soviets as a potential enemy. But
 
the cooperation became effective, in fact as well as words. Although its
 
beginning was slow the interaction among the various national space agen­
cies was to bloom into an enormously rewarding program for all humanity.
 
The major milestones of the 20th century were the U.S.-S.U. Apollo-

Soyuz linkup of 1975; the 1980 Shuttle launching of the'Spacelab module
 
built by the European Space Agency; the first space tour mentioned
 
above; and, perhaps most significant, the international funding in 1988
 
of the $50-billion 10-year program for the so-called Super Shuttle STS-­
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the first fully reusable unmanned SSTO 1/2-million-pound vehicle for
 
launching payloads to near-earth orbit, in addition to a new array of
 
advanced "space tugs" to complement this launch capability. The program
 
..grew to $100 billion as an extension and measure of its success,-not be­
cause of cost overruns. NASA had the central responsibility and continued
 
its successful management history by keeping within the budget. The
 
design of a second-generation SSTO vehicle that evolved before the end of
 
the century was a modification to incorporate the technology of the new
 
superfuels (which contained a large fraction of mono-atomic hydrogen) and
 
which became feasible in 1995. Shortly after the turn of the century this
 
vehicle tripled the SSTO's payload capability, with the same gross weight
 
at lift off (10 million pounds).
 
The major benefits from the cooperative international.effort included
 
(1)avoidance of duplicated development through technological exchange,
 
(2)earlier funding of huge projects, (3) the establishment of interna­
tional laws and procedures for settling disputes about "rights" in space
 
and planetary bodies, and (4) perhaps most important, the effective re­
striction of space to peaceful purposes (of course, observation satel­
lites obviously could be used for military intelligence, but weapons in
 
space were strictly forbidden).
 
The international cooperation, which skeptics originally predicted
 
would soon decline or collapse for the usual political reasons, developed
 
instead an unexpected aura of the kind that is associated with successful
 
enterprises and resulted in the rapid sharing of information, mutual tech­
nical assistance, and a surprising minimum of friction among the dedicated
 
personnel. Indeed, in each participating country an attitude developed
 
among those associated with the space program that resisted the political
 
pressures to obtain special "advantages." Since projects for the develop­
ment of space were able to avoid many of the usual national struggles for
 
material advantages or ideological goals, it is not surprising that the
 
space community increasingly became international, or rather, intrasolar
 
in its perspective.
 
1. 	The Space Culture
 
In each nation the natural heroes of those interested in the move­
ment 	into space were the astronauts. In manned space ventures the work
 
to be done literally became a full-time occupation--roughly a 100-hour
 
week. Quite generally an astronaut's occupation also became his primary
 
recreation. A self-selection process evolved that effectively weeded out
 
any aspiring astronaut who was less than completely dedicated to space
 
projects. Of course, the competition became fierce and remained so for
 
over 50 years as the astronaut profession became the one most desired in
 
technologically advanced societies. The successful competitors became a
 
new elite group with a commitment to their profession that evolved into
 
a new kind of "religion"; one in which they were viewed as the "high
 
priests"--yet no formal rituals or dogmas were practiced or needed.
 
The space culture was not planned, it just happened; and as it grew 
it gradually transcended the former boundaries or "bond" of chauvinistic 
nationalism. This attitude was not always understood by those outside 
the "space community" even though it became a prominent theme in the com­
munications media. The direct physical experiences of transcending the 
surface of the earth had created a psychological counterpoint which led 
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to a transcendence of the earth-centered national traditions and cultures.
 
The sociological develppment.became one of the major factors which led to
 
phenomenal changes in the 21st century and beyond.
 
J. Health in Space
 
In the 20th century it was recognized that one of the crucial factors,
 
perhaps the most crucial, in the long-term development of manned space
 
ventures would be related to their effects upon the health of the astro­
nauts. Inwhich ways would space travel and space-based occupations be
 
beneficial or hazardous to human health? How might the benefits be im­
proved and the hazards reduced? These questions had to be answered. If
 
astronauts had to become sacrificing martyrs then severe limits would be
 
placed on the potential of space-based civilization. Of course, it was
 
known that much could be accomplished in a space program based upon the
 
transient use of astronauts, with each one making a small .sacrifice in his
 
health. This would be accomplished by developing systems that were de­
signed to minimize the use of human beings and restricting the time any
 
one of them would spend in the space environment. However, the prevailing
 
attitudes considered such an approach as a faliback position of last
 
resort.
 
The great task for the biochemists, physiologists, physicians, and
 
other professionals in space-oriented life sciences was to find ways to
 
make the experiences in the space environment, on balance, beneficial in
 
terms of physical health, if at all possible. Numerous problems were to
 
appear, many of which were only dimly perceived at the time of the U.S.
 
Bicentennial, let alone understood. The life science research program
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which at first had been only very modestly funded became a huge effort by
 
the end of the century. Indeed it grew relatively more rapidly than most
 
space budgets and by the year 2000 exceeded $6 billion annually (worldwide).
 
By that time the major problems had been formulated and various poten­
tial solutions were in sight. In fact, by then it was confidently pre­
dicted that before long, in a carefully designed program, the health
 
benefits of space-based operations would exceed the impact of the hazards.
 
Itwas also conjectured over the next 50 years that living in space would
 
become associated with pronounced net health benefits. In fact, the
 
turning point came in the year 2020. From then on the remarkable "exodus"
 
into space became inevitable on principle. Only the timing was somewhat
 
uncertain, since additional technological developments, which were "soon"
 
to appear, were required to give the human race the ability to live
 
almost anywhere in the solar system, and eventually beyond it if they so
 
desired--but more of that later.
 
The principal health problems that had to be solved initially were
 
the ones associated with prolonged weightlessness or near-weightlessness,
 
those associated with radiation, and those associated with a closed cycle,
 
or very nearly closed cycle, operation of a space station, colony, or"space­
ship." One of the great marvels in the history of science is that not
 
only were all of these problems eventually solved, but that as an unantici­
pated result human beings born in the space environment were to be physi­
cally and emotionally more healthy, that their natural longevity is now
 
expected to increase by about 30 years, and that their mental capability,
 
on average, appears to be substantially greater as well. An improved
 
human being, substantially improved, emerged as a result of the efforts
 
of space scientists and from the natural benefits obtainable in the benign
 
space environment--once routines were developed which permitted an optimized
 
response to the various gravitational forces available to the "permanent"
 
inhabitants of space.
 
K. Spinoffs
 
That research and development is a good investment, on the average,
 
is an idea that has always seemed obvious to most-of those who value prog­
ress through technological and economic growth. For them the ongoing
 
political struggles related to R&D budgets are generally about how much
 
to invest in which kinds of R&D. In this context, one of NASA's early
 
problems arose because its rapid growth, culminating in the sensational
 
Apollo moon landings, were hard to justify to the man in the street on an
 
economic basis. Having won the "race to the moon" at a cost of about'$25
 
billion (1967 dollars), its budgets were then rapidly reduced in the sub­
sequent decade. In the '70s it was not apparent that the space effort
 
should be sustained as an economically profitable investment in R&D. It
 
was to require more than a decade for the situation to change--that is,
 
for the U.S. public to realize that their past investments in space were
 
a bargain, perhaps the best economic investment they could make at the
 
federal level. Their persuasion came about gradually as the importance
 
of the past technological spinoffs were assessed and as the potential for
 
future technological spinoffs became better understood. After all, the
 
growing importance of COMSATs, integrated circuits, pacemakers, improved
 
weather prediction, and some of the stunning prospecting successes credited
 
to the LANDSATs (to mention a very few examples) alone more than justified
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the entire historical expenditures on NASA projects up to the early '80s.
 
After that time the allocation to space-oriented projects began to grow
 
rapidly. As attitudes changed NASA was no longer seen as an interesting
 
but expensive "toy" but as the manager of one of the best investments in
 
the future that can be funded through the federal government. The space
 
program entered the '80s without any major boondoggles to mar its history,
 
while its successes were deemed not less than a catalogue of marvels by
 
most of those who took the trouble to look carefully.
 
By the early '90s, moreover, many of the important spinoffs had had
 
sufficient time to emerge from the complicated process of developing,
 
testing and marketing. By then economists had developed a conservative
 
method for estimating the economic value of space spinoffs that became
 
widely accepted as a calculation of the minimum impact--even though it
 
portrayed enviable record. In addition, the space program was given
 
credit for important contributions to basic science that could not be
 
quantified but which were publicly extolled as priceless. The discov­
eries of extraterrestrial primitive forms of life, black holes in the
 
galaxy, and unexpected pulsations in the sun, for example, led to basic
 
revisions in accepted scientific theory during the later years of the
 
20th century.
 
Paradoxically perhaps, but not unusual as a theme in man's history,
 
during the '70s funding of space projects was being eroded just when the
 
results of prior efforts were beginning to shower increasing benefits on
 
Americans, indeed on the world. In business language it was being "sold
 
short" just before its true value was about to be recognized. All this
 
changed after the early '80s. By the end of that decade the popularly
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accepted "rule" was to emerge from the well-known Apex Institute study
 
that the economic return from prior investments in space technology would
 
yield at least 20 percent per annum for 20 years--and some economists
 
argued that 40.percent-per annum would be more correct if the accounting
 
could be done properly. The changing perceptions and attitudes led to
 
the phenomenal growth In space-oriented developments that began in the
 
'80s and was to continue until the present time on a worldwide basis.
 
Private investments grew more rapidly than public ones, but did not
 
exceed them until the year 2045 because of a delayed and much smaller
 
beginning in addition to various political problems. Thus, technological
 
spinoffs of the space program, almost a throwaway concept to NASA in the
 
'70s--a straw to grasp in attempting to justify its existence and restrain
 
the budget trimmers--after 1989 were tofurnish some of the leverage which
 
reoriented the public's perception about the economic value of space
 
activities.
 
L. 	Milestones
 
From the viewpoint of space budgets and accomplishments, the last
 
quarter of the 20th century began somewhat slowly but finished with a
 
roar. A perspective on this critical period can be found in the data of
 
Table 16. It was a time of great excitement. Even in the late '90s a
 
few protesting voices could occasionally be heard predicting gloom and
 
doom 	ahead--but they were growing fainter and fainter.
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Table 16
 
U.S. SPACE DEVELOPMENT MILESTONES
 
BUDGET
 
CONSTANT $1975
 
(x l0u)
 
WORLD U.S. MAJOR U.S. SPACE ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
1976 9.0 3.4 Viking-I & II 
1977 9.0 3.3 LANDSAT-C, HEAO-A, Voyagers-I & II 
1978 9.1 3.2 SEASAT-A, NIMBUS-G, TIROS-N 
1979 9.3 3.1 Shuttle tested in orbit, HEAO-C, MAGSAT, SMM-A 
1980 9.4 2.9 Shuttle operational--SPACELAB-1, 2 
1981 9.9 2.9 4-stage IUS operational, LANDSAT-D 
1982 10.5 3.0 Solar Sail Comet Rendezvous launched 
1983 11.2 3.5 1st LEO Space Station begins assembly, Space Telescope 
launched 
1984 12.3 3.9 1st large antenna (100 meters) in GSO, 
SPACELABS-14, 15, 16 
1985 13.5 4.4 Improved Shuttle increases payload, Mars Rover landed 
1986 15 5.1 Ist Space Base--6 people, Large Chemical Tug opera­
tional, International Navigation System 
1987 17 6.0 300-meter antenna, U.S. Personal Communications System, 
Global Crop Prediction System 
1988 19 6.8 $50-Billion Program (International) for SSTO launch 
vehicle, Saturn orbiter launched, Disease Vectors System 
1989 21 7.8 Asteroid Rendezvous Spacecraft launched 
1990 23 9.0 Permanent NEO Modular Space Station--50 people, 
Global Air Pollution Analysis System 
1991 26 10.4 Ist Space Industry facility (I-MW power), Beamed Energy 
Tug operational, Severe Storm Prediction System 
1992 30 12 1st Moon colony landing (12 people), 1st Fission Tug 
tested successfully, Advanced Weather Prediction System 
1993 34 14 2-Kilometer diameter.antenna constructed, Marine 
Resources System 
1994 39 16 GSO Space Station (8 people), Asteroid Sampler launched, 
Multi-Service U.S. Communications System 
1995 45 18 1/2-million lb. payload SSTO HLLV operational, Earth­
quake Prediction System 
1996 53 21 2nd Space Industrial facility (100-MW SSPS and 150 
people), Multi-Service Int'l Communications System 
1997 62 24.5 Advanced Nuclear Tug operational 
1998 72 28.5 1st test module for L-5 Station launched (6 astronauts) 
1999 85 34 1-1/2 million lb. payload HLLV operational 
2000 100 40 Ist Fusion Tug test, Lunar colony--275 people 
TOTAL 744.2 287.0 
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OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
 
PART II: FIRST QUARTER--21ST CENTURY
 
A. Economic Growth: A 100-Year Perspective
 
During the 21st century the explosion of technology, the explosion
 
of knowledge, and the consequent increase in the wealth of the world was,
 
by this tricentennial year, 2076, to reach proportions which would not
 
have been believed possible by 99.99 percent of the citizens of the U.S.
 
a century earlier. Moreover, it is also now clear that this growth will
 
continue. In the tricentennial perspective mankind's de~tiny appears to
 
be far different from any which was visualized a 100 years earlier--except
 
for a few scattered projections by some science-fiction writers and futur­
ists. The changes that occurred in the world between 1976 and 2076 were
 
massive and pervasive, if somewhat uneven in their effects upon various
 
cultures.
 
The gross world product per capita in that 100-year-old period, to
 
the extent that such comparisons are meaningful, reached about $25,000,
 
in 1975 dollars. That is, on average a family of four now has an income
 
which ]00 years ago was associated only with millionaires. Of course,
 
the bulk of the world's population then was still associated with rela­
tively underdeveloped countries. However, these cultures have made enor­
mous progress and through increased productivity have reached $10,000 per
 
capita--an astonishing and tremendous improvement from the near subsis­
tence levels of the 20th century. Moreover, it is clear that they are
 
closing the remaining gap rapidly. Various underdeveloped nations had
 
differing and somewhat gloomy "prognoses" during the late 20th century.
 
However, after extensive assistance from the more advanced countries
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became constantly available, few doubted that more than two generations-­
roughly 50-75 years--would be needed before the former cultural distinc­
tions would be relegated to history.
 
After 2020 the prevailing ethic among the advanced cultures encour­
aged each human being to become an integrated member of the emerging
 
Solar Civilization, as optimally as possible in accordance with his or
 
her heritage and innate talents. However, the advanced societies were
 
only encouraging not demanding. Those who wished could choose instead a
 
lifestyle which was variously described as hedonistic, humanist, tradi­
tional, contented, or natural. Poverty or crime caused by inherited
 
mental defects or improverished environments found in most cultures of
 
previous centuries was to all but disappear by 2050; thus choices could
 
be made without duress. Also, little resentment was expressed between
 
those who felt themselves attracted to the 6utward-bound culture and those
 
who chose the more relaxed lifestyle of the earth-centered cultures.
 
These more traditional cultures did continue to have to cope with crimes
 
that tend to develop in relatively permissive societies which uncon­
sciously encourage what was called the "weak superego" in the 20th century.
 
Thus cheating, vandalism, theft, and some violence.still occurs--but much
 
less than before, and it does not spill over into the technological
 
societies.
 
B. The Computer--Once More
 
The electronic computer which had not only made rapid technological
 
change possible but inevitable, as is now obvious to all, by about 2025
 
reached its nearly'ultimate capability in terms of hardware. That is, by
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then its various designs had approached near enough to theoretical limits
 
that these limits would preclude more than another factor of 5. in speed
 
and another factor of 10 in memory density, or another factor of 10 in
 
reliability. Indeed reliability by that time had increased to the point
 
that the probability of failure caused by random external disturbances
 
which might affect some component of a computer--disturbances such as
 
penetrating cosmic rays or meteorites in space applications, for example-­
often determined the basic reliability of the system.
 
By 2025, in addition to near-optimum reliability, the figure of merit
 
of computers was about a thousand times greater than that in 1976. But
 
this exceptional hardware did not imply the end of progress in the comput­
ers' usefulness, In a major sense itwas just the beginning. Increasing
 
accomplishments were to arrive in an endless stream in software and in
 
computer architecture, that is in the programming, and networking of
 
large arrays of computers--as well as in ingenious adaptations to auto­
mated processing, product design, robotry, and problem solving--adapta­
tions which some people termed "artificial" intelligence even though the
 
distinction between artificial and human intelligence has become increas­
ingly blurred over time as the human-computer interface became more and
 
more intimate or intertwined.
 
The earlier fear that a computerized civilization would make humans
 
become "mechanical" has become an amusing recollection about one of the
 
myths of earlier history. The sense of freedom, the quality of life, the
 
A practical figure ofmerit is related to the-computer's purpose.
 
Generally it is based on a formula related to processing speed, memory
 
capacity, access time, data transfer rates, weight, volume, and cost.
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excellent physical health including the elimination of all bacterial and
 
viral diseases, the conquest of birth deformities and the ability to
 
prevent or release individuals from mental "boxes" such as autism, schizo­
phrenia, and severe neuroses; these all came about by the year 2025 because
 
of the computer. Within the dominant knowledge-oriented culture the
 
improved mental and emotional health helped to create a better environ­
ment inwhich each individual's productivity could be tremendously
 
enhanced--especially as the physical resources needed to assist individual
 
productivity were also constantly increasing.
 
C. Space Developments
 
1. Infancy to Adolescence
 
The second half of the 20th century is now generally regarded as
 
the infancy of space developments. During that time the utilization of
 
space for science, exploration, communications, earth observation, and
 
industry was shown to be possible and the first steps into space were
 
taken as the earth-based infrastructure was being created to support the
 
expanding program. It is logical to surmise that in those early years a
 
series of marvels or "miracles" was occurring. For the first time ever
 
human beings were actually leaving earth for missions in outer space
 
after countless millennia of surface-bound existence amid strife-torn
 
civilizations. This period of space infancy was followed by the "ado­
lescent" quarter, 2000-2025, during which the excitement of space was
 
picked up by a new generation whose heroes from childhood had been the
 
"captains" of the great spaceships (the successors to the Saturn V)--but
 
captains based upon the reality of space exploration instead of fiction.
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This quarter.was to be one of accomplishment, investment, and growth
 
that would reorient the cultures of the entire world and that would offer
 
the tangible evidence that any culture needed to understand that its
 
future could be secure and its horizons essentially unlimited. As one
 
small example, it was in this quarter that weather prediction and general
 
climate forecasting became sufficiently accurate that a new sense of cod­
fidence came to prevail throughout the world. "Knowing" the weather
 
accurately for a day or two was pleasant and, in a few specific cases,
 
vital. But of truly great importance, especially for the less developed
 
nations, was the new capability to anticipate long dry spells or unusually
 
heavy precipitation weeks or more in advance.
 
Earth-applications satellites matured into huge commercial enter­
prises that furnished "indispensable" services. Unanticipated earthquakes
 
became memories. Precise navigation became cheap. Collisions of ships
 
or aircraft virtually disappeared. No company explored for minerals
 
without first utilizing the processed data from space. No one any longer
 
feared being lost in a remote mountain or jungle (all the wrist communi­
cators and the backup "emergency-beepers" as well would have to be
 
smashed--a million-to-one probability).
 
Long-distance communication, over 10,000 miles, came to cost about
 
the same as short-distance communication of one mile. Ineither case the
 
signals traveled about 50,000 miles. But it was cheap and people used it
 
a lot--picturephone or audio as they wished. Holographic imaging was also
 
readily available, but more expensive, for situations where accurate 3-D
 
was important enough to justify the cost.
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What became particularly fascinating were the large space structures
 
and the automated machines that maintained and serviced these units. The
 
weird-looking array of teleoperators that replaced malfunctioning modules
 
and the preprogrammed robots that restored the functions could be watched
 
in action and entertained a surprisingly large audience. The earlier
 
(year 2000) estimates for the number of humans required for maintenance
 
of the large space-based communication systems were reduced by more than
 
a factor of 10 by 2025--partly because of greater reliability, partly
 
because of unanticipated advances in automated maintenance.
 
The huge space structures themselves outshone the former wonders of
 
the world. Many of them were several miles long in each direction; they
 
were the size of cities with symmetric geometries. However, they were
 
gossamer thin at close quarters and on earth would have been quickly
 
destroyed by a light wind let alone any rain, hail, earthquake, or many
 
other energetic phenomena associated with the earth's surface.
 
The array of functioning space vehicles had entered a long-term
 
trend of improvement and diversity--in accordance with specialized appli­
cations--that was to constantly increase the operational efficiency. By
 
2025, for example, launch costs to NEO had dropped to one-third of those
 
at the year 2000. This reduction coupled with increased income had made
 
space tourism a booming enterprise. As the need for human attendants for
 
space maintenance and repairs decreased, the demand for human "space
 
guides," as those who came to space to facilitate the tourist industry
 
were labeled, grew almost as fast as tourism itself. Before the end of
 
the quarter the first space hotels, hospitals, and museums were function­
ing and also, of course, the inevitable interplanetary races and other
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space sporting events (such as zero-G acrobatics and winged slaloms for
 
"indoor" competition) were burgeoning.
 
2. Space Industrialization
 
The quarter also witnessed the great Initial surge of space indus­
trialization, the growth of which was to expand exponentially as the
 
unique properties of space were coupled with advancing technology,
 
decreasing transport costs and man's ingenuity to create a vast array of
 
space products and processes. Eventually this was to lead to the con­
struction in space of computer systems, laser communications, technolog­
ical instruments, robots, cryogenic engines, space vehicles, beamed power
 
systems, and then-large orbiting colonies, to name a few of the "products."
 
The raw materials, of course, were to be increasingly obtained from lunar
 
and asteroid sources--although the latter was just beginning to be signif­
icant by 2025. The major industrial emphasis was to be increasingly
 
focused on better robots, the automated or "intelligent" machines which
 
were to do the really difficult wbrk without complaint or politicking and
 
which, once developed and debugged, tended to function extraordinarily
 
well in the non-corrosive environment outside the earth's envelope.
 
This was the quarter in which private investment in space-based ven­
tures replaced the former glamour industries on earth--in countries tsuch
 
as the U.S.) which encouraged private ventures to function in space.
 
Although many individuals "struck it rich,"that was to become less and
 
less important. It had become exceedingly clear that the benefits of space
 
development and its spinoffs would accrue to all of mankind and this fact,
 
coupled with a great reduction in economic insecurity almost everywhere
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on earth, led to a growing degree of international cooperation that would
 
have amazed the maneuvering politicians of the 20th century.
 
The first quarter of the 21st century was subsequently dubbed the
 
Great Awakening. People almost everywhere in the world "awoke" to find
 
that they were no longer to be poor; no longer to be threatened with
 
diseases or illiteracy; no longer to be victimized by weather, earthquakes,
 
or other forces of nature; no longer to be isolated from other human cul­
tures; no longer to live in fear of external invasions or of being sent
 
to war; and no longer to be unwanted dependents. The shackles on mind,
 
emotions, and physical health, were to be rapidly discarded--at least for
 
the children. All but a few of the most remote and isolated cultures
 
participated in this awakening, and those remaining few were "soon" to
 
join in.
 
By 2025 the world's investment in space ventures exceeded a trillion
 
dollars annually--a sum which if predicted seriously 50 years earlier
 
might have caused belly laughs or a call for a straitjacket. Yet it
 
was even constrained at that time, not by bureaucrats haggling over bud­
get allocations but rather by the physical limits to expansion which were
 
demanded by careful engineering and sequential decision-making based upon
 
tests and performance. Itwould have been non-productive to have spent
 
more. However, the expenditures on earth for health, education, and
 
training of the new generation, although not directly oriented toward
 
space, were to provide the capability for the rapidly expanding space­
oriented projects for a long time to come.
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3. Colonization
 
The first of the "large" L-5 colonies was started in this quarter
 
(in the year 2020, designed for 2020 inhabitants). From its inception
 
it was known to be an experiment whose failures or difficulties would
 
provide the experience which could pave the way for an enormous future
 
expansion. The stable L-5 region was cjearly one of the preferred places
 
for testing the concept that large space colonies might become one of the
 
great developments of the Solar Civilization and provide a stepping stone
 
toward the more advanced concept of large colonies which could travel
 
anywhere in solar space--perhaps even further, eventually. Naturally
 
immense unforeseen problems hampered the project during both its construc­
tion and "debugging" phases. It'was not until the year 2035 (15 years
 
later) that all the important problems Were solved and a rapid expansion
 
of the L-5 colonies could begin.
 
The same kind of difficulties did not attend the lunar base program
 
which expanded rapidly during this quarter. By 2025 there were 14,000
 
lunar colonists engaged in an array of unique projects. The scientific
 
ones emphasized astronomy, geology and closed-cycle agricultural research.
 
The technological ones concentrated on exploration, mining, food produc­
tion, surface transportation, and the now-famous electric-launch facility
 
which was first operated in 2017 and initially could "catapult" 2 tons of
 
moon-processed material per hour into space for use in earth-orbiting
 
space stations or at the.L-5 colonies.
 
Although planetary exploration by automated probes and vehic-les was
 
a continually expanding program the manned exploration of the planetary
 
bodies was to furnish its share of spectacular adventures as well as
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practical applications. By 2005 the first humans orbited Mars and landed
 
on its two small moons, Phobos and Deimos, to set up a fuel depottele­
scope and a small laboratory for observation and communication purposes.
 
By 2025 1,000 astronauts were exploring some distant planetary bodies
 
(the asteroids, Mercury and Mars) and observing others from orbiting space
 
stations where landing was not feasible (Venus, Jupiter, Jovian moons).
 
These were courageous groups of people risking life and health at the
 
farthest frontiers in the spirit of true pioneers. The superb chronicle
 
of their adventures is now taught to every child showing an interest in
 
space exploration. In retrospect it appears astonishing that 95 percent
 
of those explorers survived--although 15 percent of them had to be rescued
 
at least once.
 
Each tragic loss was an occasion for grief and subsequent agonizing
 
reappraisal. Each successful rescue, on the other hand, was followed by
 
a public celebration and a burst of renewed confidence. Neither the as­
tronauts nor the public had previously expected the survival rate among
 
the explorers of distant planets to be as high as 90 percent. Conse­
quently, despite the gloom surrounding each disastrous event, the remark­
able survival rate and the drama of the successful rescues allowed the
 
public to accept the risks involved.
 
D. 	Life Science in the Space Environment
 
As indicated earlier by the end of the 20th century a growing con­
fidence had appeared among the life scientists dedicated to improving the
 
health of space inhabitants. This confidence was bolstered by the large
 
budgets devoted to their purposes. By the year 2025 the scientists
 
believed that they had "solved the critical problems" associated with
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prolonged missions in space. The solutions were complex in the sehse
 
that the same procedures did not apply to everyone who was to spend six
 
months or more in space; rather there were, generally speaking., three
 
major categories into which individuals could be placed depending mostly
 
upon age, natural variations in adaptability, and prior exposure to the
 
space environment. For those who were best suited to space and who began
 
their careers in a weightless environment before they reached 24 years of
 
age there were no limits to the amount of zero-G exposure--only a require­
ment for a certain exercise regime and an appropriate diet. Those in
 
the most sensitive category were generally past 40 years of age with the
 
least acceptable natural adaptability; astronauts in this group were
 
required to spend at least 20 percent of their awake time in a 1/4-G
 
environment--again with a suitable exercise and diet ,program. The inter­
mediate category required 10 percent of their awake time at 1/10-G or
 
more. Those in the latter two categories usually obtained their minimum
 
G-requirements in the artificial gravity of. rotating space structures.
 
The above "solution" was an extremely satisfying one because it
 
resulted in a small health improvement at the 95-percent confidence level
 
and equivalent health (compared to an earth-bound existence) at the 99­
percent confidence level. Thus the space experience for nearly every
 
astronaut offered better health as an added bonus. More importantly, the
 
inference could be drawn that over time the relative health benefits of
 
living in the space environment would continue to increase. As these
 
benefits became more substantial they tended to encourage additional out­
ward migration.
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Exceptions to the health improvement involved various specialties:
 
for example, it included those who participated in space exploration or in
 
space races. These people accepted an unusually high exposure to space
 
radiation in pursuit of their careers. Itwas a health risk that could
 
be calculated and kept within reasonable limits but it entailed irrevers­
ible costs. Another group were the rescue and maintenance astronauts who
 
were called upon to perform emergency duties beyond the capability of the
 
robots. Again, radiation exposure beyond the limits set for standard
 
situations (space stations, lunar colonies) was the principal hazard;
 
separate (lower) standards were set for these specialists.
 
Almost as important for the long-term future of space was the con­
firmation during this quarter of the feasibility of closed-cycle "agri­
culture" for large space stations or colonies. This development made
 
possible the extensive colonization at L-5 and opened the way for long­
term (greater than 5 years) exploratory missions to various planetary
 
systems by large numbers of people. Indeed it opened up the path to the
 
eventual colonization of any habitable portion of solar space (which as
 
was later found did not exclude very much) and any habitable planetary
 
body.
 
E. Tourism
 
Perhaps, as much as any other index, the number of tourists to visit
 
space each year provided a measure of the growing interest and the eco­
nomic development in space. The number of tourists increased by about a
 
factor of 200 during this quarter--reaching 100,000 annually--and was con­
strained by capacity limits not by willing travelers. The combination of
 
increasing per-capita wealth, decreasing travel costs, and high standards
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of safety assured a boom in this fledgling industry for the foreseeable
 
future.
 
During the quarter the cost of a two-week tour including both geosyn­
chronous and near-earth orbits fell to $50,000. Moreover, higher priced
 
tours became available, including a lunar journey for some of those who
 
could afford the $400,000 fare. Still, not everyone who was willing.to
 
pay could purchase a seat. Preference was generally given to those who
 
were active in the space enterprises, including relatives--a policy which
 
led to some grumbling among those who were frequently disappointed. To
 
accommodate some of the younger or less affluent people who were eager
 
for a space tour a nonprofit lottery system was established in 2010 that
 
enabled between 200 and 500 lucky people each week to visit outer space.
 
Lottery tickets, at $100 each, became popular gifts.
 
Most people could enjoy space tourism vicariously through comprehen­
sive video programs, some of which were holographic when a 3-D effect was
 
feasible and desirable. Indeed such programming was a significant part
 
of the education of youngsters interested in the space-oriented culture.
 
But everyone knew that the truly deep aesthetic experience was only avail­
able out there in orbit.
 
F. 	Demilitarization
 
The growing cooperative nature of the international space program
 
had created some alarm in the latter part of the 20th century. The tech­
nological advances had produced a capability for very destructive weapons,
 
as well as for constructive developments. Fears that almost any space
 
installations could be quickly demolished by distant death rays might
 
have created a serious impediment to space development. However, the
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demilitarization of space began to be effective after the celebrated
 
"Solar System Treaty" between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries was
 
negotiated in 1988 and signed by all participants a year-later. By the
 
late 1980s the felt need to extend the burdensome military establishments
 
into space had weakened. Partly it was because of the high cost but,
 
more importantly, it was because of the emerging worldwide sentiment
 
that wished to establish a peaceful future in space developments for all
 
nations, for all mankind. The now-famous treaty is seen as a turning
 
point, not only for space programs but also for the subsequent waning of
 
the large national military establishments on earth. After 1987, the
 
confidence in successful solutions to the energy, mineral, environment
 
and food problems of the 1970s grew rapidly and led to stable and pros­
perous economies. This outcome coupled effectively with the new spirit
 
of international cooperation in space efforts, tending to remove earlier
 
incentives for promoting violent solutions to political problems and
 
especially for exporting such solutions. Thus, unexpectedly, 1989 came
 
to be seen in retrospect as the turning point for the demilitarization
 
of the major national powers and alliances. This change did not occur
 
quickly; it began with a slow shrinking of military budgets and over time,
 
almost imperceptibly, the earlier compelling logic for the maintenance of
 
huge arsenals gradually disappeared. Nations did not reduce their mili­
tary R&D establishments, nor did they stop building prototypes of new
 
weapons and maintaining intelligence organizations. But the overall
 
strategic tone gradually changed to reflect a new worldwide version of
 
political realities. The interest in nations conquering nations had in
 
fact vanished long before 2015, by which date it was fully and overtly
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recognized and accepted as an 6bsolete notion. There was, of course, a
 
general understanding that the tise of "another Hitler" was not impossible
 
in principle, and that a worldwide sensitivity was needed to assure that
 
such a megalomaniac could not achieve cdntrol in any of the 'leading
 
national powers. Even this fear, however, was to be essentially elimi­
nated by 2025, partly as a result of the progress in the life sciences
 
which could assure the basic mental and physical health of all citizens
 
through the prevention of genetic defects in new births. Thus, by the
 
end of the first quarter of the 21st century the world discovered that
 
peace on earth (i.e., war avoidance) had evolved and had become part of
 
the new style of life almost "by itself"--or so some claimed.
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OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
 
PART III: REFLECTIONS ON THE HALF CENTURY BEFORE THE TRICENTENNIAL
 
A. 	Maturity of Space Development
 
The 20th century was described as the infancy of space development
 
- and the first quarter of this century as its adolescence. It is now felt, 
to continue the analogy, that the world has reached a maturity in space 
during the last 50 years--however much this may appear to be nonsense a 
century from now. After 150 years of continued (some say amazing) growth 
some of us do feel a kind of maturity. Children today accept space travel 
as simply natural, much as children of the 20th century came to accept 
automobiles and aircraft. 
During its early period of development (i.e., in the 20th century)
 
annual space budgets in the developed nations were often thought of,
 
strange as it now seems, as a kind of sacrifice; or sometimes as an entry
 
fee to an exclusive "club"--composed of those nations with organizations
 
devoted to the study of space science and advanced cosmology through
 
actual exploration. ;Ordinary citizens often had little inkling that there
 
was much to be gained from this effort beyond a few planetary rocks and
 
some astronomical observations which they had been told were important,
 
though they had difficulty understanding why.
 
Today the rich rewards of the early efforts are apparent to every­
one. The frontiers of space exploration have been pushed far beyond our
 
most distant planet, Pluto, and the resources of space are being inge­
niously utilized for the benefit of humans everywhere in the growing Solai
 
Civilization. Former space budgets are now only called investments, and
 
they 	have had a long record of economic success. This year, with $20
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trillion from earth sources and $30 trillion of income from space produc­
tion being reinvested, the total of $50 trillion for space development is
 
roughly 10 times greater than the gross world product was a century ago.
 
During that Bicentennial year the U.S. Congress was debating whether the
 
(reduced) budget for NASA should be $3.6 or $3.7 billion. This year the
 
U.S. 	will invest over $11,000 billion.
 
B. 	Social and Economic Progress
 
By any historical standard, prior to this century, the world has
 
become relatively very wealthy in a very short time. Poverty, crime7
 
and disease no longer have the mea6ings which existed "way back then'-­
during the U.S. Bi.centennial, for example. Poo'r people today are so
 
labeled because they choose to be poor; that is; to live in the "style
 
of their forefathers" without the benefit of hundreds of robots, without
 
specialized knowledge, without participation in most of present technology
 
and, naturally, disdaining space travel. Of course they are well provided
 
for in terms of food, housing, surface travel and health care; and most
 
of them are i-nvolved in their own forms of arts and crafts, sports and
 
recreation. Generally these groups are held together by their religious
 
convictions although a few claim to be purely hedonistic. Yet they have
 
been 	a steadily diminishing portion of mankind and now constitute less
 
than 	20 percent 'of the total population.
 
The earth's population is now 9.4 billion people and is expected
 
to remain stable. The population living in space, now at 40 million, is
 
small compared to this number but it is expected to continue to grow for
 
some time. Since our world product is about $290 trillion (260 on earth,
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30 in space) the GWP per capita is almost $30,000. Moreover, except for
 
those who are poor by choice the income gap has shrunk considerably from
 
that of a century ago. Today even the South Asians and Chinese are well
 
to do with an income level about 40% of the world average. Even this lag
 
is mostly due to the fact that there is still a high proportion of them who
 
did not have the opportunity for a thorough education when they were young-­
a situation that does not exist today.
 
Every child born after 2050 has been free from mental or physical
 
defects and (again excepting those who choose a traditional existence)
 
will be raised under ideal circumstances as they can best be defined.
 
Thus, by 20th century standards each child today is expected to develop
 
into an intellectual genius, physically in nearly perfect condition,
 
emotionally alert and responsive without neurotic instabilities, and
 
currently may expect to live at least 120 years with 80 of them being
 
highly productive. Consequently, nearly every child born after this
 
year is likely to be active during the celebration of the U.S. Quadri­
centennial, the nature of which I will speculate about later on.
 
C. Automation
 
The first 200 years of U.S. history more or less coincided with the
 
industrial revolution. Thus, since the time of the American revolution,
 
people in technologically advancing cultures have devoted increasing
 
efforts to developing, maintaining, and operating machines. During the
 
last century this has not changed in principle, only in its qualitative
 
and quantitative nature. Of course, the world today would appear puz­
zling to almost anyone from the Bicentennial year. For one thing there
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are no observable pollutants resulting from industrial enterprises.
 
Indeed, most of us now live without even the background noises of the
 
former civilization--with a few exceptions that are transitory experi­
ences. But today nearly everything called work 100 years ago is done by
 
highly automated and often "very intelligent" machines. Wherever the
 
local environment is unsuited for human comfort the human interaction
 
with these machines, or robots if you will, is communicated electroni­
cally from an appropriate distance. Maintenance procedures are automated
 
and specialized maintenance robots are designed to function reliably,
 
even in the more challenging environments.
 
Most human beings today specialize in knowledge and skills of the
 
kind that computers or robots do not yet have. Each person has many
 
different kinds of "personal robots" to assist him in his work, in addi­
tion to those which he shares with others (like the space vehicles or
 
the computer networks). Scientists generally have access to whatever
 
instruments or computational facilities they require--although where
 
expenditures are required beyond those authorized by existing standards,
 
peer-group permission must be granted.
 
D. Computers and Electronics
 
A few more remarks about computers are in order before we get back
 
to space. Itwould be almost impossible to describe,to a person from
 
the 20th century what changes the computer-based sciences have wrought.
 
Perfect human health--mental, physical, and emotional--is a "computer
 
product." That is, like most of present technology, it is possible only
 
because of computers. Present computer systems are optimally designed
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hardware components netted together in a worldwide electronic grid which
 
simultaneously is both private and intimately public, as befits a good
 
system. Thus any information anywhere about any subject that has been
 
connected to the grid is quickly available to anyone through electronic
 
information transfer--as is access to any person anywhere in the solar
 
system--when access is mutually desired.
 
Even today, though overall "efficiency," or figure of merit, of the
 
electronic computer network is estimated to be about a million times
 
greater than it was at the turn of the century, the experts believe that
 
there will be astonishing improvements during the next 100 years--or for
 
as long as people desire it, some believe. Itwould probably have been
 
very difficult for an informed citizen in 1976 to anticipate that after­
a mere 100 years the computer power available to each individual would
 
exceed the total computer power of the world in which he lived!
 
E. 	Planetary Population
 
The population in space is evidently going to continue to expand for
 
some time. On the moon today there are about 10 million people, perhaps
 
half of whom spend more time there than on earth and who have come to
 
prefer it, mostly because of the exhilarating low-gravity environment.
 
Some people are predicting that the lunar population may eventually exceed
 
a billion. Certainly there are no major obstacles to this occurrence,
 
only the debate about the lunar atmosphere. But with a billion residents,
 
the amount of gas leaking from their "closed environments" and from lunar
 
industry may become so great that the moon may acquire a sensible atmo­
sphere--a potential annoyance to lunar astronomers as well as manufacturing
 
processes requiring high vacuum, if it occurs. However, most people feel
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that there are enough alternate platforms for observatories that it would
 
be better to move some of the astronomers than restrict lunar development.
 
Others believe the leakage will be adequately contained.
 
Lunar materials are coming into increasing demand for space stations
 
and colonies and the mining activity is..apt to grow rapidly for several
 
decades or more. The colonies at the L-4 and L-5 points have a popula­
tion that equals that on the moon and are the most rapidly growing region
 
for space habitats and industrial facilities. Within the next few decades
 
almost all space vehicles (except SSTOs) are likely to be produced at the
 
L-colonies. These two regions are evidently destined to become the great
 
industrial parks of the extraterrestrial Solar Civilization--at least
 
that is the way it appears now.
 
Meanwhile the space frontiers are being expanded by the exploration
 
teams. Mars has about 25,000 people in its colonies now. Its lower
 
gravity is pleasing to the surface residents, the more enthusiastic of
 
whom predict that Mars will one day be engineered to provide climatic
 
conditions suitable for the introduction of several kinds of flora and
 
fauna. Today it is mainly used as a scientific outpost but it also
 
produces a substantial quantity of fuel for vehicles which are recharged
 
in the Martian orbital stations.
 
The rest of the 200,000 exploring astronauts are well scattered over
 
the solar system. Each planetary body is to be exhaustively investigated-­
by robots alone only where the environment is too hostile for human
 
presence. By now all of the large asteroids have been examined and
 
catalogued. Some of them will be dismantled during this coming quarter
 
to provide fuels and minerals for the planned Asteroid Industrial Park.
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Chunks of the more valuable asteroids, of course, are even now being
 
moved regularly to the L-colonies; this freight has increased about 100­
fold 	since 2050--last year 100 million tons were catapulted into space.
 
F. 	Space Vehicle Developments
 
The most impressive achievement during the last decade was the new
 
non-radioactive fusion engine which operates at an efficiency of 80 per­
cent to 90 percent--that is, at least 80 percent of the fusion energy is
 
available as electric energy if desired. In an alternate design the
 
fusion products may be directly ejected from the engine without electrical
 
conversion. This engine makes it possible for very large space vehicles
 
,to travel economically at great speeds and is particularly important for
 
missions beyond the asteroids. The manned exploration of the distant
 
planets and their satellites will be greatly increased because of the
 
power and efficiency now available.
 
Perhaps even more exciting is the potential,which now appears to be
 
quite likely, that during the next few decades advanced versions of the
 
fusion engines may open up the possibility of manned interstellar explora­
tion--a persistent dream among the more devoted buffs of the Interstellar
 
Exploration Society--one that some of them claim wi'll become reality
 
within the next 50 years!
 
Although by using a kind of rough averaging we estimate that the
 
cost of space transport has fallen during this century to about 1/5 of
 
the cost at the year 2000 (about $4 per pound for a launch to near-earth
 
orbit of a vehicle containing human beings), there exists such a large
 
array of special-purpose vehicles that statistical averaging obscures
 
some of the important economies which are achieved by specific designs.
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Also, the transport of human beings costs from 2 to 20 times more than
 
that for most inanimate materials. Also, transport time is sometimes an
 
urgent consideration and other times not. For example, in transporting
 
lunar raw materials or chunks of asteroids, the rate of arrival at the
 
space industrial center is usually the dominant factorand whether. the
 
travel time is a week or a year is much less important--especially because
 
robot-time is usually much less costly than human time in the relevant
 
systems. This is the reverse of the 20th-century relation inwhich auto­
mated machines or central computers were generally worth much more than
 
human labor on a cost-per-hour basis. A competent engineer is now paid
 
roughly $1,000 per hour, about 100 times more than his counterpart a cen­
tury ago, while the value of "equivalent" 20th-century automated machines,
 
instruments, robots or computers has fallen by a factor of 10 to 100--if
 
indeed the use of the term "equivalent" in this context has much useful
 
meaning today.
 
G. Tourism
 
Because of the steady drop in costs the phenomenal growth of space
 
tourism has set a new record reaching 200 million.tourists last year.
 
The average length of time per journey is now over 30 days and the
 
average cost for a trip which includes 10 days on the moon is about
 
$50,000. Space tourism currently is-a $10-trillion annual business--about
 
twice the entire world's GWP a century ago, and perhaps 20 percent of
 
the total expenditures in space development projects. A "standard" tour
 
might spend several days in various earth-orbit-ing space stations and
 
industrial complexes, a week at one of the L-colonies, about 10 days on
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the moon and a-few days visiting space museums, sports stadiums, and
 
examining some special features such as power stations, exploration
 
vehicles, space robot displays, giant laser-communication centers, or
 
astronomical observatories. Many people have found that their greatest
 
single spiri'tual experience was spending several hours, or days, in a
 
space suit, orbiting by themselves--especially the first time it was
 
tried.
 
H. 	Interstellar Exploration
 
Some interstellar buffs keep redesigning the space vehicles which
 
they believe will soon set out to investigate one of the nearer stars
 
with a human crew. The estimate (in 2060) was about $8 trillion for a
 
vehicle with 20 people which might, with luck, make a round trip safely
 
in about 150 years. While still too expensive it is commonly believed
 
that within 50 years the first such mission will be undertaken, perhaps
 
even with a larger group--since none of the original starters may be
 
among the finishers. None of the problems seem insurmountable, only
 
costly, dangerous, and of questionable value. But when the total cost
 
comes down to less than 2 percent of-the GSP the first star-bound adven­
turers 	may prevail.
 
One-way scienttfic missions with robots are now being launched
 
regularly toward interesting stars, black holes, and various anomalous
 
regions within a 100-light-year radius. Scientists are eagerly awaiting
 
the returns from the first contacts which will occur in about 5-years,
 
although it will take another 4 to 10 years to get the information back
 
through the interstellar communication network, which the robot explorers
 
are still installing as the probes reach out toward their destinations.
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The black holes, of course, are still tantalizing the astrophysicists.
 
Several thousand black holes have now been'positively identified and the
 
theory of their formation, sizes, and distribution is now well understood.
 
Still the physical laws applicable to the processes within these holes
 
have resisted the most ingenious attempts to understand them. For this
 
-reason the data that might be returned by the first probes approaching
 
a black hole are eagerly awaited and, some believe, might revolutionize
 
some of the basic theories of physics soon after they are received. Who
 
knows what that might lead to?
 
Powerful astronomical instruments have mapped our galaxy with much
 
detail. Of the planets as large as or larger than the earth that exist
 
within 500 light years of us, probably 90 percent have been identified
 
and catalogued. At least 10 percent of them appear to have a potential
 
for some form of life and perhaps 12 planets are considered to offer
 
conditions that make advanced life forms possible. Only one of these,
 
however, is near enough to be reached by one of our probes within the
 
next 50 years. Still the sensitive receivers of the interstellar com­
munication system will be constantly listening from now on--and the
 
system will be continually expanded into deep space along many directions.
 
I. Solar Civilization Government
 
Even though certain residual traces are still present, the former
 
nation-state system has largely been supplanted by the solar civiliza­
tion and the new institutions of present societies. With the elimina­
tion of poverty, crime, disease, insecurity, and war during this century
 
and with the expansion into both the space frontier and the earth's oceans
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(25 percent of the earth's population now live on floating cities) many
 
of the traditional functions of nations were no longer useful. To what
 
nation children born in space or in ocean cities should "belong" was a
 
concept that simply eroded away. Language barriers were quickly trans­
cended early in this century with computerized translators and eventually
 
the logical language of our present civilization became the common central
 
one. Of course, many people are still facile in the languages with which
 
they were raised and the remaining "poor" people speak their traditional
 
languages by choice.
 
But our present "government" would be incomprehensible to our great­
grandparents back in 1976. In those days politicians of democratic coun­
tries pretended to be the "servants" of the people when in fact they held
 
the power of masters and often used it viciously or stupidly, sometimes
 
covering up their real motives until they deceived themselves more than
 
others. None of this is possible today. Dishonesty is no-longer needed
 
or useful; it is hard to find and carefully exorcised when it appears.
 
Governing today is serving-the people and is not one of the exalted pro­
fessions. Effective power exists in real knowledge and in physical
 
skills; no longer in hypnotic propaganda, wealth, or traditions. Our
 
society knows that the astonishing foolishness of people's behavior prior
 
to this century has become only a memory--a set of recorded events,
 
unlikely ever to be repeated. It is difficult for young adults today to
 
believe that they have only so recently, and luckily, emerged from the
 
long era of "jungle" civilizations.
 
Today life is a glorious 120-year adventure for each citizen. Death
 
is considered no more of a tragedy than a long sleep would be--except for
 
the chance fatal accidents and these are quite rare. Our fellow human
 
beings, whatever their origins or destinations, are always a pleasure to
 
.meet and to interact with. Today this is how people believe it should be.
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OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
 
PART IV: FORECAST
 
A. Future Exploration
 
Now what of the future? There have always been those who believe
 
that mankind has gone about as far as it can--but these opinions are not
 
too numerous now. For most space professionals, today, the gist of the
 
future potential of space exploration is summed up by the phrase, the
 
universe beckons. This phrase goes beyond the mere human visitation to
 
other stars or their planets--an accomplishment not yet achieved but
 
believed quite generally to be'one which will become routine and whose
 
beginning is even now on the drawing boards. More about these ventures
 
later. Now we simply want to establish more fully the meaning of that
 
phrase to the current generation.
 
It is taken for granted that the development of the solar civiliza­
tion will continue in many of the directions now clearly indicated. All
 
accessible planetary bodies will be mapped, explored and colonized by
 
humans where this is feasible and by robots where (or while) the environ­
ment prohibits human access. Massive planetary engineering will be a
 
constant potential program for each planetary body, whether it is a
 
small moon or great Jupiter, itself. But there will be no great hurry
 
as such undertakings at present are interesting more as scientific
 
investigations than as economic or social requirements. Even in their
 
early stages such projects (assuming that in the efficiency of space
 
travel the expected sustained technological advances do occur) should
 
make the trip from earth to Jupiter, or even the outer planets, a frequent
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"routine" journey less arduous by far than the sailing trip from England
 
to the U.S. during colonial times.
 
Travel in the solar system is now readily available for anyone who
 
desires it and living in space is a commonplace experience for tens of
 
millions of people; we expect the space-based population to expand to
 
several billions within the next hundred years. Wherever large groups of
 
space explorers travel they can choose to take with them complete closed­
cycle systems for comfortable living, including the required portable
 
space industries, all with operating and maintenance robots. The neces­
sary operating information would be stored or made rapidly available
 
through the laser-linked communication systems. Thus the only signifi­
cant communication or information delays between planetary communities
 
are the inevitable ones caused by the time it takes light to travel the
 
intervening distances.
 
Perhaps (and this is a personal view) the shape of the future expan­
sion of our civilization into space will be somewhat analogous to a slow
 
motion unfolding of a gigantic explosion which would gradually reach
 
outward in every direction. Thus, some people today visualizethat self­
contained, self-sufficient communities (containing between thousands and
 
several tens of thousands of people, each person with hundreds if not
 
thousands of specialized robots) will gradually expand, first throughout
 
the far reaches of the solar system--and then beyond that--maintaining
 
continual communications (indeed, while developing the interstellar com­
munication network) but generally roaming farther and farther from the
 
solar center. The enormous energies available near the sun will become
 
less and less important, as even now the energy needed can be plucked
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from the outer planets, soon from any passing comets and other space
 
"debris," and finally even from the diffuse hydrogen atoms of space, if
 
need be. The energy from fusion, coupled with efficient recycling of
 
matter inside each colony, should provide the bulk of the requirements
 
for almost any journey--even one to distant stars--that is now contem­
plated.
 
In this concept of an expanding space-based civilization the design
 
of complete systems for interstellar voyages appears likely to be substan­
tially different from those generally visualized prior to this century.
 
Those concepts, usually involving speeds approaching that of light and
 
possible round trips within a lifetime, are now deemed appropriate only
 
for vehicles operated purely by robots--many of which are already pro­
ceeding at optimum speeds to the nearer stars. But voyages of colonies
 
of people will take much longer and are likely to be part df the general
 
expansion into the galaxy, while maintaining intimate communications with
 
all neighboring communities (those within a few light weeks or so). Thus
 
the present image is one of armadas of large self-sufficient space colo­
nies regularly emanating "radially" outward from the solar system, main­
taining intimate contact through laser communication, drawing their
 
energy requirements from the endless resources of space and continualfly
 
developing the community organization (and the individuals within it)
 
while the grand voyage proceeds. The first destination of the journey,
 
which in itself clearly is an endless one, can only be the first objective
 
of the expedition. The journey itself would simply be the physical path
 
in space-time that the community will be following as it proceeds about
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its business of living, learning, and interacting with the other communi­
ties of the expanding solar civilization.
 
The above image, of course, may change greatly during the next hun­
dred years. It is simply considered to be the most likely one to develop-­
according to the present state of knowledge. However, since this grand
 
expansion has not yet begun--nor is it likely to for another 50 years or
 
so at the earliest--who can say whether it will- come about as described?
 
After all, there are still some who contend that even the "impediment" of
 
-the speed of light may yet be overcome when we have delved still further
 
into the scientific secrets that nature only gradually reveals to us a
 
bit at a time. That alone could, and many believe will, usher in an
 
incomprehensible new universe of discoveries that would make the above
 
image of the future appear to be naive--or primitive.
 
The awesome aspect of looking backward in time is the implication
 
within the exponential nature of the knowledge explosion that-has occurred
 
over the last few hundred years. If that expansion is projected for
 
another hundred years at the recent growth rate it will imply that,
 
despite our impressive planetary exploration, our current knowledge of
 
the cosmos, and our understanding of the infinitesimal structures of the
 
component parts of matter, that currently we are still infants in knowl­
edge--that the really impressive breakthroughs in comprehension are yet
 
to come. Each of the last four or five centuries has witnessed ever
 
more awesome and radical changes than the one before, at least by one or
 
more orders of magnitude, where numerical measurements are relevant.
 
Futurologists are very excited, yet they must feel a little shaky inside
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at what must lie ahead, knowing that beyond a decade or so the future is
 
essentially opaque, even as they try to peer through the thick fog for a
 
glimpse of what is to come.
 
In a more practical vein projections for the next century, for what­
ever such exercises are worth (relatively little, judging from past experi­
ence), have been made and I discuss some of them now more in the spirit
 
of entertainment than as a serious guide to what will be.
 
B. 	100-Year Projections
 
1) First, the population living in space should grow to about 10
 
billion people in 2176--a substantial fraction, perhaps 10 percent, of
 
whom may be outward bound in the sense discussed above. The 10 billion
 
total is an extrapolation based on a gradually diminishing "exponential"
 
growth of population (see Table 17)and is coupled with our assessments of
 
the rate of future economic growth on a relatively conservative basis.
 
The space population by then will be about as large as the population on
 
earth, that is expected to remain about the same as it is today.
 
2) Tourism will grow rapidly but will have changed before 2176,
 
mainly because the number of people traveling between earth and various
 
space destinations will increase by about a factor of 1,000. Even now
 
space tourist is a term which is rapidly losing much of its former
 
meaning: Except for first-time visitors most space travel is now asso­
ciated with specific projects that the individuals are involved with.
 
Whether a large space-liner or personal space vehicle is utilized for the
 
journey is a matter of optimizing the choice. A century or more ago a
 
tourist was a person traveling in a foreign land interacting with an
 
-167-
Table 17 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
 
POPULATION AND GROSS PRODUCT
 
(PAST & PROJECTED)
 
POPULATION (BILLIONS) GROSS PRODUCT" ($ TRILLIONS)
 
YEAR EARTH SPACE EARTH SPACE
 
1975 4.o 6.6 
2000 6.0 0.8.. 20 (.045) .02
 
2025 7.7 60. (.188) 50 (.037) .36 (.12)
 
2050 8.8 .003 (.170) 115 (.034) 4.0 (.10)
 
2075 9.4 .04 (.108) 260 (.033) 30 (.084)
 
2100 9.7 .31 (.085) 720 (.041) 18o (.074) 
2125 9.9 1.5 (.065) 1,670 (.034) 900 (.066) 
2150 9.9 4.5 (.045) 3,500 (.030) 3,600 (.057) 
2175 10.0 10.0 (.032) 6,700 (.026) 12,000 (.049) 
FIGURES IN PARENTHESES ARE AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES FOR THE PRE-

CEDING QUARTER.
 
- THOUSANDS. 
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unfamiliar culture, usually from a somewhat protected and insulated van­
tage point (or path). Today cultural insulation is largely non-existent-­
except among the remnants of traditional cultures that remain so by choice.
 
The knowledge-oriented civilization has no interest in developing tourism
 
as a method of intercultural communication. Indeed, it would generally
 
be an extremely inefficient approach. Information about any aspect of
 
space cultures, as with earth cultures, is generally available quickly
 
and accurately through the solar communication network in any of the
 
desired standard forms (i.e., visual, audio, holographic, symbolic, etc.)
 
or any combination of these.
 
3) Economic expansion in space is projected to increase roughly by
 
a factor between 100 and 1,000 (the median GSP projection for 2176 is $12
 
quadrillion, for those who find such numbers meaningful) compared to a
 
factor of 25 projected for earth--partly because of the anticipated con­
tinuation of the relatively unproductive traditionalists, partly because
 
the earth is relatively crowded and investments tend to flow into space
 
projects, partly because the climate and the diurnal cycle on earth con­
strain optimal development, but mostly because of the opportunities and
 
the resources which exist beyond the earth's atmosphere. The average
 
income of a family of four within the knowledge-oriented culture now
 
exceeds $100,000 annually and has been increasing monotonically (and
 
almost exponentially) as we all know (Tablel17). Since the total popula­
tion (earth and space) is expected to no more than double during the next
 
century, economic standards in terms of per capita gross product should,
 
on average, increase substantially more than 10-fold.
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4) Space travel is soon expected to become much cheaper as the
 
result of several imminent developments. One is the recoverable momentum
 
system which will, in principle, enable travel to be almost free in terms
 
of the required matter (ejection mass) and energy wherever travel time
 
is not a major consideration. For long journeys, where time is important,
 
both the recent anti-matter engine and the constantly improving fusion
 
engines have been reducing costs steadily. We now anticipate that during
 
the next 100 years costs will drop to less than $1 per pound for trans­
porting people from the earth's surface to near-earth orbit (freight will
 
generally be much cheaper, of course). But the more important aspect of
 
commercial travel beyond cislunar space is the time/cost ratio. It is in
 
this regard that the improved engines will be most useful. Jupiter, for
 
example, will soon require no more than 4 weeks to reach without great
 
expense or discomfort during t.ravel (i.e., at approximately l-g most of
 
the time) and about half that much time for urgent business,although this
 
latter is not expected to be frequent--at least not during the next decade
 
or so.
 
5) Perhaps some of the most exciting possibilities that lie ahead of
 
us are related to the interaction of people and computers. As in the
 
past we cannot see, except in vague--perhaps meaningless--ways, what
 
important discoveries or applications are likely. However, informed
 
people continue to speculate upon the possibility of direct linkages
 
between computers and the human brain in order to further improve the
 
human memory, speed up thinking processes, and perhaps learn while sleep­
ing (or'even while awake--on an unconscious level). Technology already
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has enabled us to make considerable progress in all but the last process,
 
but not through a direct linkage--rather through much better understanding
 
of the electro-chemistry of brain functions, an important part of the
 
foundation of the knowledge-oriented culture. Even now, however, the
 
innate capability of the healthy brain is known to be at least 100-fold
 
greater in terms of memory than that which is usually achieved; and for
 
creative problem-solving ability we still can't make meaningful quantita­
tive estimates; it is only believed to be potentially much greater than
 
that which exists at present. Coupling these expectations with the
 
evolving computer networks and the growing number of effective contribu­
tors simply makes the future continue to appear "explosive" in terms of
 
its potential for new knowledge, just as it has always appeared since the
 
middle of-the 20th century. More or less consonant with experiences a
 
hundred years earlier, we still find that our information systems produce
 
much more than can be rapidly digested--an inevitable "problem" associated
 
with rapid growth in the system's capacity. But, in retrospect, the
 
progress is astonishing. About 200 million people are now professionally
 
engaged in improving the information and communication system; each of
 
these people-also have the present integrated information and computing
 
network available as a tool to help with the task.
 
C. A Universal Brain?
 
Naturally, one of the common spectacular images of the future is
 
that of a great."universal brain" composed of all of the brains of the
 
inhabitants of the solar civilization linked optimally into the vast
 
integrated computer network, which by innate design is self-programming
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and therefore potentially rapidly self-improving--even as it improves the
 
effective brainpower of its users! Even though today individuals conceive
 
of themselves as independent autonomies--as they always have done in the
 
past--they are more aware than ever of their interdependence through the
 
information network.
 
The major difference in current attitudes from those which prevailed
 
a century or so ago is that this interdependence is now aonsidered desir­
able; that rather than promoting robot-like humans this interdependence
 
promotes "human-like' robots where these are desirable and frees human
 
beings to perform ever more creatively in endeavors of their choice. No
 
adult is forced to participate in any project and anyone who so wishes
 
can leave the knowledge-oriented culture without fear of reprisal. It
 
even happens occasionally, although quite rarely. Actually the drop-in
 
rate in recent years was 100 times greater than the drop-out.
 
Thus, the expectation exists that if the "Universal Brain" does
 
evolve into a meaningful entity it will be an entirely desirable and
 
natural evolution that will undoubtedly completely recast the image of
 
man's role and destiny in the universe. Few people now doubt that over
 
the long term (more than 100 years from now) that the concept of human
 
destiny will come to include the exploration of our whole galaxy through
 
actual visitation--perhaps even other galaxies as well. However, it is
 
in the necessarily murky ideas of what else man's destiny will include
 
that engenders the greatest excitement.
 
Chapter V
 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDERS
 
PART 1: THE CHINESE SOLUTION
 
(A PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO--FROM NASA'S VIEWPOINT)
 
A. 	1976-2000
 
The New Class
 
During the '70s the New Class had become relatively strong in most
 
of the advanced countries. Its influence was expressed worldwide through
 
(a) the rapid growth of environmental and conservation movements; (b) a
 
growing concern about economic disparities within each country and among
 
nations (e.g., the North-South dialogues resulted from this concern);
 
(c) a neo-Malthusian doctrine which opposed most large industrial--espe­
cially new energy--projects within 0ECO countries; and (d) an increasing
 
transfer of responsibilities upon innovators of new products or processes,
 
requiring them to furnish prior proof that any risks would be insignifi­
cant, plus the responsibility for damages if they are wrong (i.e., forcing
 
them to buy large amounts of risk insurance if it was available--or to
 
assume the risk themselves if it was not).
 
The ideology of the New Class, which in retrospect appeared to have
 
sprung into being during the 1960s in the U.S. and developed rapidly during
 
the 1970s and 1980s in the OECD countries, became a dominating ideology
 
and led to a continuing struggle to improve the Quality of Life (QOL)
 
during the balance of the century. To some observers the ideology had a
 
strong religious overtone--that of modern day Zealots, some claimed. It
 
See 	Appendix A.
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was not always--or even usually--clear how QOL was to be defined or inter­
preted since one person's perception of improvement was often at the cost
 
of another's standard of living, The argument that this ideology created
 
disincentives for hard work was brushed aside. Work was to be made desir­
able, not hard. Hard work should receive extra compensation. To the
 
extent that it was feasible, health, education, economic security, a more
 
equitable distribution of income, and opportunities for a happy life in a
 
clean environment for all citizens were to be increasingly encouraged by
 
government. Indeed, this ideology was, in principle, to be extended to
 
help all other countries--especially the poorer ones--gradually to improve
 
their QOL until they were on a par with the developed countries.
 
Technology was to be both useful, in providing required material
 
needs, and controlled, to keep it from creating new risks to health and
 
strains on the environment--or on the capacity of nature to provide
 
resources. That technological progress continued to take place under
 
these circumstances was probably due more to the fact that the most power­
ful tools of technology, the solid state computer, the laser, instruments
 
for automated chemical analyses, automated production, and a revolution
 
in most basic sciences and in engineering had come into being during 'the
 
1950-1975 quarter and continued to develop-despite growing social resist­
ance. The full impact of this technological revolution was so vast and
 
so complex that even relatively few scientists fully appreciated what was
 
occurring. Thus, the increasing potential for rapid technological develop­
ment in the most advanced countries was able to compensate for a changing
 
social system which was to drain its funds, its brains, and make its appli­
cation to new products and processes increasingly cumbersome.
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After 1990 the New Class ideology contilnued to strengthen in the
 
i-OECD nations, '(including Japan, but less so)'and started to affect the
 
Soviet Union. The Third World remained relatively impervious to the
 
ideology, accepting only some obvious environmental benefits'-but they
 
gave some lip service support where itwas to their advantage. Within
 
the OECD the low economic growth rates were rationalized by the New Class
 
as a required sacr'ifice to achieve an'improved quality 6f fife (QOL).
 
U.S.S.R., China, and Brazil were the relatively successful large
 
(non-OECD) countries that effectively resisted the New CIass concepts 
and which continued to stress economic and technological growth--each in 
its own style, of course. Each of these countries, as we shall see, was 
to pass the United States in space development by the early part of the 
next century--a direct.consequence of the .ideological differences of 
their societies. -
The great concern about energy shortages within most of the developed
 
countries abated somewhat in the i80s because of (1)an economic slowdown
 
in the OECD countries and a reasonably successful energy conservation
 
effort (after 1978 the energy demand of the developed nations increased
 
on average only 1.5 percent/year); (2) by 1982 OPEC had dev'eloped a 10-

MBPD excess capacity and considerable -infighting or elbowing for markets
 
occurred--a "game" in which the Saudis usually prevailed; (3) very suc­
cessful exploration for oil and gas in Third.World countries--especially
 
in Brazil and Mexico--as service contracts.with the major oil companies
 
increasingly became the standardized method of operation, usually with
 
financing help from OECD nations.- The reduced demand and increased pro­
duction were sufficient to meet the energy needs until alternate energy
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technologies became effective after the late' 90s. The abatement of the
 
energy crisis was interpreted by the New Class as a victory for their
 
ideology while their opponents grumbled about forced conservation mea­
sures, inadequate sized autos, and--most of all--economic stagnation, a
 
trend which the New Class'favored (and pointed to the relaxed energy
 
situation as evidence to vindicate that policy).
 
U.S. Progress
 
Although the GNP in the U.S. increased 50 percent during the quarter
 
century,that represented an average growth rate of less than 2 percent and
 
a per capita growth rate that nominally was greater than zero, but in
 
terms of material consumption was slightly negative--but, according to
 
the New*Class more'than offset by an overall improvement in the QOL.
 
In ,the U.S. the space budget during the last quarter declined, in
 
real terms, about 1/3 to $2.4 billion (1975:dollars). Science and tech­
nology funding also eroded, but more slowly, to about 85 percent of the
 
1975 level. Innovations became very threatening to many industries where
 
the available risk insurance was inadequate or very costly. Also, where
 
government licensing and/or permits were required the time and effort
 
involved continued-to increase,much to the dismay of private industry.
 
For example, the estimated time between the initiation and completion of
 
an electric power installation in the late '80s had increased to 15
 
years--compared to 3-4 years in Brazil, and 8 years in Japan (inwhich
 
only a decade earlier it had been less than 4 years),. As a result higher
 
:unemployment and lower salaries'prevailed in most technological areas of
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the U.S. By 1990 the beginning of a reverse "Brain Drain" was observed-­
technologists looked for and found opportunities in the growing Third
 
World countries and in OPEC countries as U.S. employment declined.
 
Highly successful space programs generally did not create confidence
 
in similar outcomes for future programs whose economic benefits could not
 
be "proved" in advance. The LANDSATs were known-to be highly useful but
 
doubt about the value of future improvements prevented their rapid expan­
sion. The remarkable success of COMSATs became embroiled in national
 
debate over the value of excessive communications--in any event they were
 
largely within the province of private ventures. The Advanced Space
 
Shuttle program, proposed in 1982, was buffeted about for 3 years by argu­
ments about the growing risks from the impact of spacecraft launches on
 
the upper atmosphere. Itwas postponed indefinitely in 1985.
 
The U.S. space program probably would have been a relatively early
 
casualty of the developing social system had it not, astonishingly, been
 
so successful. Still, itwas a rare year that its budget was not reduced,
 
in real terms, although the continuing inflation often made it appear to
 
be constant or increased slightly in successive budgets.
 
Even though the space program was increasingly oriented towards cur­
rent needs on earth by designing systems to improve communications, monitor
 
pollutants, predict weather, provide accurate navigation, prevent ocean
 
collisions, find mineral resources, predict earthquakei, assess agricul­
tural production, determine water resources, etc., and generally performed
 
these tasks better than had been first anticipated, it did not keep the
 
space budget from falling. Each success became a new routine service
 
and was soon forgotten by the non-technical public. These services, once
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established,were thought of as "free"--that is, it did not require a
 
dollar to be spent out of pocket in order to get a weather report or a
 
measurement of sulfur dioxide concentration. The value of the communica­
tlons system was burred in the telephone bill, the inflationary changes,
 
and the complicated and peculiarly American system of charging for tele­
vision services. It was difficult for the public to appreciate the cost­
effectiveness of the space program because of its inherent complexity,
 
its dependence on government support, and because hostility to science
 
and technology increasingly came into vogue.
 
Nevertheless, there were some impressive new successes. The Solar
 
Sail was shown to be effective as a spacecraft which, in 1986, after a
 
rendezvous with Haley's Comet, was sent on a mission to observe the planet
 
Mercury from a near orbit. A large (250-foot diameter) Antenna was con­
structed-in space in 1990, 1 year after a Modular Space Station was estab­
lished (with 6 people). Roving Landers were successfully placed first on
 
the moon (1985) and then on Mars (1991) to gather scientific data. A
 
small Space Industrial R&D facility with a 100-KW Solar Power Satellite
 
was established in 1993--but the Soviets were well ahead of the Americans
 
by then.
 
Particularly disappointing to the space specialists was the refusal
 
of the government to fund a large capacity advanced Space Transportation
 
System, a program for colonizing the moon, or a program for testing the
 
feasibility of permanent space colonies (of the type suggested by Pro­
fessor O'Neill and others). An advanced transportation system, of course,
 
would have been 'tantamount to a long-range commitment to a large and
 
growing space program. Thus, it was not consistent with the new ideology.
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While these changes in attitudes discouraged the space professionals,
 
and indeed the entire scientific and technological community, the American
 
public barely noticed it, except for the leaders of the New Class who were
 
pleased and felt that humanity had been protected from potentially great
 
new risks. In the late '90s many of the more aggressive New Class leaders
 
in the OECD nations came to believe that the time had come to start shift­
ing their efforts to the more successful developing countries and to those
 
of the centrally-controlled economies--especially the U.S.S.R. and China.
 
Progress in Brazil
 
The most spectacular economic success during that quarter century
 
occurred in some of the Third World nations, the outstanding example of
 
which was Brazil. The new desire for wealth and power which had been lit
 
in Brazil during the '60s and early '70s developed into an unquenchable
 
national passion that overcame obstacles such as inflation, worldwide
 
recession, energy shortages, heavy indebtedness, and regional illiteracy-­
obstacles which were effective barriers to many other nations. As a
 
result the Brazilian economy grew from about $110 billion in 1975 to $750
 
billion at the end of the century. Their economic success was greatly
 
assisted by the financing from the more developed nations and by the
 
technologies brought to them by the large supra-national corporations.
 
These corporations found an increasing symbiotic relationship with the
 
Brazilian passion for growth, after which the "honeymoon" became a pro­
tracted one.
 
Brazil's educational system acquired a strong science technology
 
and business orientation. Partly because of profitable internal growth,
 
but more from the rapid exploitation of huge new oil and natural gas
 
reserves, found during the '80s and '90s, it began to improve its balance
 
of.payments situation. The-Brazilian universities developed rapidly and
 
soon were enticing the world's best brains with both high compensation
 
and guarantees of adequate research support. The use of the English
 
language in all technical departments of higher education levels became
 
customary as foreign specialists and professors were given the right to
 
teach in English or in Portuguese and almost always chose English. High
 
technology industries were given very favorable treatment after 1980 and
 
foreign investment--especially from West Germany, Japan and the-U.S.-­
continually increased thereafter.
 
More because of their eagerness for technological progress than for
 
its commercial potential the Brazilians began a serious space program in
 
1990 which grew 10-fold in 10 years to a $1.2 billion level, a level that
 
at century's end was within striking distance of the U.S. space budget
 
($1.8 billion). This growth became possible because many of their space
 
scientists could be recruited from West Germany and the U.S. In cele­
brating the turn of the century Brazil projected its space program to
 
increase at least 6-fold during the next 25 years, a level that--if
 
attained--would be roughly equal to the year 2000 budget estimated for
 
the Soviet Union--the acknowledged world leader in space in that year.
 
Progress in China
 
Another "sleeper" in the economic growth "race" was China. Because
 
of the customary Chinese tendency towards self-reliance its average growth
 
rate of 6 percent during the last 25 years of the 20th century was noticed
 
mostly by professional China-watchers. Although foreign trade with China
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was growing, it did not compare with that of any of the other large
 
nations. Consequently, the developments within China tended to be over­
looked or soon forgotten. By the year 2000 its GNP had reached $1.25
 
trillion--a very respectable amount and substantially greater, if less
 
flamboyant, than Brazil's $.75 trillion. Of course, China's per capita
 
GNP was only about $1,200. But the population had stabilized and the
 
quality of its infrastructure had been kept well balanced as it improved
 
over time.
 
A quiet Chinese "passion" resided in the traditional belief that
 
their cultural superiority would enable them in time to succeed in any
 
areas that they chose to compete in. It was clear to observers that they
 
were making excellent progress in technology, economic development,
 
science, and in space projects.- The evaluation of their quality of life
 
was more subjective and depended strongly upon the values and data selected
 
for analysis by the observers.
 
The Chinese were destined to become an envied culture in many ways.
 
They had been admired for decades because of their independence, their
 
self-assurance, their conviction of cultural superiority despite their
 
earlier poverty, and their refusal to accept (let alone ask for) outside
 
assistance--even during severe natural calamities. Thus, their interest
 
in space development, as in all matters which to them meant progress, was
 
only natural. The pace of their space program, of course, had to be deter­
mined in competition with other demands, but their attitude was simply that
 
that they would become the natural leaders there, too--as in all important
 
cultural developments--in the course of time. The ideology of the New
 
Class had almost no effect upon the Chinese. They interpreted it merely
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as a manifestation of a struggle within confused inferioK cultures, going
 
nowhere.
 
Of particular note, however, was the Chinese space program which
 
first appeared noticeably in 1981 when two satellites were launched into
 
near-earth orbit. By century's end they had launched 140 spacecraft
 
(with only-6 failures) and were reliably reported to be testing a reus­
able launch vehicle which was believed to be able to compete easily with
 
that of the U.S.S.R., which until then had developed the most advanced
 
automated space "freighter." Its budget for space projects, though not
 
publicly reveal ed, was estimated to have increased to about $2 billion
 
annually and in the year 2000 therefore exceeded that of the U.S. The
 
trend toward space development in China was less flamboyant than that in
 
Brazil, but more secure in that it did not depend upon foreign assistance0
 
There were at least a few observers who at that time projected that the
 
Chinese effort in space would grow almost twice as fast as their economy
 
and might even reach an astonishing $25 billion/year level by 2025. (This
 
forecast, as we will see, turned out to be premature.)
 
Progress in Japan
 
After 1985 the Japanese were judged by some investigators to be the
 
most technically competent nation of all, especially after making allow­
ances for their late start and lower GNP/capita (than the U.S.). However,
 
their original goal of achieving parity with the U.S. in GNP/capita by
 
1985 was not achieved until 1992, and even then more because the U.S.
 
growth had slowed to about a 2 percent rate--not because the Japanese
 
were able to maintain their earlier momentum. Their economic growth
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averaged 5 percent since 1975,which was high 'by world standards but only
 
about half what they had achieved during the prior quarter century.
 
The Japanese were strongly (psychologically) affected during this
 
period by the traditional poor mouthing of their resource situations.
 
(Qweare only a poor small country without our own energy or enough
 
mineral resources of any kind," etc.) which they general by came to believe
 
was critical despite hard evidence to the contrary--that is, that they
 
were rich not poor and were getting richer rapidly. Feeling insecure
 
prevented them from making substantial investments in a space program,
 
the economic advantages of which were not at all clear to their principal
 
decision makers.
 
Of course, there were many other relevant factors, not the least of
 
which was the inroads made by the New Class concepts--especially after
 
the middle '80s when the pressures by that ideology in the other-OECD
 
nations and from their own intellectuals came in many subtle ways to have
 
an increasing impact on the Japanese. Without pressure from within their
 
own culture or from their allies Japan's space program languished. It
 
was to remain in a relative torpor until the commercial utility of space
 
investments became evident worldwide--that change would occur only after
 
2025.
 
Space Program in Western Europe
 
The European Space Agency (ESA),whose principal contributors were
 
West Germany, France, England, and Italy, struggled from its inception.
 
Beset with problems of different languages, differing economic needs, and
 
a bewildering array of public perceptions about its role or utility, it
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was perhaps remarkable that ESA was successful in its $.5 billion Space­
lab project with NASA in 1980. Despite this success further attempts at
 
a unified program proved to be too difficult in a period when science
 
and technology were losing ground. ESA was abandoned in 1985 although
 
each country maintained some kind of space program thereafter, but each
 
of these continued to struggle. Only the West Germans managed a program
 
whose growth kept pace with GNP but which nevertheless was unimpressive
 
by American, let alone Soviet,standards.
 
Progress in the U.S.S.R.
 
Despite the Americans' spectacular early successes in space (the
 
astonishing Apollo lunar landings, the miraculous Viking robots, the
 
eminently successful Space Shuttle and Spacelab, as a few examples) the
 
Soviet tortoise was to be well ahead-of the American hare by century's
 
end. This was the surprise-free result which was clearly signaled during
 
the decade following the Apollo program by the graph of the U.S. space
 
budget and its comparison to the (estimated) Soviet one which is schemat­
ically represented below.
 
T U.S.
 
i I I
 
1960 '70 '80 '90 2000
 
Actually, both the Soviet economy and its space program grew slowly
 
but steadily during the quarter at about a 2.5 percent rate. Nevertheless,
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by century's end Soviet expenditures in space were estimated to be at
 
least 3 times those of the U.S., and their advances in space science, space
 
exploration, and in the potential for commercialization of space had
 
become enormously impressive to specialists in space science and technol­
ogy. Even though some of the ideology of the New Class had rubbed into
 
the Soviet way of life and perhaps accounted for the slower growth rates
 
in their economy and in space than would have been anticipated prior to
 
the '80s, the change was relatively small. The simple fact was that with­
out significant competition from the U.S. the Soviets became the Giants
 
in space development well before the year 2000.
 
Beginning in the late '80s the American space buffs were to be sub­
jected to a sequence of Soviet space "victories" that, because of their
 
competitive attitudes, was to depress their morale. The Soviet Union was
 
first with a:
 
SSTO 100-ton payload unmanned reusable "freighter"
 
Solar Electric Powered (SEP) orbital transfer vehicle
 
Permanent lunar station (12 people)
 
Lunar observatory and scientific laboratory
 
Kilometer-sized space antenna
 
Space industrial facility
 
Solar Satellite Power System (SSPS--500 KW)
 
Space station in geosynchronous orbit
 
Nuclear space "tug" 
The Soviet-American cooperation in space technology which had worked
 
quite well during the '70s began to slip later that century as the "one­
sidedness" of the arrangement became clear to both. By 1990 the arrange­
ment had lapsed for all practical purposes other than desired voluntary
 
disclosures. Although some people imputed military motives to the Soviets,
 
this was later found out to be unimportant. The Soviet Union had simply
 
preferred to keep its growing advantage over the Americans. The tortoise
 
was finally enjoying its victory over the hare.
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B. 	2000-2025
 
Brazil
 
The Brazilian economy roared into the 21st century as the envy of the
 
modern industrial world. It continued to average an 8 percent growth rate
 
over the next 10 years, bringing its GNP to $1.6 trillion. But after 2010,
 
economic difficulties began to accrue which slowed Brazil's growth consider­
ably. First, their largest oil and gas fields which were developed during
 
the previous quarter had become substantially depleted,and the available
 
profits decreased rapidly after 2010. This forced them into greater
 
borrowing to finance much of their expansion goals--an option which soon
 
brought severe limitations, and affected their economy over the balance
 
of the quarter. Furthermore, their growing foreign exchange problems
 
after 2010 stopped and then reversed somewhat the flow of external (and
 
expensive) brain power toward Brazil--unfortunately before their internal
 
advances in education were sufficient to produce the required indigenous
 
competence needed to assume the tasks performed by the foreign talent.
 
Their booming space program which by 2010 had a budget of over $3
 
billion, "the largest in the free world,"--as the Brazilians were not
 
slow to proclaim--was affected by the growing economic stress after 2010
 
and,although it continued to increase, the growth after 2010 averaged
 
only about 3-1/2 percent for the last 15 years, ending with a respectable,
 
although not spectacular, budget of $5 billion. From the beginning their
 
program had a dual purpose: to help develop Brazil's science and tech­
nology capability and then to enhance their economic development by ex­
ploiting space industrialization as well as the abundant spinoffs and the
 
utility of earth-oriented satellites. Later, in 2017, they promoted
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the world's first serious commercial space tourist enterprise. Both the
 
space industrialization and the tourism ended the quarter much less suc­
cessful than the Brazilians' earlier expectations.
 
The principal problem in their space industrialization effort was
 
that its commercial success depended to a large degree upon their ability
 
to export its innovative products. But in their enthusiasm they had, too
 
naively perhaps, refused to understand the depth of the resistance in
 
the developed (and now post-industrial) world to innovations in technol­
ogy--especially from abroad. Thus, although a flood of new and, to them,
 
exciting products and processes emanated from that program, foreign con­
sumers did not eagerly run to Brazil to buy these products and services.
 
The slow acceptance and long procedural delays made the commercial aspects
 
of the program very awkward since the economies of scale needed for effi­
cient production often required very expensive large-volume space instal­
lations. This resulted in a number of costly abandonments during the
 
quarter--and a number of broken dreams.
 
The space tourist industry was formally started in Brazil in 2017.
 
The cost for a week's tour in NEO started at about $50,000. Business
 
was brisk for about five years and then flattened out just as a greatly
 
expanded capability was being installed. Supporters of the New Class con­
demned such costly, "gaudy" expenditures as inconsistent with their ideo­
logy--a view which after the exciting first few years increasingly re­
stricted the available volume of foreign business. However,a careful
 
study revealed that the most significant factor was that about 10 percent
 
of the lay space travelers were significantly discomforted by the physical
 
stresses associated with the transition to weightlessness and subsequent
 
reentry and adjustments. This led to a rather bad press and tended to
 
discourage the interest of would-be space tourists. Indeed, the Brazilian
 
authorities had been all too casual in their attitude towards the physio­
logical aspects of this new venture. They had decided to treat it as a
 
strictly commercial venture--a decision which in effect left the estab­
lishment of criteria for space traveler selection and preparation in
 
private hands. Unfortunately, the franchised operating corporation in
 
its enthusiasm (or perhaps from financial pressures) was less than com­
pletely careful in its approach to the physiological considerations. By
 
the end of the quarter the industry's capacity (50,000 tourists/year)
 
was more than twice the demand for seats. Some huge losses resulted that
 
were to make future investors quite wary of commercial ventures in space.
 
U.S.S.R.
 
The Soviets entered this quarter as the space giants by virtue of
 
a budget estimated at about $7 billion for non-military development.
 
Their space industrialization effort was directed toward furnishing new
 
products and processes for Soviet industry. Even though they created
 
many which were interesting, even exciting, they made a mistake (common
 
to many new Soviet commercial ventures) by overestimating the ability of
 
their traditional industries to respond to innovation. The sluggishness
 
of routine Soviet commerce was usually only experienced directly by some­
one who tried to encourage change. Except in the production of new scien­
tific or military equipment (and not always then) the resistance of the
 
Soviet system to the acceptance of innovation was profound. Ina Soviet
 
factory such change generally meant little but trouble to the commissar
 
of production, making him loath to give up a satisfactory routine for
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something new--especially when failure usually brought great punishment
 
and success, small rewards. Thus, the Soviet space industrialization
 
effort--like that of the Brazilians,but for'different reasons--had a
 
severe marketing problem which greatly impeded its potential development.
 
Their science and exploration program, however, was excellent and
 
they easily maintained their lead in these fields for the quarter. The
 
Soviet space budget grew during the quarter but the average rate of growth
 
rarely exceeded the "standard" 2.5 percent. By the end of the quarter
 
their budget was estimated to be $13 billion, about double that of the
 
Chinese who had made significant progress and had the second largest
 
effort. Their lesser efficiency, however, reduced their budget advan­
tage considerably.
 
China
 
The economic progress made in China was steady if not spectacular.
 
The Chinese maintained a well-balanced growing space effort suited to
 
their own needs. Their orientation emphasized both basic science and
 
applied research and technology. In addition to their earth-oriented
 
satellite program, they concentrated on developing spinoffs for their
 
potential utilitarian purposes. Their interaction with the space programs
 
of other nations was kept relatively small although they were present at
 
every international conference which related to space developments. At
 
these gatherings their contributions, while few, soon acquired a reputa­
tion for unusually high quality.
 
During this quarter their space budget--keeping pace with their
 
GNP--grew at an average of 5 percent annually. By 2025 it exceeded $7
 
billion. The effectiveness of their effort was clear to all space
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scientists--some of whom stated that China's program shone with a quiet
 
brilliance thatoften was not observed because of the minimal communica­
tion and lack of publicity beyond their borders. But by the end of the
 
quarter Chinese presence was observed almost everywhere in space where
 
other countries had been successful. The Chinese Space Transportation
 
System was well balanced and efficient. Their array of space tugs in­
cluded nuclear propulsion systems as well as ion engines, solar sails,
 
metallic hydrogen thrusters, and beamed energy systems. They had a
 
small 6-man Mars station and werestudying theasteroids with both manned
 
and unmanned vehicles. Their contributions to space astronomy during
 
the quarter had on several occasions startled the scientific World with
 
new findings (for example, the first reliable description of the distribu­
tion of black holes in the galaxy by type, size, and density--i.e., num­
ber per cubic parsec).
 
Japan
 
During this quarter Japan was the richest country in terms of GNP/
 
capita and turned largely into a consumer-oriented society--but with grow­
ing elegance. The lack of international commercial interest in space
 
industrialization (except COMSATs and other earth-oriented satellites)
 
was apparent to them,and they were content to participate in the scien­
tific and exploratory aspects in cooperation with the Americans, the
 
Brazilians and others. Being the richest they were more eager to maintain
 
their position than to attempt to further outrun others. They constituted
 
a rather large fraction of the space tourists who patronized the Brazilian
 
system and appeared to be less disturbed than others by the weightless­
ness problems.
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The New Class ideology, however, increasingly affected them and the
 
demands for sharing more of their wealth with the poor (Fourth World)
 
were strong, both from within their culture and from the outside. The
 
Internal Ideological conflicts combined with some of their growing altru­
istic motivations to reduce their former growth capabilitieswhich slowed
 
to 3 percent by the end of the quarter (averaging 4 percent). Still their
 
per capita GNP reached $30,000.
 
U.S.
 
The U.S. had been in a prolonged depression (since about 1985) which
 
had been justified as the price of an improved QOL. But by 2015 the QOL
 
concept was not much more clear than it was in 1976. The social conflicts
 
between the productive and unproductive segments of U.S. society remained
 
severe. The U.S. was considered to be the world leader in very few areas
 
of former importance and had lost much of its earlier competence in organ­
izing and managing industry and in applied innovations. Its scientific
 
group was competent--but relatively small and isolated--and tended to
 
emphasize theory more than experiment because of meager funding. It was
 
also becoming clear that the New Class was becoming an "old class" and
 
that its ideological grip was starting to fade. It was not clear what
 
direction(s) the country would take as the quarter ended, but there was a
 
sense of imminent change.
 
The space program by 2025 had dwindled to the point where it was
 
maintained at about $1 billion annually, with more than that (about $2
 
billion) being invested by private industry which had taken over most of
 
the commercial earth-oriented ventures, COMSATs, LANDSATs, SEASATs, etc.,
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and the small Sl program which was developing only very slowly as an ad­
vanced transportation system (mostly constructed by the Brazilians) was
 
just being phased in on a joint venture basis (involving Brazil, West
 
Germany, Japan, and the U.S. government as well as private industry from
 
each country).
 
Europe
 
The New Class ideology continued to prevail in Europe. The costs
 
of providing pure clean energy, achieving and maintaining environmental
 
purity,and providing welfare assistance in and out of the country had
 
severely drained their resources--especially as interest in new technology
 
had weakened as well. The Germans held a stronger technological inter­
est in space than the other European countries but it was difficult to
 
maintain even though itwas not large. Economic growth in Europe aver­
aged about 2 percent during the quarter; about half of that was given away
 
in foreign aid. Fortunately for Europe the Soviet Union did not have a
 
military appetite during that period.
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C. 	2025-2076
 
China
 
Strangely, perhaps, the quidt but pervasive Chinese confidence in
 
their "inherently superior" culture may have been the most important
 
factor in developing an ideology which led to their preeminence in science
 
and 	technology--and in space development in particular--during this period.
 
In retrospect, it appears that the Chinese probably had been more egali­
tarian, in a national context, than the countries which had adopted the
 
New Class ideology--which in most countries often was only accepted in a
 
casual or surface manner, like that of the Sunday morning Christian. How­
ever, the Chinese had learned to couple their "egalitarian" economic dis­
tribution system with a productive one which emphasized excellence and
 
which had always included environmental protection as part of the system-­
well before the U.S., for example, passed its first National Environmental
 
Policy Act (1969). The need for an appropriate balance between cleanli­
ness, in the larger sense, and production was more ingrained in the Chi­
nese than in the other countries and consequently made it easier to re­
solve new conflicts as they arose.
 
Economic growth, per se, was not an overriding motive in China as it
 
had been in most of the free world. Rather they had emphasized an un­
heralded underlying admiration for wisdom, competence, and excellence in
 
all of its forms. Wealth was a great potential aid to the achievement of
 
progress in this context but wealth, in itself, was not admired as a
 
measure of success. Moreover, their communist system did not permit much
 
wealth to be accumulated by individuals, thereby effectively removing it
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as a personal goal. But general increasing wealth for the country-­
also in reasonable proportion for the smaller regions, and for local
 
communes or industries--was more expected than desired. Of course, the
 
battle for funding was always a struggle and in retrospect could always
 
be found to have been suboptimal. But the sustained common goal was that
 
of promoting the greatness of the Chinese culture through progress in
 
every important attainable way: arts, science, technology, educat-ion,
 
health, sports, etc.
 
The Chinese GNP grew steadily--usually about 6 percent annually in
 
real terms--as best this can be measured. By the year 2050 they were rich
 
in a world sense having passed all of the OECD nations, except Japan, in
 
GNP/capita. But with 950 million people their GNP came to almost $20
 
trillion that year.
 
The big surprise however was their space budget which, increasing at
 
an average rate of 10 percent from 2025, reached $75 billion in 2050. By
 
that date the Chinese had become the outstanding world leaders, not only
 
in space technology but in science and technology, quite generally. More­
over, it had become clear that it was unlikely that any other country
 
would or could surpass them in the foreseeable future. Their wealth, popu­
lation, GNP, scientific establishment, technological competence, and,most
 
of all, momentum made effective national competition unlikely for the
 
foreseeable future.
 
Competition, however, was no longer a key issue. By mid-century the
 
Chinese culture had evolved to the point where it was quite secure, where
 
its national boundaries were deemed to be more the result of an historical
 
set of accidents than the 20th century view of a cause celebre over each
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debatable line. Since 2025 their culture had opened up a relatively free
 
exchange with the rest of the world. The results were slow in coming but
 
they were predictable. China had become a successful model for the
 
developing and the developed countries as well. Naturally, there was an
 
attempt to follow that model as best it could be perceived and understood.
 
But, of course, it was difficult. Societies rarely change. rapidly in
 
foreseen ways. Attempted change,whether planned or evolutionary,is gener­
ally resisted, and is usually misunderstood. However, the Chinese model
 
was there and the communication system available almost everywhere in the
 
world made the detailed operation of this model easily accessible, if not
 
always easy to comprehend.
 
Several important international developments had occurred or began to
 
occur after 2025. First, it became clearly understood, worldwide, that
 
poverty in any form was a sign of deep social sickness within the society
 
of which it was a part. Moreover, there was always an escape route avail­
able in principle. The wealthy countries of the world--especially China
 
and Japan--were ready to assist any country or culture in which the desire
 
to eliminate poverty was believed to be genuine. This attitude had always
 
existed on a small scale but by the year 2050 it had become a large scale
 
standing commitment to any society in which such a result could reason­
ably be achieved without a military intervention.
 
Indeed, military solutions had become less and less important over
 
time. After 2050 they essentially disappeared. There were several prin­
cipal reasons. First, Japan had clearly demonstrated that land was an in­
creasingly small fraction of a nation's wealth and therefore relatively
 
unimportant for economic reasons. Second, and perhaps more significant,
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was the capability, fully developed shortly before the year 2010, to
 
detect and prevent any child from being born with serious genetic defects-­
including those which would seriously impair mental or emotional functions.
 
Although application of this technology was slow for a decade or more, by
 
2050 it was very rare for any child to be born with any such handicap.
 
Thus, the concept of a clean environment had been extended to include
 
genetic "cleanliness" and it helped to stabilize societies.
 
Another reason for the fading interest in military solutions was the
 
lack of interest among the leading great powers: China, Russia, Brazil,
 
Japan, U.S.A., West Germany, Mexico. China had even startled the polit­
ical world in the year 2028 by renouncing any formal claims to Taiwan-­
and at a time when'the Island could probably have been taken readily.
 
The surprising result since then has been a rapid gravitation of the
 
Taiwanese toward China and a surprising amount of reunification sentiment
 
in Taiwan--a possibility that China was no longer eager for, primarily
 
because of the cultural disparities which arose out of the long separation.
 
Thus, the stage was .set in 2Q50 for a slow cultural change in the
 
world towards the Chinese model--which was itself evolving. The next 25
 
years was to witness the world's most immense change, one which led to the
 
society we'have today. The notion inherent within egocentric cultures
 
that a democratic society should be oriented to maximize the individual's
 
QOL and his personal goals wherever they may lead was eventually deemed
 
to be inadequate because of its inherent tendency towards internal conflict,
 
fragmentation, or even anarchy. A basic conflict arises from its inherent
 
encouragement of freeloaders, who oVer time mqy approach or become a
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majority and through their political influence (in a democratic political
 
system) tended to place an. unacceptable load upon the rest of the society.
 
Some of the countries which had been dominated by the New Class ideology
 
began to shake it off before mid-century. After that point in time the
 
trend accelerated. Now, in 2076, the New Class has become history; the
 
theme of the U.S. Tricentennial celebration is Rapid Progress, through
 
Knowledge and Wisdom.
 
The total world effort in space'development this year wi.11 be about
 
$1.2 trillion; $500 billion will come from China's space budget, $300
 
billion from reinvested space production (2/3 Chinese) and $400 billion
 
from private investment and the budgets of other countries of the world.
 
Perhaps the most important current development is the new sense of harmony
 
inworld science and technology, indeed in the world's interest in knowl­
edge, in cooperation, and in establishing new goals for mankind. The
 
successful Chinese space colonies at L-4 and L-5, and on the moon, and the
 
recent large international scientific laboratory on Mars,coupled with the
 
impressive, rapidly growing space industries, have given a new vision to
 
mankind about his potential future. This was greatly aided by the Chinese
 
space tourism program.
 
This tourism program was started in 2030, shortly after the Brazilian
 
program became stagnant. The first Chinese tourists were selected from
 
the list of qualified interested applicants by lottery. Since that time
 
it has grown rapidly and a modified lottery system is still being used.
 
.After 2040 selected foreigners were welcome to use the Chinese space tour
 
system which is now the world's largest by far. The growth of the system
 
is shown in the table below.
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Table 18 
CHINESE SPACE TOURIST PROGRAM
 
TOURISTS (THOUSANDS)
 
DATE CHINESE FOREIGN TOTAL 
2040 20 I 21 
2050 250 50 300 
2060 3,000 1,500 4,500 
2075 22,000 10,000 32,000 
Not only have the numbers of tourists grown rapidly but the duration and
 
nature of the tours have changed. The.average tour today is 30 days, com­
pared to 7 in 2040,and the itinerary generally includes a week on the
 
moon and a visit to at least one of the space industrial installations-­
in addition to the special NEO facilities for tourists (hotels, hospitals,
 
museums)--and to a colony at L-4 or L-5. However, the cost, at $23,000,
 
is a little less.
 
Brazil
 
Early this century the course of history appeared to have given the
 
Brazilians a unique opportunity to have become the world's model for suc­
cessful development. However, the model which shone brilliantly for about
 
40 years was not soundly enough based to maintain its momentum. Of course,
 
the Brazilians did extraordinarily well during that period and became one
 
of the world's most advanced countries--in several senses perhaps the most
 
advanced for a short while. One of their problems, their requirement for
 
income from natural resources, had not ended when the more profitable
 
resources did and forced them once again into heavy borrowing in an attempt
 
to maintain their growth. Secondly, they were locked into an international
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economic system that was stagnant or at best growing very weakly,, which
 
created various kinds of resistance to their growth potential.. Finally,
 
the 40 years between 1975 and 2015 that they had had to become independent
 
of external assistance, were simply insufficient for the required social
 
changes to occur, the ones that were needed to invigorate the entire
 
population. Those would require 75-100 years, depending upon various
 
external and internal factors.
 
The Brazilian culture was basically oriented toward economic growth
 
and employed technology and capital as its principal means of achieving
 
that goal. Their initial successful gambles to develop economically'on
 
borrowed funds, their successful, efforts to exploit natural resources for
 
additional capital, and their bold program to import both the technology
 
and the technologists gave them a tremendous boost, but Jt was insuffi­
cient as a self-sustaining arrangement. When the principal exportable
 
resources were largely used up, when borrowing had reached-practical
 
limits and their conversion to a modern industrial society was incomplete,
 
they had to endure a long period of adjustment from about 2015 to 2050,
 
during which their economic growth became relatively low (and, of course,
 
their technological development programs in space as well as on earth
 
became relatively flat).
 
Their fine space effort which reached $3 billion annually at 2010
 
and far exceeded the American budget, at that time constituted the prin­
cipal hope for the development of space among the non-communist countries.
 
However, this'budget grew only to about $5 billion during the next 15
 
years. These sums were sufficient for a variety of developments including
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an advanced Space Transportation System, an early Space Industrial.effort
 
and a very respectable science and exploration program which included a
 
lunar colony, an advanced modular space base, and a manned geosynchronous
 
space station.
 
However, the growth of the program after 2010 was primarily depen­
dent upon the successful commercialization of space. This failed in part
 
because the tourist program was not very successful, as discussed earlier,
 
and because the space industrialization program required the support of a
 
vigorously growing world interest in new technology. Unfortunately for
 
Brazil during those years most of the developed world remained in an ideo­
logical state which resisted innovations in technology and thus hampered
 
its commercial space effort.
 
Therefore, itwas not until the middle '30s when the Chinese model
 
began to affect other nations significantly, including Brazil, and oppor­
tunities for growth again appeared,that the situation began to change. By
 
2050 the Brazilian economy was booming; their space budget reached $10
 
billion and was growing rapidly. During the following quarter it averaged
 
a 6 percent growth and reached $40 billion only last year. Also, neither
 
Brazil's economynor space program is now dependent on outside assistance,
 
in the sense that it was at the turn of the century. Of course, the world
 
is also much more cooperative now and national commitments to the world
 
space program appear likely soon to become "standardized" as the program
 
becomes more international or, as some expect, supranational.
 
U.S.
 
Since this isour Tricentennial year we are at once pleased at the
 
recent rapid progress and the renewed commitment to space development by
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the U.S., and--looking back--are surprised at .the astonishing pause in
 
activity that U.S. and other countries experienced for.about 75 years.
 
Perhaps something valuable was gained through this experience--perhaps
 
it had to happen to prevent a truly disastrous outcome. That is an
 
unknowable and wishful statement at present, but maybe it can be ana­
lyzed in coming decades. We have learned a great deal about societal
 
trends, social forces,and human behavior during the last century, and
 
perhaps we will be able to solve these harder'problems before long.
 
While we all are grateful to the Chinese for having helped to pull us
 
out of a profound slump, it is clear that itwould have occurred eventu­
ally by other means. The Chinese themselves were the first to make that
 
point clear. But sooner is better than later. To have "lost" another
 
50 years in the "doldrums" would have been unfortunate for-billions of
 
people.
 
-202-

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDERS
 
PART II: THE TRIUMPH OF THE GARDEN? (2025-2075)
 
(A WORLDWIDE PESSIMISTIC SPACE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO)
 
From the viewpoint of the world's space buffs the first quarter of­
the 21st century was a relative "disaster." Except for the flashy effort
 
in Brazil which was somewhat in disarray-at the end of the-quarter and
 
the steady progress in China, there was little for them to celebrate in
 
the rest of the world. Indeed, most of the world seemed to be turning
 
inward rather than outward. Science, technology and -industry were pri­
marily being harnessed to fulfill the perceived material and environmental
 
needs and to make the world a safe place in which people could devote
 
themselves to traditional artistic, cultural, social, and political pur­
suits.
 
The potential rewards of space development and space travel had been
 
debated by the New Class and found wanting--indeed had been judged to be
 
too costly and relatively risky, especially where it involved manned
 
programs. Moreover, there appeared more and more philosophical, religious
 
polemics that asserted that man's attempt to scatter his seeds even further
 
into space was an incipient new form of pollution, if not desecration, of
 
the purity and beauty of the universe. The orbiting weapons in space,
 
the threat of pollution or other permanent damage to the upper atmosphere,
 
the potential for space warfare, and the inevitable accidents which
 
resulted in space debris and occasional deaths were'all cited as evidence
 
of the evil potential of unfettered development attempting to slip out
 
This is a variation of the previous scenario after the year 2025.
 
its first 50 years are identical with pp. 173-192.
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from beyond the new controls of reason which had only recently been won
 
on earth.
 
The unfortunate experiences of the Brazilian space tourism venture
 
furnished extra fuel for the arguments against space development. The
 
tendency of the human body to adapt to new environments had created
 
stresses among many of the tourists that had unpleasant, if temporary,
 
physical consequences with symptoms of vertigo, dizziness, palpitations,
 
weakness, headaches, and high blood pressure. Some of these symptoms
 
were believed to be amplified by accompanying anxieties--especially when
 
real or fictional stories about prior space-related disturbances were
 
discussed or recalled. Naturally, the worst of these experiences were
 
those which received the most publicity and distorted the public's ability
 
to make accurate judgments.
 
Brazil
 
The bankruptcy of the first Brazilian space tourist venture had a
 
profound effect upon many other commercial aspects of their space program.
 
Capital became hard to come by since the risks were believed to be% high
 
and the government was no longer willing to subsidize private ventures.
 
Indeed, because of its own losses in space industrialization ventures and
 
with a struggling economy that had developed huge debts, the Brazilian
 
space program was severely slashed during the 2025-2035 decade and eroded
 
slowly after that. By 2050 its funding had fallen to a $2-billion level
 
and it had essentially become an "orphan" agency in the government--one
 
of low prestige and in a no-growth maintenance mode.
 
Brazil's troubles in space were part of its prolonged economic diffi­
culties that had begun about 2020. The need for new capital after 2030
 
became more pressing as available funds were drying up. Brazil's ability
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to entice foreign experts had ended and the previous in-flow became an
 
outward one. The foreign scientists and technologists attached to space
 
projects were among the first to be phased out--ad the trend was quite.
 
clear. All foreign technological personnel whose economic security in
 
Brazil was threatened faced a very uncertai'n future since they generally
 
had to return to home countries in which their kind of expertise was
 
already in surplus. Of course, there was no real threat of poverty or
 
disgrace--the developed societies were quite beyond that--but for most
 
of these returning experts their careers, status, identities, and morale
 
were to require a substantial period of adjustment.
 
The flamboyant confidence that formerly characterized that giant
 
country, which for decades had been the envy of the developing world,
 
disappeared during the '30s. Still the people had attained a relatively
 
high standard of living. The GNP/capita was $11,000 in 2025 and has
 
during the last 50 years slowly increased to about -$18,000. Their lack
 
of economic dynamism has been replaced by a greater concern for equity,
 
justice, social welfare, and other requirements for a hi§h QOL which
 
had been relatively neglected during the heady growth stage. Thus Brazil
 
is now considered to be a mature post-industrial society without the rest­
less driving ambitions that characterized its "adolescence" during and
 
shortly after the 20th century.
 
China
 
During the first quarter of this century the Chinese economic growth
 
rate had started at 6 percent but then slowed to 4 percent (averaging 5
 
percent) and in 2025 their GNP reached a respectable $5.4 trillion, or
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about $5,000/capita. As they approached this level despite the government
 
planners' efforts to make a harmonious transition into a modern superindus­
trial society--which earlier had appeared to be feasible--the changes in
 
Chinese society had become so rapid and so complex that their struggle
 
to avoid the pains of successful growth became increasingly frantic.
 
Their need for capital was immense but they were traditionally aloof
 
from borrowing. Their determination to avoid indebtedness, while admi­
rable, had become impractical. They had used up their inexpensive
 
indigenous energy sources and needed to invest about $5-trillion just to
 
phase into the long-term inexhaustible sources over the coming decades.
 
Moreover, they avoided buying technology developed abroad but, as usual,
 
insisted on developing their own. This fierce international independence
 
was a luxury which was to increase their troubles. Perhaps most impor­
tant, however, were the emerging QOL issues.
 
During the preceding quarter the restlessness of the younger Chinese
 
had started to have an increasing influence on their society. Improving
 
communication systems had brought them into indirect intimate contact
 
with the world's many diverse cultures and the younger people were dis­
covering and expressing a need for more direct interaction. They began
 
to resent the feeling of being constrained within their own relatively
 
severe culture--one bent upon national progress, outstanding excellence
 
in performance and cultural greatness, all of which implied a life of
 
dedicated hard work toward conceptual goals that after the early '30s no
 
longer satisfied most of the younger generation. The dissidents' view
 
of the external cultures and especially of the New Class ideology--which
 
to them implied a much improved QOL now, rather than a continued struggle
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toward hypothetical future gratificat-ion--was simply that it was vastly
 
preferable to their own constrained and difficult routines.
 
The youth "rebellion" received increasing support from many of the
 
adults who had also become somewhat unsatisfied With their lives. Tele­
vision or holovision "travel" generally was not considered an adequate sub­
stitute for the reality experience. Listening to music or watching dramas
 
was a poor substitute for performing in these arts. Or more generally
 
the concept of finding and doing your own thing, rather than fitting into
 
the nation's plan, rapidly became an appealing.lureonce the new-youth
 
subculture became influential.
 
Naturally the entrenched authorities resisted, but insufficiently;
 
they tended strongly to believe the traditional notion that "it can't
 
happen here" or that the perceived trend would soon reverse itself-­
while they watched it grow and become dominant. The main part of the
 
struggle, during the period 2030-2050, was genarally non-violent; but
 
the outcome was clear before mid-century. The New Class ideology had
 
effectively penetrated the culture, without direct proselytizing, and
 
over the 20-30 year period had won the poli'tical battle. With the "fall"
 
of China into the appeal of the foreign cultures there was no longer a,
 
nation which could champion the more difficult-route emphasizing wisdom
 
and excellence in every important endeavor. Evidently economic success
 
which led to a post-industrial society sooner or later was destined to
 
yield to the temptations of a mode of life with more personal short-term
 
fulfillment. At least this outcome had occurred in nearly every econom­
ically successful country in the world. The Chinese culture had been the
 
last real hope for providing to an otherwise stagnant world a dynamic
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technological and economic model with a far reaching vision of human
 
destiny.
 
During this last quarter (2050-2075) China's economic growth was
 
almost nil after having averaged 2 percent during the previous one.
 
Their recent R&D budgets for most science and technology, including space
 
development,have been shrinking. However, at $10,000 per capita the
 
population is free of poverty, their health is good, and they devote
 
themselves to work-play or play-work much as in the Western world. Their
 
political wrangling, of course, has been furious as it is almost every­
where, as governments under pressure from innumerable factions struggle
 
to improve the elusive QOL for their citizens. The Chinese technologists
 
and scientists have lost their former elevated status but still keep the
 
productive part of society going by developing or maintaining the auto­
mated systems upon which the country's material well-being depended.
 
Compared to the conditions of a century ago it appears to be a very good
 
life for most of the people. For those who remember and long for a world
 
of continuing progress, wisdom, and outstanding performance in all fields
 
of endeavor--and, as one of its principal manifestations, for the ascend­
ance of the Chinese people into the farflung reaches of space--for them
 
the current world is a shallow one spinning slowly, endlessly, round and
 
round but with little hope of making their great dreams come true.
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The Perpetual Garden
 
So many forecasts of the future had been made in the late 20th
 
century that almost any outcome would have had at least one prophet.
 
As a post-industrial society develops, the tendency of most people to
 
lose interest in advancing technology and economic growth had long been
 
noticed and frequently discussed. .Indeed, it had become one of the
 
primary 20th century images of the future--probably because it had already
 
started to happen in the wealthier nations. Thus, a major surprise-free
 
prediction of that time--reflected in the wealthier nations by the New
 
Class ideology--became a kind of self-fulf-illing prophecy. But it became
 
even more than that--in the sense that the attraction of the concept also
 
spread to the other countries of the world, once they had developed their
 
economies sufficiently.
 
Whether or not the outcome was inevittable, advanced technology was
 
used to promote it. Every major accident that occurred during the last
 
quarter of the 20th century and subsequently, that could help promote the
 
spread of New Class ideology, employed-modern advanced communications to
 
bring the details to the attention of the public. Over the course of the
 
next fifty years some real horrors occurred that helped greatly in foster­
ing the influence of this ideology. For example, any trouble with nuclear
 
power plants became instant headline news after 1970. When the first
 
really major accident occurred in 1987, in a "runaway" reactor near Los
 
Angeles that enveloped a substantial portion of that huge city with a
 
radioactive cloud, the ensuing panic as people struggled to rush out of
 
the city only ensnarled the flow of traffic, adding automotive exhausts
 
to the troubled city. Unfortunately the accidental release of radio­
activity was coupled with an atmospheric temperature inversion and
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other meterological conditions which prevented an early dissipation of the
 
radioactive cloud. 'inretrospect the radioactivity was much less of a
 
threat than the panic--but this could not be communicated to the resi'dents
 
in-time. As a result a million peopie were stranded far from their homes
 
in huge traffic jams and, because of changing winds, often had driven into,
 
rather than away from, the areas of greatest exposure. The public fury
 
which resulted stayed at an intense level for weeks while the grim
 
details were continually flashed to the world by satellite television,
 
in color.
 
The following year a liquified natural gas tanker ran aground off
 
Cape Cod; the subsequent fire caused 500 deaths, 15,000 serious Jnjuries
 
and more than $10 mi'llion in property losses. This was followed in "rapid"
 
order, in 1988, first, by the explosion of a chlorine plant in Yokohama,
 
and then a tragedy in space when, after the first landing of a telescope
 
on the moon, the returning spacecraft with six astronauts aborted, a few
 
seconds after launch, killing the occupants. This occurred on the far
 
side of the moon; however, the tragedy was brought into full view by tele­
vision pictures relayed from the Lunar Orbiter.
 
The "smalI" nuclear war of 1995 between Pakistan and India involved
 
"only" three kiloton-size weapons--but 150,000 deaths and a million severe
 
injuries resulted. The prior war between North and South Korea, in 1,993,
 
was non-nuclear but longer and almost as grisly, as civilians bore the
 
brunt of the casualties because of indiscriminate attacks on population
 
and industry. At that time advanced space satellites both photographed
 
and transmitted these grim events around the world. "Technology" was­
blamed by the New Class for making possible each major tragedy.
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The list goes on at great length. 'The essence of this 50-year
 
sequence of tragedies is now preservedin the famous 46-hour video pro­
gram entitled Lest We Forget. This program is a mandatory part of the­
present education of every child in the post-inddstrial nations.
 
There are some "radical" intellectual's who claim that the emphasis
 
on tragic aspects of technology distorts the "true" picture--meaning
 
that the benefits-are improperly weighed. This argument has not gathered
 
many adherents--except among dedicated .technologists--and tends to become
 
weaker over time. The people prefer their lives to be free of the risks
 
of wars, radioactive contamination, explosions in mines and factories,
 
cancerous chemicals, and threats to the fragile envelope of air that must
 
protect us daily--to name but a few of the many dangers from indiscrim­
inate technology, and the lust for ever-increasing personal wealth.
 
The'tendency in the U.S. today, indeed in most of the world, is to
 
resist any potentially-dangerous-new technology--or the impact of the
 
uncontrolled "Machine," as the technological subculture is popularly­
referred to. In the most important sense this is the democratic process.
 
By the vote of the vast majority, the Machine is to be maintained and
 
carefully nurtured, but it must be kept subservient to the desires of
 
society. For the past 50 years at least, the understanding of science
 
and technology, the basis for the Machine, has required fewer and fewer
 
people, although this is not a trend towards zero. Over'these years the
 
technological sectors steadily lost status, (that is, political influence)
 
as their active population shrank. Althbugh the ownership and control of
 
industry and R&D establishments are largely distributed among the general
 
population or within the government, the knowledge required to maintain
 
or improve technology is now concentrated in the small Machine subculture.
 
Some of our sociologists are concerned about this development, since a
 
number of ominous scenarios of the future are thought to be possible,
 
if unlikely. For example, suppose for society's stability the number of
 
people operating the Machine was required to exceed a certain minimum-­
that is, to prevent the possibility of a relatively sudden collapse.,
 
How can -itbe assured that this critical point is not reached--especially
 
since social power and prestige are generally associated with the other
 
professions such as Law, Politics, Finance,.Publicity, Artistic Perform­
ance, Sports, and Management? That is, the argument goes, the QOL in
 
society more and more has become dependent on the Machine while, in a
 
social sense, it increasingly disdains or ignores its professionals.
 
The U.S. space program is now dependent upon a mere 10,000 individ­
uals who alone have the technical training to keep it functioning. Tours
 
in space have recently become relatively popular again and a growth trend
 
in this activity will continue as long as the Machine personnel can main­
tain it adequately. After formal schooling and apprenticeship, each of
 
these individuals will be required,over time, to complete at least 10 years
 
of additional study and training, to remain a qualified professional.
 
During this period he will be expected to work to maintain sdciety's
 
.Garden, without, in a spiritual sense, being a part of it. The sociolo­
gists warn us to keep a careful watch that this separation of society
 
into two subcultures remains sufficiently satisfactory to both parts.
 
A similar situation, of course, exists in all post-industrial nations,
 
and appears to be relatively stable everywhere. Although some sociologists
 
continue,to worry about it, most other people are too busy to be much con­
cerned. Indeed, the very long-term outcome may be beyond analysis in any
 
reasonable sense. The general prevailing attitude is that the technolog:s
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are content with their robots, lasers, computers, and rockets,and there
 
is no reason why this should change.
 
However, the division between the technological and non-technological
 
cultures has grown very sharply during this century. It isalmost as if
 
two alien cultures have managed to live under the same government while
 
one of them shrinks slowly over time yet becomes increasingly vital to
 
the other. The majority is not, at least in principle, vital to the
 
minority--except in the sense that they hold the current political and
 
financial controls.
 
Now that China, Brazil, and many of the other former "Third World"
 
nations have become post-industrial, the remaining fourth of the world's
 
population--principally in South Asia and mid-Africa--that are still in
 
the earlier stages of industrialization are being helped in their upward
 
struggle so they too may become poit-lndustrialized. Actually this
 
process appears to be proceeding steadily and estimates indicate that in
 
the latter part of the next century this outcome may be quite general
 
the world over.
 
Growth in economic output has been very slow recently, when it
 
occurs at all. Energy and material consumption in the "Garden" countries
 
has been almost flat for the last two decades. The continuing develop­
ment of automation in industry is about balanced by the growth in
 
government and private services. To some extent the computation of
 
real GNP is somewhat of an "artform," since the changes accumulated
 
over time make it hard to make meaningful comparisons with prior'
 
decades; at least many leading economists have been making this argument
 
for a long time. However, the 'important measure to society is their
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quality of life. Of course this has to be partially subjective, but the
 
general consensus is that it is gradually improving.
 
Some of the technologists operating.the:acbne-the space development
 
enthusiasts in the U.S., for example--have expressed frustration at what
 
they believe is an excessive constraint on funds for projects they would
 
prefer. -However, society can ill afford to "lose" many of these highly
 
trained people to the pursuit of expensive projects which may have little
 
social benefit, and possibly some important disutilities--especially as
 
each of them usually has a substantial area of responsibility that must
 
be maintained for the benefit of society in general. The restlessness or
 
frustration among the technologists has been chronic for some time but
 
has not measurably worsened, according to government subsidized studies,
 
and therefore is not expected to pose a substantial threat to society's
 
stability. Thus, our society, or our Garden, to use the popular term,
 
appears to have considerable survival value for the long-term future.
 
The.people are busy, generally content with the present arrangement and
 
do not wish to risk their QOL by supporting new developmental activities
 
which have even a small potential for disruption. Why should they? This
 
Garden is theirs! They expect it to last for a very long time--and to be
 
enjoyed by their children's children's children's.. .children.
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Chapter VI
 
A MODERATE SCENARIO
 
PART I: SOME GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES
 
A. 	1976-2000
 
Social Attitudes Toward Growth
 
Almost everyone has experienced the feeling that social changes are
 
very slow. This feeling generally comes to those who desire certain
 
changes and are waiting for them to occur. Thus, in the great depression
 
of the 1930s the way out seemed that it would never come. The energy
 
crisis of the 1970s and '80s seemed like it might never end, etc. But
 
this appearance of slow change is an illusion. Since the industrial
 
revolution began no person from an industrialized country has experienced
 
a period of 20 years without profound social changes occurring.
 
In this sense the developed countries of the world during and
 
shortly after 1975 found themselves in the grip of an economic slowdown,
 
a constant pressure toward inflation, a conflict between rising pressure
 
groups that believed in limiting economic growth and traditional growth­
oriented citizens, and an ongoing ideological conflict between centrally­
controlled and market-controlled economies. Although the world was to
 
change radically, in many ways the above features were to be surprisingly
 
persistent and would lead to rather agonized or agonizing cultures. So
 
much time was spent trying to resolve conflicts that refused to yield
 
much--although new areas of conflict had little difficulty in arising-­
that a sense of being trapped in one's own making became "increasingly
 
widespread and for several decades had a depressing effect upon public
 
morale in most countries.
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Despite these socio-political difficulties economic growth did occur
 
at roughly historical rates for the last quarter of the 20th century.
 
This was probably due in large measure to the phenomenal "explosion" in
 
science and technology, in which a growing effectiveness was occurring
 
even while much of the public's attitudes toward them reflected the neo-

Malthusian orientation of the New Class, and R&D budgets were under
 
perennial stresses. The "explosion" could occur in such circumstances
 
primarily because the "electronic revolution" permitted scientists and
 
technologists to perform more with less time and money; this more than
 
compensated for the stiffening opposition.
 
The U.S. space program was a case in point. Although the U.S. space
 
budget increased in real terms after 1980, the average increase was less
 
than the GNP growth, and always far from satisfactory from NASA's point
 
of view, and a source of bitterness to space enthusiasts each of whom longed
 
to see his favorite projects funded--usually in vain. Nevertheless, in
 
reviewing the developments in space over the quarter century the U.S.
 
program achieved some remarkable results (see Table 19).
 
During this quarter it became clear that the world population would
 
soon stabilize and probably would not exceed 10 billion. The most useful
 
technological assist to this expected outcome was the simple procedure
 
for reversible sterilization that could be applied to either sex, and
 
which for women became insurable at $1 per year, with a $100,000 benefit
 
for any resulting pregnancy. The two developers of this technique were
 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine for their valuable contribution to
 
the long-term welfare of humanity.
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Table 19
 
HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. SPACE ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 1976-2000
 
1. 	THE EARTH-ORIENTED SATELLITE PROGRAM WAS A REMARKABLE SUC-

CESS. IT TOOK OVER ESSENTIALLY ALL NAVIGATION, COMMUNICA-

TION, MAPPING, EARTHQUAKE AND STORM WARN[NGS, CROP AND WATER
 
INVENTORIES, BECAME AN INDISPENSABLE AID TO EXPLORATION, AND
 
OFFERED CONSTANTLY IMPROVING WEATHER PREDICTIONS.
 
2. 	THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM DEVELOPED THE SHUTTLE AND
 
LATER THE IMPROVED AUTOMATED (UNMANNED) SHUTTLE TOGETHER
 
WITH A COMPLEMENT OF SPACE TUGS AND PLANETARY LANDERS FOR
 
THE MOON AND MARS. BY CENTURY'S END THE COST OF LAUNCHES TO
 
NEAR-EARTH ORBIT HAD DECREASED TO $80/LB FOR FREIGHT AND
 
$150/LB FOR HUMAN PASSENGERS.
 
3. 	THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROTOTYPE SPACE INDUSTRY HAD REACHED
 
THE POINT WHERE A DOZEN PRODUCTS HAD BECOME COMMERCIAL AND
 
MANY OTHERS WERE DEPENDENT UPON THE NEXT GENERATION TRANS-

PORTATION SYSTEM. MEANWHILE THE R&D FOR NEW PRODUCTS AND
 
PROCESSES HAD ABOUT A $100 MILLION ANNUAL U.S. FUNDING (1/2
 
FROM INDUSTRY) PLUS A ROUGHLY EQUAL AMOUNT FROM EUROPE AND
 
JAPAN.
 
4. 	THE SCIENCE AND EXPLORATION PROGRAM BECAME A SERIES OF SPEC-

TACULAR DEVELOPMENTS. THE SPACE TELESCOPES AND OTHER SENSORS
 
REVOLUTIONIZED ASTRONOMY AND COSMOLOGY. THE TWO MARTIAN
 
ROVERS FOUND EVIDENCE FOR RUDIMENTARY LIFE FORMS ON MARS.
 
THE LUNAR STATION NOT ONLY DISCOVERED WATER BUT VERIFIED THE
 
FEASIBILITY OF MINING FOR USEFUL MINERALS AND MADE PLANS TO
 
BUILD THE FIRST SMALL-SCALE ELECTROMAGNETIC ACCELERATOR.
 
5. 	THE FEASIBILITY OF A MANNED GSO STATION WAS ESTABLISHED AS
 
WELL AS THE MAINTENANCE OF LARGE GSO ANTENNAS AND SOLAR POWER
 
SYSTEMS.
 
6. SPACECRAFT WERE SENT TO MAKE CLOSE-UP OBSERVATIONS OF ASTER-

OIDS AND COMETS--DEMONSTRATING THE POTENTIAL OF THE ASTEROIDS
 
FOR MINERALS AND OF THE COMETS AS A HYDROGEN SOURCE.
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Economic progress during the quarter was steady if not spectacular,
 
with Brazil emerging as the outstandihg developing nation with an average
 
annual growth rate of 8 percent. Of course, the OPEC countries did
 
remarkably well--although after 1990,when oil prices started to drop,many
 
of them experienced economic difficulties. With the exception of south
 
Asia and middle Africa, the developing nations grew about 50 percent
 
faster on average than the developed nations. These results are indicated
 
in Figure 2, p. 62.
 
Military Systems in Space
 
One of the more disheartening failures during the 190s was the lack
 
of any meaningful progress towards arms control, conflict resolution, or
 
effective international restraints against war. In this respect the dis­
harmony among nations was reflected in armaments expenditures that easily
 
kept pace with GWP. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. maintained their arms
 
"race" by developing the measures-countermeasures "games" to ever growing
 
complexity; this included the deployment of several kinds of space weapons
 
aboard maneuverable satellites--weapons employing various forms of "death
 
rays" which could deliver lethal blows against other space satellites up
 
to 1,000 miles away. The deployment of these systems soon came to sym­
bolize national power and military prestige although their utility in a
 
real war would be doubtful at best. Nevertheless,at least four other
 
countries had deployed these weapons by century's end--China, Japan,
 
France, and West Germany. Moreover, by then these satellites could be
 
bought by almost any nation which was on sufficiently good terms with
 
any of the above Big Six, as they soon became labeled. Brazil was
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expected to make them the Big Seven soon,and some military experts pre­
dicted a proliferation of these systems to at least another dozen coun­
tries by the year 2025.
 
Non-Military Space Programs
 
Although the non-military U.S. space program was dampened by rela­
tively flat funding itwas assisted by increasing contributions from
 
other OECD nations. Since none of these nations had developed its own
 
STS (Space Transportation System) to compete with the U.S., their obvious
 
alternative was to depend upon the U.S. Shuttle-based STS. NASA was
 
pleased with this outcome since it reduced the burden of maintaining the
 
Shuttle system and enabled them to develop a more comprehensive set of
 
orbital transfer vehicles (space tugs), The combined budgets of the
 
European and Japanese space programs increased to over $1-billion annu­
ally by the end of the quarter--about a 4-fold increase. Although
 
growing more rapidly, it was still less than 1/4 of the U.S. budget. To
 
this it is necessary to add $.9 billion from U.S. industries and another
 
$.5 billion from the private industries of the other OECD nations--mostly
 
for investments in communication systems and space industrialization
 
processes.
 
The U.S.S.R. space program continued to grow at its 2-3 percent
 
annual rate, although as usual the allocations between military and
 
peaceful purposes were hard to unravel. It was roughly estimated, how­
ever, that at the year 2000 the Soviet expenditures equaled those of all
 
of the DECD countries. However, the Soviet space accomplishments, while
 
significant, did not equal those of the U.S.-OECD programs, except in the
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military developments. Their principal reusable launch vehicle, opera­
tional in 1988, was capable of sending 110 tons to NEO at costs roughly
 
competitive with the improved Shuttle system. Perhaps because by 1991
 
they had built more of these launchers than they would need for at least
 
another 10 years little improvement in these costs were to occur before
 
the next century began.
 
Perhaps the principal surprise during the quarter was the growth of
 
the Chinese space program. Although their GNP grew from about $300 bil­
lion to $800 billion during the period,and therefore to about $900 per
 
capita, they made a proportionately much larger commitment to their space
 
ventures which,from a small beginning, rose by century's end to match the
 
U.S. effort at about $5 billion annually. The Chinese surprised the
 
world by deploying during the '90s an automated "freighter" which could
 
deliver a 1/4-million pound payload to orbit at roughly $50/lb--which was
 
less than the U.S; cost. It became quite clear that the Chinese had main­
tained a greater respect for science and technology than had the OECD
 
countries and that they intended to be second to none over the course of
 
the coming new century. Chinese presence at international science con­
ferences had been growing rapidly during the quarter and by its end the
 
number of Chinese scientists attending was seldom exceeded by any nation
 
other than the U.S. Moreover, the quality of their contributions to the
 
conferences was highly regarded. The number of contributions correlated
 
strongly with the number of their representatives.
 
The group of prospering middle-income countries, Brazil, Taiwan,
 
Korea, Argentina, Chile, etc., with a combined year-2000 population of
 
about 1.5 billion people generally were much more concerned with economic
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growth based upon imported technology than with space development. Efforts
 
to develop the needed internal infrastructure to support a modern techno­
logical society were slowly succeeding but Were not to blossom signifi­
cantly until after the turn of the century--and even then great differ­
ences among these nations were to prevail in their relative successes.
 
B. 2000-2025
 
This quarter was destined to be a strange one for space development.
 
On one hand, the technological capability existed in three major blocs-­
the OECD nations, the U.S.S.R. and its allies, and China--for impressive
 
advances. On the other hand,a major distrust of the motives among these
 
powers led to an increasing diversion of funds into military space systems
 
and a 3-way cold war "paranoia" was to prevail that distorted the space
 
developments.
 
During this quarter the Chinese chose to orbit many satellites, some
 
of which wete (erroneously) believed to contain nuclear Weapons. In
 
addition, they deployed ever more sophisticated defensive systems which
 
included observational satellites, maneuvering inspection satellites, and
 
a number of space-based anti-satellite systems which used destructive
 
measures ranging- from simple explosives t6 sophisticated laser and par­
ticle beam guns. Of course, they claimed that these were defensive mea­
sures to insure the viability of the Chinese space installations as well
 
as to deter possible attacks on the earth's surface. Inevitably, the
 
Soviet Union and the U.S. felt compelled to respond in kind and the space
 
arms race was on. "
 
Although each of the chief protagonists had established small lunar
 
stations before the turn of the century and continued to expand them
 
-222­
during this quarter, no weapons were based on the lunar surface. Rather
 
a series of unilateral announcements made it clear that each power intended
 
to avoid military uses of the moon except for possible communication and
 
control systems. This understanding permitted lunar observatories, labo­
ratories, and exploration stations to proliferate in accordance with the
 
international space laws that had been worked out under U.N. auspices
 
during the '90s.
 
The lunar inhabitants understood, however, that if serious disputes
 
arose which required legal resolution by international courts on earth,
 
the viability of all lunar installations would be shaky. Moreover, the
 
experience of living and working on the moon had a very strong psycho­
logical impact on the inhabitants. They found it extfemely difficult to
 
feel anything other than respect and friendship for their "neighbors"
 
with whom they were in close communication. The political or military
 
affairs on earth rapidly became as psychologically distant as the "big
 
blue marble" was physically distant. As a result the lunar inhabitants
 
rapidly gravitated toward a common feeling of belonging to a lunar society
 
which, however "primitive," was beyond traditional nationalism. The
 
longer one remained on the moon the more did nationalism appear to be a
 
ludicrous arrangement for organizing human society. (This judgment was
 
to lead to the formation of the United Lunar Authority, an international
 
lunar society which eventually became independent of earth governments.)
 
The Great Space War
 
One difficulty in space during this quarter was related to a growing
 
fear of war and some concern for the manned installations in earth orbit-­
especially the space industries for which there was so much hope. Private
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investment in expens'ive new facilities continued at a high level despite
 
the apparent war prone environment. Most people would not believe it
 
could actually happen, although in retrospect it was clear that the situa­
tion had become so unstable that it had to explode before long. Although
 
it was clear that any new space facilities could very readily be destroyed
 
by enemy weapons constantly within view, except for sporadic situations
 
investment continued to soar. It was true that theorists and war-planners
 
considered the small number of R&D and maintenance personnel to be highly
 
vulnerable "demonstration targets," if one of the three powers wished to
 
flex its military space muscles. Still, there was no reduced emphasis on
 
unmanned systems or restraints on private investment in space development.
 
This space-based powder keg was inherently unstable as a deterrent
 
and resulted in the Great Space War of 2019. In principle, this was a war
 
which could be fought by generals and their extensive staffs of officers,
 
scientists, technologists, and various other consultants. It could be
 
played like a chess game with little being destroyed that was even visible
 
and few human lives involved--providing the war did not escalate to a sur­
face exchange of weapons. Perhaps the script could have been written in
 
advance. A space war was not deterred because a "clean" victory was pos­
sible, in principle. No power would deliberately escalate to even limited
 
use of highly destructive surface weapons. Yet that same possibility may
 
have made the war inevitable.
 
How the shooting started may never be known. Too many irreconcilable
 
claims and accusations have been made that were beyond investigation. All
 
that is clear is that the Soviet Union and the Chinese not only blamed each
 
other for starting it, but for escalating it by destroying U.S. satellites
 
in an attempt to catalyze U.S. reprisals against the other. It was all
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over--the space battle that is--in one day. Almost everything of poten­
tial military value that could be shot at, was--often more than once just
 
to make sure. The measure-countermeasure game was played out in full.
 
About 98 percent of all the military satellites and 100 percent of the
 
orbiting military stations had been reduced to scrap in orbit. About half
 
of ihe noh-military satellites on earth-oriented missions were lost. For
 
both the Soviets and Chinese all of their personnel manning space stations
 
and space industries were casual ties. Fortunately for the Americans only
 
-one of their manned installations was fired.upon. Altogether, less than
 
300 lives were'lost but perhaps $200 billion worth of equipment (original
 
cost) was destroyed. The major blessing, however, was that the destructive
 
orgy-did not descend to the surface of the earth. Indeed, very few human
 
beings knew that anything was happening until itwas all over; they were
 
incredulous when it was first reported by the news media. Even then it
 
took weeks or more to sink in fully., A major war without sound and fury
 
which began and ended in a single day? That, concept was beyond the human
 
experience except for a few prior fictional portrayals with some accidental
 
similarities, but those had never had much impact in any event. On the
 
moon the stunned lunar inhabitants had monitored many of the events, but
 
they did not know how to respond to the strange sudden insanity of it all.
 
The reaction on earth took awhile to go through all the steps of
 
what appeared to be a well-rehearsed play. The accusations, recriminations,
 
investigations, deliberations would rise up, interact, and subside--over
 
and over like waves from several simultaneous,epicenters of gradually
 
diminishing power. But from the beginning wiser heads knew what the main
 
outcome would be. The orgy was over--for good. Space would be returned
 
to peaceful purposes once again. Itwould take decades before some
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investors would be sufficiently convinced that the risk would be worth­
while--but, as generally happens after wars, peace appeared secure before
 
long and investment began to return. The more astute private investors
 
reinvested rapidly and benefited greatly. As a result,a few great corpo­
rations were to arise and dominate the commercial space enterprises (these
 
are described in Part II). The Great Space War has been the only space
 
war inour history. Fortunately, the casualties were so few.
 
Technological and Economic Progress
 
While the military powers were devoting much of their technological
 
capability to space weapons and space defense systems, the scientific,
 
exploratory, and industrial uses of space were also pursued by each of
 
the major powers but at a relatively low level. Nevertheless,- lunar-based
 
science and technology, asteroid mapping, unmanned Mbrtian rovers, and
 
then small Martian laboratories by the Chinese and the Americans were
 
among the highlights of the quarter. Large space colonies were not seri­
ously contemplated although considerable R&D on the life science aspects
 
of self-sufficient, long duration operations in zero- or low-gravity were
 
steadily pursued and much progress was made that was to be field tested
 
during the next quarter.
 
Meanwhile the developing countries were making reasonable economic
 
and technological progress. Economic growth ranged from 4 percent to 7
 
percent annually for the more ambitious countries, and 2 percent to 4 per­
cent for the more traditional cultures. The larger nations (Brazil, Mexico,
 
Argentina, India)Tbecame more interested in space activities as their
 
technological capabilities expanded and as they saw some potential for
 
its economic applications. Of course, the Great Space War set all such
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ambitions back for awhile, but they were reemerging as the quarter was
 
ending.
 
In an important sense the Space War Was to become a boon to future
 
space programs for two reasons. First, itwas to lead to an effective
 
international treaty that was to ban development of destructive weapons
 
in space. Second, none of the subsequent funds for space development
 
would be siphoned into costly military hardware--the debris of which was
 
to be orbiting the earth for a long time. During the next quarter most
 
of this debris was collected for special orbiting museums as permanent
 
reminders of that notorious day--and has furnished some of the more fas­
cinating points of interest for subsequent space tours.
 
C. 	2025-2076
 
Aftermath of the Space War
 
The treaty restricting nuclear weapons in space to the Anti-Nuclear
 
Command (see below) became effective in 2031, twelve years after the
 
Great War. But its effect was anticipated well before then since none of
 
the belligerents had moved to replace their prior systems. The public's
 
attitudes--as reflected by the actions of their government leaders--had
 
become all too clear. Indeed, the spill-over to other military systems
 
and philosophical concepts led to a gradual withering away of the former
 
arms races. During these last 50 years the perceived need for elaborate
 
forces for offense and defense under the umbrella of various deterrence
 
concepts has faded away until only relatively rudimentary capabilities
 
remain--just minimal "light cover" systems which can keep the military
 
R&D establishments active in the event that unanticipated political
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developments arise that make renewed strategic military forces desirable
 
once again. Currently, the need for the light cover and even the R&D
 
is being questioned.
 
The United Lunar Authority
 
George Lincoln was an unusual genius who became entranced with the
 
idea of the development of space and space colonization as a vital part
 
of the manifest destiny of humanity. At a critical historical moment he
 
found himself in a position to move both men and nations in that direction.
 
It was largely due to him that in the year 2001 the Lunar Treaty was signed
 
in which the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, West Germany, France and
 
Japan, as well as (later) many other powers,joined together in a pledge
 
to create a truly international lunar facility which would be available,
 
under reasonable terms, for use by all nations and individuals. By 2011
 
the lunar facility included two telescopes (one of Soviet and one of
 
American design), several launching platforms, two electromagnetic accel­
erators, facilities for logistics to be used by all parties, and so on.
 
Unfortunately,-after 2010, relations among these nations began to deteri­
orate sharply and a new "coldness" arose which focused considerable atten­
tion upon the use of space satellites for defense, ultimately leading to
 
the Great War of 2019. Fortunately, however, the United Lunar Authority,
 
which was nominally under the direction and the authorization of the U.N.,
 
was able to preserve its international character at a high level. In the
 
years of its existence before the Great Space War its personnel had
 
developed an extraordinary sense of unity and felt independent of national
 
considerations. Their attitudes became quite different from the national­
istic ones which characterized most groups on earth. Itwas their sense
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of detachment from earth and the ever-growing bonds of a common lunar
 
culture that led them to a one-for-all and all-for-one'attitude. Further­
more, the selection of personnel was strongly affected by George Lincoln.
 
Most'Lunarians became infused or imbued, partly by desire and partly by
 
the effect of the environment, with Lincoln's sense of mission and 'reli­
gious" zeal for unity. They soon lost any sense of identification with
 
the international rivalries of earth (except as these were clearly con­
structive for the developments in space).
 
By 2035 the United Lunar Authority had gradually evolved into a
 
positipn where itwas trusted by all national groups on the lunar control
 
issues of most concern. Some of these issues were very important to the
 
survival and continuation of both military and non-military operations on
 
the moon. Although a partial separation of selected lunar activities did
 
occur as a result of pressures from earth towards "nationalization" of
 
these activities (that is, phys-ical separation of facilties for separate
 
national purposes), on the whole the attempts of earth authorities to
 
extend this process were effectively resisted. (Before mid-century the
 
earth authorities, to, their astonishment, had learned that a genuine
 
international body was operating on the moon.)
 
Lunar Command
 
An important breakthrough occurred after the Great Space War when,
 
in 2032, the international control of space systems was organized through
 
the United Lunar Authority (ULA). This powerful organization in turn was
 
asked to organize the Lunar Command, which in 2035 was given basic opera­
tional responsibility for the International Space Defense System (ISDS).
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(See Appendix B for another version of a Lunar Command.) Various national
 
space defense forces were dedicated to this system. The ULA never received
 
the ultimate authority to utilize these weapons for their deterrent mi-ssion;
 
this was kept by the Temporary World Defense Authority (TWDA) and by various
 
national governments operating independent systems. However, the Lunar
 
Command actualy controlled the day-to-day operation of the ISDS forces,.
 
most of their maintenance, and "owned" the Lunar headquarters which could
 
transmit the orders and carry out the agreed-upon policies. The Lunar
 
Command was given very restrictive guidelines; but within these guidelines,
 
they could and did'operate quite independently in practice.. This was
 
general-ly accepted as a reasonable arrangement until about 15 years ago,
 
when some began to worry about the great power held by the Lunar'Command-­
because after that time they were no longer dependent on supplies from
 
earth. Also, the need for the space defense system has greatly decreased
 
according to most recent competent analysis. War or even the-threat of
 
war now seems very unlikely to occur among the large nations of the world
 
(see Appendix C); during the last decade only two of the smaller nations
 
have even hinted at escalation of local conflicts. Of course, many of
 
the small nations will still wish to retain their "Anti-Nuclear Command"
 
(ANC) which is also stationed on the moon.
 
Most of the personnel training and systems procurement were con­
trolled by the national governments or the TWACA (Temporary World Arms
 
Control Agency). As is well known, the latter organization is now the
 
oldest "temporary" organization in the world.
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Anti-Nuclear Command
 
Soon after the Lunar Command Was established the Anti-Nuclear Com­
mand (ANC) was set.up on the moon under the direction of the ULA. Itwas
 
sponsored by a number of small nations--ones who did not wish to own
 
nuclear weapons themselves but instead contributed to the ANC's ability
 
to obtain and deploy such weapon systems. These were the only nuclear
 
weapons allowed to be maintained in space, and by international agreement
 
their only purpose was to retaliate (in a tit-for-tat fashion) against
 
any country which used nuclear weapons against one of the non-nuclear
 
sponsor countries. These weapons could not be used in defense of a
 
sponsor which subsequently developed an independent nuclear force. It
 
was also agreed that if the ANC was ever disbanded, its weapons would be
 
removed from space and dismantled by the ULA. This arrangement made it
 
feasible for the sponsor nations to refrain from developing their own
 
nuclear weapons systems and it was widely applauded as a relatively
 
acceptable form of "nuclear proliferation"--certainly preferred to many
 
other alternatives. It gave the small nations an independence and self­
respect that they would not have had as dependent clients of one of the
 
great powers, in order to feel safe from nuclear threat or nuclear
 
aggression.
 
These nations played no active military role subsequently, but the
 
mere existence of the ANC probably helped maintain a smoother and more
 
secure peace and may have been much more important than is generally
 
realized. Because many dire things did not happen, people do not realize
 
how important the ANC was to world peace. The final peaceful demise of
 
the ANC occurred and was celebrated in 2066.
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Societal Changes
 
Perhaps most important for general world progress and political
 
stability was the elimination of the grinding poverty which up until
 
this century had characterized most of the world's population thfroughout
 
recorded history. That poverty had also been closely associated with
 
poor health, illiteracy, extreme corruption, callous urban societies,
 
incompetent governments, and repressive authoritarian societies--in
 
deeds, if not in form. Nearly all of these conditions have disappeared
 
during this century. What vestiges remain are very unlikely to survive Zo
 
the year 2100. Today almost every child is born wanted, and has a guaran­
tee of appropriate nutrition and health care. Moreover, prior genetic
 
screening essentially guarantees that it will be free of serious mental
 
or physical defects at birth. It is hard to conceive of a plausible sce­
nario leading once again to illiterate subcultures; also violent crimes
 
have become quite rare, having had a negative growth rate for at least
 
the last 40 years. Although corruption has not been eliminated it has
 
been greatly reduced and does not exist anywhere in any of its former
 
virulent forms.
 
By former (i.e., 20th century) standards ours is a far more wealthy
 
and egalitarian world. The average income today is almost 7 times that
 
of a century ago. Perhaps more important is the fact that the former
 
very poor countries have an average per capita GNP that is at least 20
 
times that of, 1975. Moreover, they are the ones whose economies are
 
expected to grow most rapidly in the future, an almost inevitable out­
come about which there is little disagreement among our experts.
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Technological and Economic Progress
 
When we leave the social and political arenas it is possible to
 
characterize the progress in the more technical areas much more easily.
 
Indeed, wherever appropriate theories and initial data exist most problems
 
can now be expressed in a language which computers understand,and one or
 
more solutions are usually readily generated--or the cost of producing a
 
solution can be determined. Thus, to produce ultra-pure diamond fibers,
 
or develop-a fusion engine with 92 percent efficiency, or determine the
 
chemical composition of petroleum to .1 percent accuracy for the top 300
 
components, or predict next month's precipitation within 2 percent--these
 
are straightforward problems with straightforward solutions. Today it is
 
taken for granted that improving technology is a general characteristic
 
of the entire world and that it will lead to even more surprising out­
comes--despite the dwindling fraction of the population engaged in these
 
activities.
 
Our "colonies" in the different regions of space specialize in the
 
various technologies which make them most valuable. The lunar and aster­
oid colonies are furnishing materials for space processing industries.
 
The La Grange point colonies build large space structures: habitats,
 
exploration vehicles, fusion propulsion engines, antennas and electric
 
power systems. The orbiting factories produce many thousands of products
 
and components for both earth and space uses. These include satellites,
 
electronic instruments, ultra-pure crystals, computer "chips," cryogenic
 
.alloys, medical specialties, metallic hydrogen, space foods, metallic
 
foils, foams, whiskers, and so forth. The huge space depots specialize
 
in refueling and maintenance services for spacecraft and tourist facili­
ties.
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Tourism in space has become one of our most rapidly growing space
 
industries, especially during the last several years when the cost of the
 
minimum (2-day) NEO tour fell to $9,000. Indeed, there is a shortage of
 
touring facilities which, because of government regulations, are unlikely
 
to be expanded rapidly enough to meet the demand for some time to come.
 
The GWP today is about $110 trillion; roughly half of that comes
 
from the countries with large commitments to space: the U.S. whose space
 
program is integrated with those of Japan, Germany, Brazil, France and
 
others; China; and the U.S.S.R. and its eastern European associates.
 
These three countries and their collaborators represent about $65 trillion
 
of the current GWP. Their respective annual space budgets- are roughly
 
$100 billion, $200 billion, and $100 billion. In addition, from the U.S.
 
group about $200 billion annually comes from private investment--mostly
 
profits from tourism and space industries being plowed back. Thus, about
 
I percent of the GWP of the countries actively involved in space develop­
ment is being allocated for space purposes. This allocation is high by
 
historical standards but is not expected to diminish.
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A MODERATE SCENARIO
 
PART II: THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
 
In retrospect, one of the most significant forces in the commercial
 
development of space was of two extraordinary American men, George Lincoln
 
(described earlier) and Henry Geneen. Both about the same age, the men
 
had been space buffs since their teens, and both had been exposed, as
 
students, to the influence of Krafft Ehricke, and Freeman Dyson in the
 
* 
1970s. Otherwise, they were about as different as two Americans could be.
 
A. Spacecorp
 
Spacecorp was the commercial space organization which first employed
 
Henry (Hank) Geneen. He put together an extraordinarily dedicated group of
 
space engineers and scientists, received a surprising amount of support
 
from government, private institutions and influential wealthy investors,
 
and started a large number of commercial activities in space--almost simul­
taneously. More than half of these activities succeeded, and became the
 
focus of Spacecorp's business. The failures were frequently'written off
 
as basic or applied research or sometimes could be charged to various
 
national governments or international authorities. As a result Spacecorp
 
was incredibly successful in its ventures. In addition Spacecorp spawned
 
a seriesvof earth-related subsidiaries. Because it proved to be more effi­
cient than its competitors in most space activities the United Lunar
 
Authority came to depend upon Spacecorp as its main contractor in prefer­
ence to its own subsidiary, Lunar Corporation.
 
The reader can think of Henry Geneen as a combination of Henry Ford
 
and Harold Geneen and of George Lincoln as a combination of George
 
Washington and Abraham Lincoln.
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In 1998 Geie~n, as'Pres'ident of Spacecorp (the successor to INTEL-

SAT), started a new expansion which led to the uhexpectedly rapid com"
 
mercialization of space. We all have heard the phrase "an institution
 
is a lengthened shadow of an individual"; never was this'truer than for
 
Spacecorp. Even before Hank (as he became generally known) came to the
 
Presidency, Spacecorp was an energetic organization, multinational in both
 
ownership and operation, with a heavy governmental investment. While
 
INTELSAT was at the cutting edge of technology, it had never really pur­
sued expansion aggressively and creatively. Thus, it was due to Hank that
 
in 2009 the first major expansion occurred in the space tour.ist industry
 
as well as the extraordinary expansion of the space-based power station
 
industry (though Spacecorp was eventually--in 2045--overtaken in this
 
industry by the Comca Corporation which, as is well known, is mostly owned
 
by German, Japanese and Brazilian investors and governments). But Hank's
 
true genius shone in the field of space industrialization which, together
 
with tourismbecame Spacecorp's principal successes.
 
B. 	Space Industrialization
 
In the 20th century there had been much-speculation about the com­
mercial potential of space-based manufacturing. As it turned out the
 
reality surprised most of the forecasters since many developments were
 
totally unexpected. The relative ease with which manufacturing processes
 
could be kept'free from vibrations, gravity, contamination and corrosion
 
was extremely useful. The perfection of a series of cryogenic space­
alloys which were super-conducting at relatively moderate temperatures
 
(below 150' Kelvin) was probab'ly the most spectacular early innovation.
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There is scarcely an electrical system in the world today of any substan­
tial capacity that does not use these alloys and the associated advanced
 
technology,
 
Another result which proved to be much better than expected was the
 
extraordinarily long mean-time-to-failure in space of properly designed
 
equipment. The earth environment is, as we can now fully appreciate,
 
basically hostile to smooth failure-free operation of machinery and
 
equipment in ways that do not--or need not--occur in space. Of course,
 
space industry is not immune to hazards; there are cases where sudden
 
solar flares, meteorites, ionic radiation, or very high energy cosmic
 
rays have caused problems, but these have been relatively infrequent-­
and now can easily be circumvented by proper design--easily, that is,
 
compared with the hazards the designer has to face for "equivalent"
 
installations on the surface of the earth.
 
C. Tourism
 
Soon after the year 2000, it was widely noticed that an increasing
 
number of very wealthy--or specially situated--people accepted the concept
 
that it was imperative to visit outer space during their lifetime. At that
 
time a trip confined to a low orbit cost a minimum of $25,000. For about
 
$50,000, a trip, even if short, normally combined a number of activities:
 
about twenty earth orbits (to give a relatively complete earth perspective),
 
a visit to a space station and a day or two in nearly geosynchronous orbit,
 
where a tourist could float and absorb the awesome feeling of the cosmos
 
while able to gaze upon the spectacular blue marble, his own earth, sta­
tionary "below." These cosmic perspectives still make vetetans gasp.
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Almost every new space traveler soon feels an overwhelmi-ng sense of both
 
the unity of manki'nd and the fragility of the earth and its inhabitants
 
when first observing the "little globe" some tens of thousands of miles
 
away. Most have claimed this feeling *to be the most aesthetic or reli­
gious experience of a lifetime--independently of the observer's prior
 
aesthetic or religious bent. The fact that this experience 'isstill an
 
extraordinarily moving one should give us some indication of what it
 
meant to the early astronauts of the late 20th century and the "tourists"
 
who followed shortly thereafter.
 
It is popularly believed, and many analysts concur, that the space
 
tourist industry was one of the major forces in reversing a surprising
 
social trend which occurred within the developed countries during the
 
last part of the 20th century--the trend against science, technology and
 
industrialization. Through their space experience .the tourists foundand
 
communicated a renewed sense of a challenging frontier, ofthe wonders of
 
,technology and science, and--most of all--of an exciting pew perspective
 
on the meaning of the Universe. The new challenges to--and the prior
 
accomplishments of--science and technology led to new concepts of man's
 
purpose, or mission. Many began to think in terms of a "manifest destiny"
 
or a holy mission to "colonize,"first the solar system and eventually the
 
Universe. The Universal Party dates its inception to those strongly
 
affected individuals who in 2001 had their first orbiting experience. A
 
similar beginning ison the record for many 21st century religious move­
ments. Probably the most influential of these experiences was that of
 
Pope Peter II in 2010. The impact of his space trip on the famous "Extra­
terrestrial Encyclical'.' is too well known to comment upon here.
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Almost every child today istaught that sooner or later he will take
 
at least one trip to outer space. This, of course, will not be feasible
 
for everyone this decade (the current cost of a 15-day lunar excursion is
 
still about $40,000) but it will be practical over the life span of today's
 
adolescents. Indeed, Spacecorp, Solar Systems, Inc.., as well as the United
 
Lunar Authority, with the endorsement of most governments, are dedicated to
 
making it possible. In any case almost every child has read or watched on
 
Holovision a rendering of Bobby and Betsy on the Asteroids and Minnie the
 
Space Mouse, as well as some serious programs, articles, and books on space
 
travel. Mankind has attained a high degree of solar consciousness, perhaps
 
a necessary prelude to--and part of--a true Cosmic consciousness.
 
D. Space Buffs, International
 
This organization (formed in 2010) admitted only space enthusiasts
 
who had had direct space experience, either as a member of a space devel­
opment project or as a tourist. It became a very active organization,
 
intensely oriented towards the rapid and pervasive development of almost
 
every aspect of space. They had tenuous but important connections with
 
both Spacecorp and ULA. A general community feel'ing arose among these
 
three groups, though occasionally their interactions led to some clashes
 
of interest. One of the most significant ebrly accomplishments of Space
 
Buffs, Intl. was to help bring George Lincoln into a position of great
 
prominence and influence.
 
Possibly their greatest single accomplishment was the organization
 
of Solar Systems, Inc. which soon became both'a competitor and a comple­
ment to Spacecorp and Lunar Corporation. Because Space Buffs, Intl. had
 
so many of its members in positions of power within both influential
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pirivate organizations and agencies of various governments, they were able
 
.to charter Solar Systems, Inc. (SSI) as a fully private company with
 
important political links to'many governments and with access to an extra­
ordinary amount of government help. SSI soon became a kind of quasi-inde­
pendent arm of the United Lunar Authority (ULA), and became trusted by
 
ULA almost as much as their own departments. As a result, ULA achieved­
what they felt was a useful counterpoise to Spacecorp-.
 
E. 	Solar Systems, Incorporated
 
This institutional breakthrough occurred in 2020, the year after the
 
Great Space War, when Space Buffs, Intl. organized Solar Systems, Inc.
 
SSI soon became the most rapidly growing ','private" corporation in world
 
history, attaining an average annual growth rate of 15 percent in the forty
 
years between- 2020 and 2060 (or an overall factor-of about 250). With an
 
initial equity of $200 million plus'$800 million of-borrowed money, it
 
then controlled $i billion. It doubled its assets (on the average)every
 
5 years for the next forty years. While its growth rate has since slowed
 
substantially (to about 6 percent), it seems £lmost-certain to become the
 
first $5-trillion privately-owned corporation in mankind's history. With
 
40 percent of its assets in space SS controls about 20 percent of the
 
tangible wealth in the extraterrestrial region of the solar system (this
 
would be consi.stent with a dollar output ratio of 10 to 1 ahd about $1.0
 
trillion of Gross Space Product). SSI now is substantially larger than
 
its chief competitor, Spacecorp.
 
The decision in 2025 to allow SSI to acquire (at very advantageous
 
terms) most of the property of many of the obsolete Space Commands was of
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major assistance-to the extraordinary expansion of Solar Systems, Inc.
 
Of particular importance here is the fact that SSI became the major con­
tractor for the United Lunar Authority and the Lunar Command--more or less
 
replacing Spacecorp in this role.
 
Many people think of SSI as equivalent to a space-based government;
 
its power and influence are indeed great. Partly as a result of its inno­
vation and subsequent support by Space Buffs; Intl., partly as a result of
 
its control by Space Buffs, Intl. and of its unusual policies in operation,
 
it also has many of the aspects of a crusade and often appears to be more
 
of a fellowship than a business. This orientation has been deliberately
 
supported by design and policy. No other private international corpora­
tion has such a genuinely emotional dedication to its mission--one which
 
is symbolically supported by a flag, by songs, and many rituals and totems.
 
The relationship of the SSl cadres to the parent organization recalls more
 
the 19th and 20th century sense of patriotism than just the current more
 
common sense of community and social contrast. SSI maintains a complete
 
and very dramatic record of its history in its holovision library--to a
 
degree which does not exist in any other corporation we know of. The
 
continued growing demand for its old holost surpasses that of many com­
mercial productions.
 
Few SSI analysts expect its former growth rate to be regained in the
 
future. That rate has slowed down, it is believed, not because the cor­
poration is less creative but, in part, because there is less urgency for
 
commercial innovation, in part because of greater political opposition
 
from other industrial organizations and, to some degree, from more effec­
tive competition. In any case, its economic expansion today is more a
 
genuine expansion by internal growth--it no longer attempts to grow by
 
acquiition, by merger, by outside capital, or by absorbing other ventures.
 
It may even have taken over too much; some SSI adherents have expressed a
 
concern about the potential of its inherent power-and pervasiveness and/or
 
the likely diseconomies--either now or in the near future--of its great
 
size.
 
In defense of SSI, it should be noted that-they own less than a
 
quarter of the factories in the asteroid belt and less than 20 percent of
 
lunar industrial capacity. Their strength lies in the colonies at the L-4
 
and L-5 La Grangian po.ints that produce power systems, vehicles, space
 
habitats and factories, and, of course, a large array of computers and
 
robots. Also, their commercial installations on the Moon and Mars are
 
among the most advanced. Even so~they produce less than half of the pro­
cessed lunar minerals supplied to space factories and to earth. The fields
 
in which they most excel are in specialized computer systems, robots, space
 
factories, orbltal transfer vehicles and space tourism.
 
In any case, almost all of its critics ahd even many ofr its supporters
 
had begun to believe that its sheer size was a potential threat; and most
 
of us were pleased when its growth slowed after 2060. But most of those
 
who for many 'years opposed the projects of Solar Systems, Inc. have con­
ceded that it played a fantastic, eveh glorious, role in space development
 
since its inception--and constitutes avery useful balance to Lunar Enter­
prises, Inc. and Spacecorp. SSI has come under much criticism here on
 
earth. Some of this criticism may have been justified, but much of it has
 
arisen through'normal clashes of interests, or'from a certain amount of
 
early envy--which,some say, is increased by a little bit of resi'dual
 
paranoia.
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None of the above is meant to'challenge the reasonableness of the
 
recent legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress and the World Legis­
lature to place controls and some limits upon the activities of this cor­
poration, though many critics are claiming that this legislation may be
 
unconstitutional or Ill-advised.
 
Concordat
 
Probably the most significant single Space/Earth "confrontation"
 
was the one that-resulted in the famous "Concordat" of 2038. Previous
 
to that, activity in space by private ventures was organized in techno­
logically advanced countries by various international corporations and
 
essentially had been untaxed by any governments, either singly or in
 
groups. Only when income went back to earth was its owner ever taxed.
 
This greatly helped to encourage the rapid expansion of industry in
 
space. However, an increasing number of people felt that space activi­
ties were not bearing a fair share of earth's overhead--or even paying
 
for many earth activities that supported those in space. Inaddition,
 
there was always te serious issue of a more equitable redistribution of
 
income. By 2040, itwas claimed that many people in space lived in what
 
was often pictured as fantastic luxury. Of course, many of these luxuries
 
were grossly exaggerated, others were necessary or at least useful--and
 
most in space did not share in the more extreme activities--or even
 
condone them.
 
Under the Concordat the principle was established that no direct
 
taxes should be paid by permanent inhabitants of outer space to any earth
 
government covered by the Concordat--even when operating in territory
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,nominally under-the sovereignty of the earth authority. Earth organiza­
tions, of course, charge their space customers in a normal fashion for
 
supplies and equipment. Even when these goods and services are priced
 
quite-competitively, their prices usually include many overhead charges
 
and various taxes. However, other than the indihect taxes included in
 
the price of equipment and-supplies, ho.direct taxes were to be placed on
 
space income or property. This policy subsequently led to great pressures
 
for change but all these pressures have been resisted.
 
Of course, by now various commercial space ventures-voluntarily con­
tribute more than $20 billion a year towards the promotion of social and
 
economic progress on earth--or other philaRthropic activities (including
 
many that encourage-new space activities or interest). Many critics argue
 
that itwould be appropriate if this voluntary contribution were increased
 
and made compulsory, but they evidently chose not to understand and accept
 
the extraordinary intensity with which the Solarian societies defend the
 
principle of "no direct-otaxes." Earlier in this-century this no-direct
 
taxation concept was not an important issue because most of the ventures
 
were government-owned or so firmly earth-based that their income tended
 
to go directly to the government or to the parent earth corporations. Now
 
it is a settled issue, so well settled that most, analysts believe that it
 
is really a non-issue.
 
The above discussion, of course, does not include regions in space
 
solely controlled by some of our centralized economies who can still do
 
what they please, but it does include all the countries,which have signed
 
the Concordat.
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To some extent this freedom from direct taxes must have motivated
 
some emigration from earth. It doubtless has helped enormously the
 
spirit and pace of space development generally--and very, recently of.
 
the retirement industry, in particular. The very wealthy people who
 
have reti.red to space habitats have tended to invest much of their wealth
 
in private space ventures, thereby creating a major source of private
 
capital for outer space,
 
Culture in Solar Systems, Inorporated
 
One great competitive advantage which Solar Systems, Inc. soon came
 
to have over most of its competitors was its growing reliance upon space­
born, space-bred, scientific, technological, and-managerial personnel.
 
As a result these space people developed a very high morale, special
 
sense of unity, a dedication to their mission, and they became incredibly
 
ingenious at exploiting the resources of space for their industrial
 
potentia-l. Further, often the operating expenses, construction costs,
 
and exploration cdsts were much less than that of their competitors
 
because of this dedication, creativity, decentralization, and extensive
 
experience. SSI also appeared to many to take many more chances--both
 
physically and financially--than did other companies. This is not to
 
say it slighted safety precautions, but it did not allow "excessive"
 
safety precautions to stand in the way of important projects. Its
 
safety record was about as good as any, but its safety regulations and
 
practices would be considered unacceptable by many of the other companies
 
--particularly those regulated by governments. Similarly, it has not
 
been financially imprudent; its record confirms this. But its emphasis
 
-245­
on local decision by experienced and dedicated people who really cared
 
about the.cost-effectiveness of each task gave it an important flexibil­
ity.
 
We should not think of Solar Systems, Inc., as an ordinary company.
 
It is more a kind of relatively lightly managed, permissive, functional
 
arm of the community or the government than a normal business corpora­
tion. It has many of the elements of a big family, but is very
 
decentralized and has an extraordinary amount of independent decision­
making by its employees. It is quite surprising that it has managed to
 
achieve the ends of a normal business corporation with this unusually
 
decentralized and permissive management.
 
Business and management experts who have studied Solar Systems, Inc.
 
have argued that it is very much dependent upon the shared backgrounds
 
and concepts, the high morale, the sense of unity, of altruism, of common
 
goals,and of respect for technology and science that occurs because it
 
has so many space-born and space-bred personnel. These employees have
 
all been raised to feel a strong sense of trust in as well as respons-i­
bility for their associates and companions and, indeed, for the other
 
SSI personnel, also.
 
Both academ.ic and business observers who have studied SSI have been
 
astonished at the degree to which SSI personnel are conscious and
 
knowledgeable about what their associates are doing and to find that
 
almost none would consider acting irresponsibly or unnecessarily risking
 
any lives or property.
 
Conceptually, there remains the important problem of terrorism that
 
emerged at the end of the last century. Fortunately, despite their
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apparent vulnerability to such threats, space installations have not
 
experienced any such incidents for over 20 years. In part because many
 
"bottle-neck" situations exist requiring control or examination of
 
arriving or leaving people and baggage,it is believed to be almost
 
impossible for a terrorist to make a "get-away" or to hijack a space
 
vehicle successfully. These and other reasons have made the terrorism
 
in space a very small problem--particularly as compared with the same
 
problem on earth. There is a constant sense of vigilance and protection
 
of the system whether or not one is worried about terrorism. Little is
 
taken for granted. It is different from the earth environment where,
 
even now, so much appears to be taken for granted, Every space installa­
tion has been created by human effort and must be conscientiously main­
tained and serviced. Every potential disaster becomes a community
 
problem. Any individual who commits a careless or irresponsible act is
 
noticed and feels the community's censure,
 
This customary vigilance and consciousness tend to diminish gradually
 
in installations which have a long-term history of smooth operation. The
 
newer generations, to some degree, take their safety and welfare for
 
granted--much as people on earth tend to take their environment for
 
granted. However, even the current generation clearly understands that
 
their environment was created and is maintained at a high quality by
 
human beings operating within an equally human and equally high quality
 
organizational context, and that without continual maintenance and
 
renewal their culture would soon decay and disappear. The same may be
 
true of much of our current environment on earth, but here it is easier
 
to maintain the illusion of naturalism and even allowing some people to
 
be carefree or even irresponsible.
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A MODERATE SCENARIO
 
PART I1: THE NEXT 100 YEARS (2076-2176)
 
I have-been asked to offer some'projections about things to come.
 
Naturally -any such projection can be wildly-wrong since every space buff
 
like me holds an-optimistic view, at least secretly. Typical.ly one of
 
these. views,if carried out over a 100-year period at a "nominal" 10 percent
 
growth rate,gives about 14 doublings or about a 14,000-fold increase in
 
overall growth. In comparison, over the last 100 years the GSI experi­
enced about a 60-fold increase. Moreoverwe need to face up to the argu­
ment that space development is no longer in its infancy and thus its growth
 
may be slower in the next century than-in the last one. This maturing- is
 
fairly evident now because it is difficult for us to project good new
 
vistas, to conquer without entering into "science fiction"-type develop­
ments to a large extent. One hundred years ago,much of what we find in
 
space today was reasonably envisioned by sensible forecasters of that time.
 
We have not exceeded the speed of light nor evolved methods of transporting
 
people to distant planets by "teleportation," whatever that word is sup­
posed to connote. Of course,we have made some progress which could not
 
have been predicted and therefore would astonish the scientist of 100 years
 
ago--e.g., the focused magnetic monopole array which permits the exchange
 
of kinetic energy between orbiting bodies without any mass losses, and which
 
has greatly reduced the cost of orbital transfers. But even in 1976
 
scientists were confident that many unpredictable developments would occur.
 
Undoubtedly, if the people on earth had been willing to invest more in
 
space science and technology--for example,to make it an increasingly funded
 
Gross Space Investment (including military expenditures in 1976).
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field-rather than an erratically funded ond--its present size and scope
 
could have been vastly greater and the surprises much more numerous and
 
impressive (for an analogy we can compare a potential 14,000-fold increase
 
from an average 10 percent growth rate with the 60-fold one actually
 
attained--average growth rate about 4 percent). However, erratic budgets-­
with all their inefficiencies--are much more consonant with political
 
realities than the smoothly growing ones which planners prefer.
 
Consequently,to make a realistic, rather than idealistic projection
 
for the forthcoming 100 years, and taking into account the maturation of
 
space exploration and space industries, we might project that the growth
 
in space might be 2 or 3 times that of the economic growth on earth. The
 
latter is expected to grow less than 1 percent per annum on average, for
 
reasons which our economists and social scientists have explained quite
 
well,and on which there is a general consensus. Thus,barring the unexpected,
 
the GWP should about double over the next century and the world's annual
 
investment in space might increase to roughly 5 times its present level-­
or to about $3 trillion per year.
 
Taking this to be a reasonable number the next task is to project the
 
manner inwhich spacemight beexploitedand then to ask what kind of specific
 
developments might result. For this purpose we consider the topics of:
 
tourism, industry, subsidized colonies, exploration, and science. Natu­
rally a great amount of overlap exists among these--a fact which we will
 
ignore. Also we will ignore many other relevant facets of the expanding
 
space-based services such as weather prediction and control furnished
 
through government agencies or government-related institutions that are
 
now not included as space investments, as well as questions related to
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private versus public financing which economists consider to be quite
 
iportant.
 
We begin with tourism as the most rapidly growing aspect of space.
 
A hundred years from now we believe that essentially everyone on earth
 
will tour space at least once during his'lifetime if it is physi'cally
 
possible--as I assume it will be--and that about a I-month tour in cis­
lunar space, including about a week on the lunar surface,would be a rea­
sonable average. After the next 100 years our projection is for the
 
transportation costs to fall to about $10,000 and I allow another $10,000
 
for other costs. $20,000 per person and roughly 100 million tourists
 
annually comes to $2 trillion, or 2/3 of the assumed total space expendi­
tures. (The required annual investment in our steadily growing tourist
 
business has roughly been equal to the gross annual receipts--according
 
to Solar Systems, Inc.)
 
Of the $1 trillion balance my consultants and I have agreed that an
 
appropriate divisionamong the four remaining sectors would be industry,
 
60 percent; subsidized colonies, 20 percent; and exploration and science,
 
each 10 percent. These percentages are unlikely to be in error by a
 
factor of 2 although the $1 trillion total is a soft number which could
 
easily be wrong up to a factor of 5, perhaps more.
 
The annual investment of $600 billion in space industries would be
 
about 4 percent of the total annual industrial investment projected for
 
2176. This figure would be much greater if the electric power needs on
 
earth were required to be space-based as many people (in the old days)
 
thought would be necessary. But space electric power is expected to be
 
used to produce instruments, components, and materials in space for use
 
mainly by other space industries (including transport) and for the end
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products consumed in space by'space tourists, colonists, explorers, and
 
scientists. Secondly, space industries will continue to expand their
 
products and processes which are useful on earth and which otherwise
 
would be unavailable, or too expensive if made on earth. At.present this
 
second category is about 10 times greater than the first; but the first
 
is expected to increase much more rapidly as both tourism increases and
 
as living in space becomes increasingly self-sufficient, in the full
 
sense of the term. Thus we foresee a gradual shift in.emphasis over time
 
toward production in space for consumption in space, while the over'all
 
demand for space products and services increases substantially more
 
rapidly, than does the GWP.
 
The expenditures on subsidized colonies refer primarily to the costs
 
for establishing and maintaining new colonies in space prior to the time
 
that they became self-sustaining. This process is expected to be an unend­
ing one as long as space exploration proceeds and the colonization that
 
follows--whether in orbit or on planetary surfaces--is considered desir­
able. To date we have subsidized such col'onies on and around Mars, around
 
Venus,and in the asteroid orbit--in'addi'tion to those in cis-lunar space
 
and, of course, on the moon's surface, most of which are now self-sustain­
ing. The estimate that twice the cost of the exploration will be required
 
for subsequent subsidies of colonization is roughly consistent with the
 
experience of the past 50 years and no important arguments have appeared
 
to question this seriously. Of course this experience makes the projec­
tion only plausible,rather than "correct."
 
In addition,the recent experiments with retirement communities sug­
gest that space living might become a desirable mode for many senior
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citizens who are not too attached to their routines on earth. At present
 
the estimated costs are relatively high for retirement in space but not
 
beyond the means of the wealthier segments of the population. But these
 
costs are expected to fall substantially and possibly cote within the
 
means of the average retired citizen in perhaps 50 to 100 years--although
 
many analysts are dubious about the economics of this projection since
 
there is insufficient experience at present. Of course,such colonies
 
might also be subsidized. However, we have only included in our esti­
mated expenditures the subsidies required during the formative stages.
 
Social experiments of this kind will proceed for decades and possibly
 
for more than the full hundred years of thts projection. In any event, we
 
have not allowed this potential developmentwhose cost and/or desirability
 
is quite uncertain, to significantly affect our projected total budget for
 
subsidized colonies.
 
I must admit right away that the separation of space exploration and
 
space science, although conceptually easy, soon becomes difficult if we
 
examine the subjects in detail. Some scientists claim it is analogous to
 
splitting an animal in half--that each is so totally dependent-on the
 
other that budgetary separation makes little sense. Perhaps they will
 
forgive my crude "surgery" as I proceed with this artificial splitting
 
for ease of discussion.
 
Up until now a large variety of automated probes and instrumented
 
vehicles of various types, which I shall group together as robots, have
 
been sent to inspect every planet in the solar system and their satellites.
 
The information from these probes has given us a remarkably improved pic­
ture of the solar system and we will continue to get more from these
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marvelous robots. Our manned orbital explorations of Mercury, Jupiter,
 
and Saturn have been more in the sense of pilot projects than of a full­
scale scientific assault on the exploration missions. Of course, Jupiter
 
itself is especially difficult because of its intense radiation fields
 
which prevent too close an approach. But this year we expect to put the
 
first permanent installation on the surface of Mercury as one of the cele­
brations of our Tricentennial. Manned surface stations are being planned
 
for the smaller moons of the outer planets: of Jupiter in 5 years, and
 
of Saturn perhaps 5-10 years later if the Jupiter mission is successful.
 
The Interplanetary Exploration Society (IPES) believes that within 30
 
years we will put the first men (temporarily) on Pluto and,within 50 years,
 
a permanent station on that planet.
 
However, as the members of IPES agree, the ultimate mission of their
 
organization is an expedition to one of the nearby stars. There is little
 
prospect of such an expedition during the next 100 years, however, unless
 
some very unexpected and startling breakthroughs occur-which could make
 
such a journey appear feasible. Until now we do not know if even one of
 
the 48 interstellar probes which were launched during this century will
 
reach its destination sufficiently intact to return a message that it has
 
arrived. At least the first 6 have failed in transit since their messages
 
are overdue and they were functioning after their launches. However, there
 
seems to be no shortage of predictions of successful voyages--or prelimi­
nary designs of interstellar "vehicles" which might be launched with any­
where from 4 to 10,000 people during this or the next century,depending
 
upon various assumptions about future technological progress.
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In a relatively pure sense space science and technology have accom­
plished the usual set of miracles during this century--the full apprecia­
tion of which has, as usual, been limited to the relatively small portion
 
of society which devotes the time required to understand what has occurred.
 
For example, the study of the sun has evolved to the point where we can
 
now be confident of our capability of predicting accurately the number and
 
sizes of the "sunspots," those great flares that earlier were a threat to
 
manned activities because of their potential for sudden violent emissions
 
of destructive radiation. Now the threat is of minor concern since flares
 
are accurately predicted in advance by the new Solar Computer. In addition,
 
the "small" fluctuations of the solar constant have been accurately modeled.
 
This is also important because the accuracy of these predictions gives us
 
confidence,not only in the life cycle of the sun, but enables us to under­
stand the interior processes in all stars for which the required data is
 
available. This already includes over 100,000 stars of our galaxy.
 
To the watchers of planets in distant -solar systems the progress of
 
astronomy has been a source of great satisfaction. -The planets which can
 
now be counted, weighed, and'their orbital periods measurednow number
 
ov&r 500 for the nearest hundred stars. Several of these indicate prom­
ising conditions for the existence of life atid naturally are among the
 
early objectives'of the interstellar probes..
 
That the former mystery of the black holes has been cleared up is
 
old news of course. But that their sizes and distribution are now almost
 
completely catalogued for this galaxy is a matter of great scientific
 
importance.. Using this information in comb'ination with other data, the
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new cosmology has shown conclusively that a portion of the universe must
 
have existed prior to the Big Bang. To many cosmologists this result came
 
as a great surprise. Another scientific conclusion that now appears to be
 
certain is that half of the galaxies are made up of anti-matter. In par­
ticular,our nearest galactic neighbor, Andromeda, is one of the anti-matter
 
ones and therefore intrinsically forbids our presence. The theory of
 
formation and preservation of the anti-matter galaxies was one of the
 
vital keys of the new cosmology.
 
In addition to these space spectaculars the scientific developments
 
of this century--which by now cannot be separated from space science--have
 
led to the brilliant technological achievements in the maintenance of
 
human health--in adapting to the space environment as well as the earth's
 
surface. Thanks to this progress, the 20th century (and prior) concepts
 
involving fears of death are not much more than a lingering memory. Death
 
today is almost always a natural, pleasant and usually voluntary experience
 
which occurs when the-time is ripe.
 
A full catalogue of achievements over the last hundred years would take
 
volumes just to record those of greatest importance. In every field of
 
basic science there has been at least one fundamental revolution in under­
standing. In applied sciences there have occurred thousands of break­
throughs which have led to weather control, inexpensive energy, pristine
 
environments, supermaterials, and now the era of superrobots, without
 
which there might be little time left for politicking and complaints.
 
One of the interesting experiences for children today is that of
 
visiting the reconstructed Bicentennial village in which the way of life
 
of our ancestors is accurately replicated. They always find it astonishing
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in their first visit. Noisy gasoline engines, vacuum cleaners, pot-holed
 
roads, record players, oil-burning furnaces, incandescent lamps, trash
 
cans, fire stations, and movie houses are all novel--and to them astonish­
ingly "primitive."
 
I have been dwelling upon past scientific progress, but what of the
 
future? In pure science we simply cannot even guess; it is the discovery
 
of that which before was not known. However, in applied science or tech­
nology we can make some guesses. Here are a few:
 
Genetics: a complete unraveling and understanding of the life
 
process of human beings. that is, from the DNA sequence a complete pre­
scription of any-growth process through sequential cell divisions and
 
specialization.
 
Materials: The ultimate materials for use in functional design to
 
achieve optimum strength, flexibility, geometry, and corrosive resistance
 
will be achieved in 10,000 or more materials. Also materials superconductive
 
at the maximum temperature theoretically possible (260'K) will be created.
 
Computers: The theoretical limit to operational speed and information
 
transfer, unlimited ultra-high-density memory, reliability greater than
 
that from external "freak" accidents, automatic programming and voice com­
munications will all be achieved.
 
Robots: Which can do anything mechanical that man does first and
 
wants the robot to repeat--and more. Intelligent robots will be created
 
that can learn inmost of theways inwhichhumans do--but much more rapidly.
 
Space development: Large human colonies will be able to travel any­
where in the solar system and will be self-sufficient for at least 20
 
years, perhaps indefinitely. Cost of space transportation will fall by
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a factor of 10 or more. At least 100 million people will have their homes
 
in space colonies.
 
One of the socio-political consequences of the above developments is
 
that human beings in space colonies, whether in orbit or on a planetary
 
surface such as the moon or Mars, probably will become independent of
 
earth--that is, they will become sovereign in the sense of nations on
 
earth. Most sociologists today believe that this is an inevitable result
 
in space--just as it has been on earth. I can only assume that these
 
natives will be friendly--if we are.
 
Chapter VII
 
-REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT'
 
A. Images of the Future
 
Let us first review briefly what has been attempted in the first six
 
chapters. The first chapter offers a typology of various space scenarios
 
and of various themes for constructing scenarios. The point is made that
 
such scenarios have many uses, and that from NASA's viewpoint an important,
 
if somewhat neglected, one is the systematic formulation and dissemination
 
of appropriate images of the future. Hopefully these images would be
 
realistically-developed and become valuable to policymakers.
 
We believe that NASA should try, in a low-keyed manner, to formulate
 
and promulgate a concept of future space development as part of the mani­
fest destiny of humanity, and as an obvious next phase in an historical
 
process which started in the 15th century with the age of exploration and
 
which has led to today's modern world.
 
In the 19th century many Americans overtly believed inmanifest des­
tiny, a concept which encouraged the opening up of the West and extended
 
this country to the Pacific. Through our scenarios we did find that space,
 
to a rather remarkable degree, was Likely to play roles similar to those
 
which the frontier played in America's past. According to some historians,
 
such as Frederick J. Turner, much of the character of American life--the
 
egalitarianism, the feelings of independence and competence, the sense of
 
openness and unlimited vistas, the upward mobility, and a deep belief in
 
democracy seem to have been dependent on, or strongly influenced by, the
 
existence of a frontier. We believe that this characteristic of our past
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may well be continued--possibly in a modified or weaker form--through the
 
exploration, development and exploitation of space.
 
Whether the analogy is valid or not,an accepted image of the future
 
can give rise to expectations that could materialize into real space
 
projects. We also argued that for such images to have the greatest near­
term impact in the U.S. they should emphasize the practical uses of space-­
i.e., its scientific and economic values--and should treat its important
 
psychological, political, social, and cultural consequences as by-products.
 
We believe that basic images of the future such as we have presented
 
in this report are generally unavailable in America, or elsewhere. It
 
is clear there is a large and active group of science fiction fans and it
 
is clear that publicists have been very instrumental in spreading partic­
ular concepts (such as Professor O'Neill, for space colonies). But much
 
more can be done. Many potential space activities, even if they are unduly
 
optimistic or exaggerated (for example, as some critics believe Professor
 
O'Neill's estimates to be), are still useful as part of a social process.
 
If supported by NASA they should be properly formulated and labeled. NASA
 
should also furnish long-range estimates and images of the future which
 
are more or less consonant with its official positions; these can be quite
 
exciting and still be plausible, or even conservative, within NASA.
 
The authors believe that a basis exists for a popular but serious
 
book that will reflect much of the material in this report. We believe
 
our activity has been a very useful one, even though that is clearly a
 
self-serving remark. However we would not have entered this project unless
 
we felt that it was useful from a broad national perspective. Enough is
 
now happening in space to guarantee a moderate level of future activity.
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This means that whatever unexpected treasures are yet to be found ,have
 
some reasonable probability of being discoVered~even in a pessimi-stic'con­
text. We should add that the spirit and need of scientific inquiry, and
 
the spirit and need'for exploration, will remain as permanent forces which
 
create varying pressures for some kind of activity almost everywhere--and
 
in most of our scenarios these needs and pressures increase--if not in the
 
United States then elsewhere.
 
B. Earth-Centered Petspective
 
In Chapter II we try to visualize the coming economic role of space
 
developments in an earth-centered perspective. Our view lies between that
 
of the more extreme space enthusiasts who feel that society's problems on
 
earth are basically intractable and should not be allowed to hinder the
 
future of space, and those who conceive of the-space potential as very
 
limited, and often as an activity to enthrall the young or the technostruc­
ture--and thus often a place for exo&nsive, sterile, dangerous or foolish
 
exploits.
 
'We first offer evidence that the basic physical problems relating to
 
the world's future needs can, in principle, be solved without recourse to
 
outer space, that the earth has more than enough resources to supply an
 
adequate standard of living -for all. On the other hand it seems quite
 
clear that cis-lunar space and possibly the rest of the sol'ar system could
 
turn out to be extraordinarily important in an economic and technological
 
sense. This outcome appears to follow from just the current reasonably
 
projected potential in space--that is,without having to conjure up
 
unforeseeable great breakthroughs. Of course it also seems to be reasonable
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to expect that future space development will yield some equivalents of
 
Middle East oil or Klondike gold--that is, vast treasures which have not
 
yet been dreamed of. Thus, it is almost certain that space exploration
 
will lead to great benefits, and possibly to an extraordinary economic and
 
technological impact.
 
In our basic Surprise-Free Earth-Centered Scenario we concluded that
 
good long-term prospects existed for technological solutions to current
 
concerns about the adequacy of the world's physical resources--although
 
social and political problems could--and probably will--create many diffi­
culties in applying such solutions. When potential space developments are
 
added to the above scenario the outlook for the required solutions is fur­
ther brightened. That is, over time space technology and spinoffs from it
 
will certainly contribute to these solutions--perhaps enormously. With
 
our necessarily poor vision into the future we can still list a few general
 
ways in which space activities are likely to contribute. In each category
 
below we include spinoffs and serendipities, since they are often the most
 
productive, although intrinsically obscure, avenues:
 
Energy: 1) Space-based electric power stations
 
2) LANDSAT information for oil and gas exploration

3) Spinoffs and serendipittes
 
Materials: i) Superior materials from unique processing
 
capabilities in space industries
 
2) Lunar and asteroidal sources of minerals
 
3) LANDSAT assistance in mineral exploration
 
on earth
 
4) Spinoffs and serendipities
 
Food & Water: 1) Improving weather forecasts for days, weeks,
 
months, and possibly over longer intervals
 
2) LANDSAT information on crops, disease,
 
insects, water, etc.
 
3) Spinoffs and serendipities
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Environment: I) Monitoring pollutants by satellites
 
2) LANDSAT information on environment and
 
land use
 
3) Processing in space (e.g., nuclear power
 
or other radioactive-processes)
 
4) Spinoffs and serendipities
 
The economic and technological potential of space leads us "paradoxi­
cally" to cohclude that the near-term "soft," or socio-psychological,
 
effects may equal or outweigh the "hard" returns. As an analogous example,
 
itmight seem wise-for the United States to devote, say, I percent of its
 
GNP to building "pyramids" and "cathedrals" in order to improve public
 
morale and national unity. H6wever a direct attempt toward this end would
 
almost certainly be doomed to failure. Inour culture it is also vital for
 
most "grandeur-creating" projects to be economically-sensible--otherwise
 
the average citizen will reject them. No great national interest exists in
 
"climbing mountains because they are there." Most Americans have to feel
 
that a practical, scientific, military, economic or other purpose is
 
served in "climbing mountai-ns" before they will support and take pride in
 
such activities.- Isolated events may be exciting--and create temporary
 
heroes--but'a deep lasting pride and a solid sense of achievement usually
 
require practical projects.
 
So many tangible economic and scientific opportunities do exist in
 
outer'space that the country can affotd to pursue them with intensity-­
and also reap the important psychological, political, social and cultural
 
benefits as "by-products" of the main effort. In a cost-benefit analysis
 
the space projects cannot be given explicit credit for such "by-products,"
 
but it can note the potential which exists. It should be made clear that
 
these "by-products" could be as valuable as the more tangible objectives,
 
including any windfalls. That would be our judgment, at least for the
 
balance of this century.
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C. Space Technology
 
Chapter III explores some of the technology,expected to be associated
 
with space in the near, medium and long term. Some readers may find this
 
chapter exciting because the technological possibilities portrayed are
 
greater than many relatively knowledgeable groups currently seem to under­
stand. This chapter indicates that a basic change in the character of our
 
practical activities in space is likely to occur by the late '80s or early'
 
'90s. As knowledgeable NASA personnel and other space-oriented profession­
als know, up until now space systems have attempted to keep the large, com­
plex, expensive equipment on the ground, where possible, and place the
 
smaller or cheaper equipment into space. (The present situation may be
 
compared to the use of river ferries which are severely limited in the
 
loads they can transport.) In ten or fifteen years, we expect to find many
 
new systems which deploy the large complex equipment in space and keep the
 
small inexpensive, but numerous, parts of the system on the ground. (To
 
continue the analogy this change would be similar to the replacement 9 f most
 
river ferries with modern bridges. That change was basic and effective.)
 
Although Chapter III focuses strongly on technology, it also attempts
 
to indicate that future developments in space, especially in terms of manned
 
activities, are probably dependent more on a number of imponderables other
 
than successful technology. For example, the personal health and safety of
 
a space traveler--or tourist--is potentially crucial to many activities.
 
Although safety is more or less a direct consequence of technology, future
 
health in space is still a mystery which may involve risks that are subject
 
to straightforward technological solution--or at least not fbr quite a long
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time. At the moment there appears to be some useful information from
 
prior life science studies, but these are reliable mainly for relatively
 
short-term exposures to the space environment.
 
Space tourism,which appears in every scenario as a major new growth
 
industry,should not be taken as quite that certain. That is, even assum­
ing that problems of health, safety and cost do not become intrinsic deter­
rents, it is possible at least to conceive of other developments that might
 
hamper that potential industry. For example, the excitement might vanish
 
after the first few years. After all, will there be enough important expe­
riences which an expensive tour can bring that the advanced electronic
 
systems anticipated for the 21st century could not? Many of the visual
 
experiences in space might be better perceived through electronics, and
 
probably a lot more comfortably. Still, the experience of weightlessness,
 
or the knowledge of the new realities, such as being suspended in space,
 
perhaps 25,000 miles above the earth, or a chance to walk on the moon,
 
might prove to be priceless. Certainly electronics has not been a suffi­
cient substitute to date. These uncertainties might possibly be resolved
 
fully during this century.
 
Another consideration might be that of the possible fragility of the
 
upper atmosphere. If it is found that this protective envelope would be
 
seriously degraded beyond some calculated nmber of annual launches, then
 
the future tourist industry could be greatly hampeted since itwould prob­
ably have a relatively low priority. This might not rule tourism out but
 
could limit it severely or restrict it to only a very few high priority
 
needs. On the other hand, the upper atmosphere might not prove to be frag­
ile at all for properly designed propulsive systems.
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These potential issues are raised for balance in this discussion.
 
Space tourism has an exciting long-term potential but it first needs to
 
be developed and shown to yield sufficient benefits. During the next few
 
decades unforeseen problems will undoubtedly arise and will need to be
 
solved satisfactorily. Until that time space tours are likely to remain
 
in the limbo of hopes or dreams.
 
If the health problems associated with protracted journeys into space
 
should become relatively severe, varous solutions may emerge over time
 
that will permit space development to continue. Indeed, the major compet­
itors to the human presence in space have been and undoubtedly will be the
 
various automated devices--robots, in one form or another. Currently,
 
according to Carl Sagan, "As a rule of thumb, a manned mission costs 50 to
 
100 times more than a comparable unmanned mission." Over time,automation
 
has become increasingly compact and effective. That is, the robots tend
 
to shrink in size and increase the range of their activities. Humans can
 
learn to do the latter but they will have difficulty in shrinking.
 
Nevertheless, a human presence in space will be needed and is likely
 
to grow. The economics of the competition with the robots generally will
 
determine the relative balance only when the same tasks can be done by
 
both. As space development proceeds, the balance may shift either way.
 
However, as'space industrialization grows in complexity the need for human
 
specialists may grow in proportion. The first Space Shuttle decade, the
 
'80s, should give us some early clues about the outcome of this long-term
 
competition.
 
The New York Times Magazine, July 10, 1977.
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D. 	The Scenarios
 
Optimistic Scenario: Some of the potential technology discussed in
 
Chapter III is used in the Optimistic Scenario of Chapter IV. This sce­
nario simply exercises the possible technological and economic muscles to
 
show what could reasonably occur in an environment of sustained funding,
 
high morale, dedication, cooperation, good management, and reasonable luck.
 
It is intended to open up some vistas, to make it clear that extraordinary
 
possibilities exist that are not necessaril'y Utopian. Although the events
 
portrayed are generally not expected to happen as soon as indicated, we
 
believe that the sequence is not intrinsically forbidden. It may only
 
require a change in public attitudes, which is certainly possible. The
 
scenario not only is intended to give a sense of some ultimate possibili­
ties 	but also of an eventual outcome. Almost all of the technological
 
developments that "happen" in the first 100 years are likely to occur
 
sooner or later--even in a pessimistic scenario, although probably much
 
later 	and on a reduced scale. As is discussed below, the economic and
 
technological progress associated with the Optimistic Scenario is amazing
 
in its long-term outcome, but is relatively modest in any particular year
 
or decade.
 
Pessimistic Scenario: Chapter V portrays the two New International
 
Order Scenarios: Part I carries out a theme which today is widely accepted
 
in the world, although not by the authors. This is a perspective which
 
suggests that the developed nations generally are relatively "decadent"
 
and that the developing nations have the energy and dynamism to push them
 
aside 	and become the focus of the future. The second (Part I1)version of
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the scenario assumes that the richer countries will, in part through the
 
transfer of resources, greatly accelerate the development of the poorer
 
countries and that these, as they attain comparable wealth and technolog­
ical advancement, will adopt the social attitudes and ideology of their
 
former benefactors. Both of these scenarios strike us as being rela­
tively improbable--but they do raise important issues.
 
On the other hand,we do find that many formerly poor nations are now
 
middle-income ones and progressing very rapidly. Scenario I gives special
 
roles to China and Brazil in determining the world's future, each for dif­
ferent reasons. Scenario IIgives a much weakened and modified form of
 
this New International Order in which both the middle-income nations and
 
the poor nations eventually become post-industrial, after which further
 
economic progress is very slow.
 
In both scenarios, it is the middle-income nations that appear likely
 
to "challenge" the lead of the U.S. and the Soviet Union inspaceactivities
 
by the end of the century or soon afterwards. In fact, in these scenarios
 
the U.S. lead--as measured by budgets--is lost to both the Russians and the
 
Chinese before the year 2000, and to the Brazilians soon afterwards. We
 
believe that in this respect the two scenarios depicted are not implausi­
ble; it may well turn out that these newcomers in advanced technology and
 
growing affluence will become technologically dominant, including space
 
development. Perhaps nothing succeeds like success in a space "race."
 
Moreover, the successes of the former middle-income countries in space
 
could greatly increase their ability to become wealthier than the present
 
developed nations. In these scenarios it occurs, not only because of
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direct economic and technological achievements, but because their success
 
creates a high morale and a sense of competence from the attainment of
 
communal goals--attitudes that growing space activities might also engen­
der in the OECD nations under appropriate circumstances.
 
Because visible signs of success are so important, many of the Third
 
World countries often attempt to "fake" them. That* is, they are attracted
 
to four-lane highways and jet airliners in order to achieve the appearance
 
of success before they have properly attended to their problems in rural
 
roads, agriculture, employment, and education. The diversion of resources
 
to showy projects can be tragic even if the showy projects are successful;
 
usually they are not. Thus it may be undesirable for a Third World country
 
to jump into space development rapidly. Unless both their economies and
 
technological resources are substantial it can represent a serious and
 
impractical diversion of scarce resources. However, the appropriate eco­
nomic conditions and technological development can appear with astonishing
 
rapidity. In fact, even S. Korea and Ta'iwan may be ready for certain spe­
cialized space ventures in the foreseeable future because of the rapidity
 
with which they have been progressing. Potential economic and technological
 
giants such as China and Brazil may also develop a space capability much
 
more quickly than generally expected,'if their recent progress continues.
 
In our most Pessimistic Scenario progress in economics and'technology
 
becomes very slow after a country becomes post-industrial. Still, a sur­
prising outcome (one which struck both authors forcibly) was that eventu­
ally, despite a general pessimism about space projects and other techno­
logical developments, space activities still become surprisingly extensive.
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(Consider, as an analogy, that even if Queen Isabella had not financed
 
Columbus, or if he had failed on his voyage, the Western Hemisphere would
 
still be there, waiting to be found; since the time was ripe for worldwide
 
exploration and exploitation other Europeans would have reached it before
 
many more years had passed.)
 
The pressures for exploring and exploiting outer space basically
 
derive from increasing wealth and advancing technologies. Over time the
 
projects become easier to fund and, with advances in technology, less dif­
ficult to do. At some appropriate time, barring an almost religious aver­
sion to new technology, a sufficient desire for space development will
 
arise--even if long intervals occur when support is hard to find.
 
Another analogy might be made with the development of the U.S. rail­
roads and the West. The railroads were stimulated by gifts of free land
 
by the government and the belief that, as the railroads were built, the
 
traffic would follow--that a great deal of industrial mining and agricul­
tural development, including forestrywould occur quite rapidly and justify
 
their investment. The time was ripe and it did.
 
A similar experience could occur with the Space Shuttle system. In
 
space there may be no equivalent to the free 160-acre homesteads which
 
were once available to the average American, but great opportunities are
 
likely to exist for various "railroad" companies who "stake out claims" in
 
outer space. At the moment the space frontier and its available resources
 
seem relatively unlimited. Relatively few critical regions appear to
 
exist that might eventually become the cause of major conflicts and hinder
 
commercial development.
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Moderate Scenario: Chapter VI develops our Moderate Scenario which
 
is intended to be more plausible than the others. It has an implied con­
viction that the progress represented is worth striving for-and can be
 
achievedwithout undue reaching. It represents our '"median" image of
 
future developments in space. It contains somefictional elements which
 
are intended to be prototypes of actual historical events, including indi­
viduals who are "movers" and "shakers" and who play central roles in
 
forcing a more -rapid space development.
 
.The Moderate Scenario emphasizes two new commercial opportunities:
 
space industrialization and tourism, both of which appear to have extremely
 
large potential in all the scenarios. The term, "space tourism" alone may
 
not convey the intended meaning. Ifw6 assume that space travel is the
 
moving experience that it has been to many astronauts, at some future time
 
various organizations or societies may wish to proVide this experience to
 
selected people. It may be a reward for dedicated service or special con­
tributions, or a ritual associated with special religious groups. Or it
 
could be arranged through an open or limited access -lottery.
 
Shortly after the beginning of space tourism, assuming it is success­
ful, we find the possibility of great interest in establishing permanent
 
orbiting colonies-possibly with many of the same motivations. We have
 
not dwelt up6n the desire for utopias or choices for one's preferred l'ife
 
style. However, it may well turn out that one of the major motivations
 
for colonies in space is similar to that which drove the Pilgrims to New
 
England: the desire to choose their way of life with minimal interference
 
from the home country. This outcome, of course, would depend very much on
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the cost and viability of such colonies.- But even relatively small sects,
 
given a growing future affluence, could eventually finance a colony if
 
they were sufficiently motivated--particularly if they had ability to tithe,
 
.like the Mormons or Black Muslims.*
 
In many religions the wealth of the church is thought of as a common
 
resource for its members to help those in difficulties and sometimes, even
 
when some members are successful, to be used to facilitate additional suc­
cess. To the extent that space colonies, in addition to their religious
 
connotation, might look like profitable ventures then the investments
 
would eventually increase the wealth of the church. Furthermore, through
 
merit criteria or lotteries, every member would have a chance to become a
 
colonist, or a tourist. The church might deem the high costs well worth
 
the increased faith and activity of its members--particularly if these
 
"tourists" returned with an inspired and zealous commitment to the church.
 
E. Potential for Growth
 
Our very rough estimate of current world space project expenditures
 
is about $9-billion per year on non-military developments and perhaps half
 
that much on military space programs. That is, total expenditures on space
 
projects are about .2 percent of the GWP (about .13 percent non-military,
 
and .07 percent military).
 
In a pessimistic space scenario that small (.13 percent) fraction
 
generally remains stable or decreases, despite the fact that the cost of
 
transportation to space must almost certainly fall by more than a factor
 
For example, if 1,000,000 families each contributed $2,500 a year
 
for 40 years, without interest this becomes $100 billion, enough to estab­
lish a substantial colony in the early to mid-2lst century, according to
 
our projections. The contributions could appear to a believer as a tax­
exempt investment in the future rather than as a gift.
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On the positive side--that is, from a space enthusiast's point of
 
view--the.high growth rates lead to an optimistic scenario. In the Opti­
mistic Scenario of Chapter IV the average growth rate inworldwide space
 
investments rose during the last quarter of the 20th century at about 10­
percent per annum (about the average for a "glamour" or high technology
 
industry currently). During the first 100 years after a brief rise to a
 
12-percent growth rate, the Gross Space Product (GSP) then declined stead­
ily to about an 8-percent growth rate, and during the second 100 years to
 
5 percent--see Table 17, p. 167. We note that the growth rate in space,
 
per capita, ends at about 2-1/2 percent--actually, less than the productiv­
ity increase of the average American worker i'n recent decades. Thus, the
 
Optimistic Scenario portrayed would not be perceived as having an astonish­
ing growth during any year of its history--except perhaps during 1980-2000,
 
when a general change in societal attitudes toward space is assumed to
 
occur. After the turn of the century it is just the assumed.long-term
 
steadiness of the slowly declining growth rate that brings about a "mirac­
ulous" transformation--first to a $30-trillion GSP and then, during the
 
much slower growth of the second 100 years, to an awesome $12,000 tril­
lion (Table 17). Stated only in this last way the numbers tend to be hard
 
to accept as having any reality; the average annual GWP/capita, including
 
the GSPs after 200 years, reaches almost $1 million--about 600 times greater
 
than the average today!
 
The 200-year progression of moderate successes in the Optimistic Sce­
nario not only leads to fantastic developments in space, it also demands
 
an extremely rich society on earth--one in which essentially everyone
 
(except those who voluntarily opt out) is an active participant. To the
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of 10 during the next century. Still the GWP during the next 100 years
 
is expected--in our earth-centeted surprise-free projections--to rise by
 
about a factor'of 20 (Table i, p. 40). - If space expenditures merely 
keep pace with GWP they would be approximately $200-$300 billion by then
 
and would almost double again in the following 100-year period. The
 
"truly" pessimistic space scenario would, on average, maintain a slower
 
growth in space investments than the GWP. On average means that "tempo­
rary" fluctuations may vary that projection somewhat over periods of a
 
few decades or less.
 
A moderate scenario, in our view, would, on average, but probably
 
with erratic fluctuations, show a growth rate in space which exceeds that
 
on earth--perhaps by about a factor of 2 or 3. Thus, the world's space
 
budget would have a mean growth rate of 3-1/2 percent to 5 percent, which
 
would lead to space budgets between $200 and $1,200 billion at the Tricen­
tennial. We arrived at $700 billion for our particular Moderate Scenario
 
(Chapter VI).
 
However, we notice that the 2076 budget (or annual investment) esti­
mate is extremely sensitive to the assumed average growth rate. Over a
 
hundred years-a 2-percent change in this average affects the budget by
 
about a factor of 7--and, over 200 years, by a factor of 50. Yet it appears
 
to us that the inherent uncertainty in the average future growth rate is
 
intrinsically greater than 2 percent and may be as high as 5 percent--the
 
latter leads to a factor of more than 100 over a century and more than an
 
astonishing lO000 over two centuries.
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average ci-tizen, today-, this must represent an unbelievable outcome--even
 
though the path to it is rellatively straightforward-. For example, to go
 
from,the current GWP of roughly $6.6 trillion to one of $6,700 trillion
 
over 200' years (on.earth, see Table 17), requires "only" an average'growth
 
rate of 3.5 percent--less than that whi~ch, the world as a whole has expe­
rienced during the last few decades! What is so astonishing about that?
 
The answer appears to be nothing to an optimist, everything to a pessimist.
 
In the above sense of economic and technological progress, we have
 
portrayed pessimistic, moderate, and optimistic scenarios.' In the pessi­
mistic one the intrinsically high-technology enterprises-are treated as
 
fascinating but dangerous tools to be kept under very tight control.
 
Society responds to science and technology as'if it were a "foreign" cul­
ture beyond its real understanding, and potentially fraught with great
 
new risks.
 
The Moderate Scenario is more of a long-term business-as-usual per­
spective. Where space projects are profitable the economic rewards tend,
 
over time, to dominate the socio-political restraints and, accompanied by
 
numerous problems, difficulties and interruptions, space development
 
erratically but slowly climbs the ladder of progress. But even such
 
erratic slow progress over a "mere" 100 years brings about changes which
 
in today's world could only seem amazing--for example, a $600-billion
 
annual investment in space when transport costs are about 1/25 of the
 
present ones, coupled with tremendous advances (to take a few examples)
 
in automation, instruments, materials, and new designs (for vehicles,
 
industries, communication systems, and processes in space). Thus, even
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the slow, erratic Moderate Scenario reveals a potentially astounding trans­
formation, one that may be almost impossible to comprehend fully or fore­
see accurately That is, the projections we have made are likely to appear
 
primitive 100 years from now--just as do the U.S. projections from 100
 
years ago that could not seriously imagine the'general use of automobiles,
 
let alone airliners, space flight, electronic computers, television, or
 
nuclear energy--to name just a few of the evolved "miracles"--and all this
 
with an average growth in per capita GNP of less than 2 percent.
 
How then, when the business-as-usual projection becomes shocking or
 
incomprehensible, can we expect anything but incredulous reactions for any
 
optimistic scenario? Our Optimistic Scenari requires, for the world as
 
a whole, merely that human beings opt for growth and set about to obtain
 
it with roughly the same, but sustained, vigor that on average we find
 
exists today. That is all.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
 
ANC: Anti-Nuclear Command 

CCD: charge-coupled device 

COMSAT: Communications Satellite 

DNA: deoxyribonucleic acid 
EFF: efficiency 
E-M: electro-magnetic 
ERTS: Earth Resources Technology 
Satellite 
ESA: European Space Agency 
G: gravity 
GHZ: gigahertz 
GNP: Gross National Product 
GSI: Gross Space Investment 
GSO: geosynchronous orbit 
GSP: Gross Space Product 
GWP: Gross World Product 
HEAO: High Energy Astronomical 
Observatory 
HLLV: Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle 
HYV: high-yield'variety 
INTELSAT: International Telecom-

munications Satellite 

Organization 

IPES: Interplanetary Exploration
 
Society 

ISDS: International Space Defense 

System 

IUS: Interim Upper Stage 

K.E.V.: thousand electron volts 

LANDSAT: Land Satellite 

LEO: low-earth orbit
 
MBPD: million barrels per day 

MISS: Made In a Space Station
 
MPD: magnetoplasmodynamic
 
NASA: National Aeronautics and
 
Space Administration
 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty
 
Organization
 
NEO: near-earth orbit
 
NIMBUS: NASA Improved Meteoro­
logical Satellite
 
OECD: Organization for Economic
 
Cooperation and Development
 
DFS: Outlook for Space
 
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum
 
Exporting Countries
 
QOL: quality of life
 
RAD: radian
 
R&D: Research and Development
 
SEASAT: Sea Observation Satellite
 
SEP: solar electric power
 
SEPS: Solar Electric Power System
 
SI: Space Industrialization
 
SMM: Solar Maximum Mission
 
SSI: Solar Systems, Incorporated
 
SSPS: Solar Satellite Power System
 
SSTO: Single State To Orbit
 
SSUS: Spinning Solid Upper Stage
 
STS: Space Transportation System
 
TIROS: Television Infrared Observa­
tion Satellite
 
TWACA: Temporary World Arms Control
 
Agency
 
TWDA: Temporary World Defense
 
Authority
 
ULA: United Lunar Authority
 
VTOVL: Vertical Take Off and
 
Vertical Landing
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Appendix A'
 
THE NEW CLASS
 
For some time it has been recognized by a number of futurologists
 
and others who speculate about social trends, that for a wealthy country
 
the marginal utility of increased wealth could decrease quite rapidly.
 
A decade or.more ago it was widely accepted that within'the next hundred
 
years the desire for increased wealth could decrease to the point where
 
it would strongly affect the growth rates. Almost nobody expected this
 
effect to be felt in the very near future, although many now believe that
 
it has begun. In particular, it has shown up in changed attitudes which
 
strongly support the New Emphases which are listed below:
 
RECENT NEW EMPHASES
 
(ALL LEADING TO "SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH")'
 
1. 	RISK AVERSION
 
2. 	LOCALISM
 
3. 	COMFORT, SAFETY, LEISURE AND HEALTH
 
4. 	PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY
 
5. 	LOSS OF NERVE, WILL, OPTIMISM, CONFIDENCE, AND MORALE
 
6. 	PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (INCLUDING EQUALITY
 
OF RESULT)
 
7. 	HAPPINESS AND HEDONISM
 
8. 	GENERAL.ANTI-TECHNOLOGY, ANTI-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
 
ANTI-MIDDLE-CLASS ATTITUDES (E.G., "SMALL IS BETTER"
 
AND "LIMITS-TO-GROWTH" MOVEMENTS)
 
9. 	MANY MODERN FAMILY VALUES
 
10. 	 GENERAL DE-EMPHASIS OF (OR EVEN HOSTILITY TO) THE
 
THIRTEEN'TRADITIONAL LEVERS
 
11. 	 INCREASING SOCIAL CONTROL AND "OVERALL PLANNING" OF
 
THE ECONOMY OF THE "WRONG" SORT
 
12. 	 ADVERSARY REGULATORY ATTITUDES
 
13. 	 INNER SPACE (OMPHALOSKEPSIS) AND/OR CONCERN WITH SELF
 
GENERALLY, PERHAPS EVEN AN EMPHASIS ON MYSTIC OR
 
TRANSCENDENTAL VALUES
 
This Appendix draws on previously published material by B. Bruce-

Briggs and Herman Kahn.
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If the attitudes represented in the list should become completely
 
and intensely pervasive, it could effectively impede advancing technology
 
in general and space development, in particular. Therefore, it is worth
 
discussing some of the forces that give rise to the above New Emphases.
 
First and most.important: as the membership of the upper-middle class
 
increases and as the availability of cheap, inexpensive services decreases,
 
the upper-middle class finds that its pleasures, its privileges, its
 
purposes, its quality of life and even its standard of living are seri­
ously threatened. Recent books have discussed these phenomena in some
 
detail though, perhaps, from a somewhat misleading perspective. That
 
is, the issue is discussed as if the perspective and interests of the
 
upper-middle class were the same as everyone else's. Little recognition
 
is given to the fact that a middle-class individual who moves into the
 
upper-middle class feels a substantial improvement in his standard of
 
living and his quality of life, even if those already in the upper-middle
 
class feel they have lost something.
 
Within this upper-middle class we find an active sub-group which
 
seems to be--intellectually, politically, and polemically--a cutting edge
 
of this phenomenon and which has been labeled the New Class. Largely
 
these are people whose status and occupation not only derive from posses­
,sion of considerable education, but who earn their living thereby--i.e.,
 
by the use of language and analytical skills. The New Class comprises a
 
large part of academia, the media, and most "public interest" groups,
 
and many philanthropic, public service, and social service organizations-­
all of which not-only have been growing in size, but gaining in impor­
tance and power in the industrial Western countries and in Japan. While
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there are many "gray areas" in these categories, it is also true of pre­
viously recognized classes; it is equally tough to delineate "aristocracy,"
 
"bourgeoisie," and "proletariat" with great precision, and each of these
 
classes contains important sub-classes and new arrivals or dropouts.
 
Initial analysis suggests that the New Class can be defined in terms of­
high or potentially high (i.e. including students) formal education, pro­
fessional occupational status, with an emphasis on the "soft" sciences
 
and arts, high (but not the highest) income, usually from non-market
 
sources (government or non-profit salaries, graits, and contracts), and
 
relative youth. The last is important;because the New Class is "emerg­
ing" its attributes should be most obvious among the young. In this
 
connection, Karl Marx's insight that a class does not exist unless it
 
has self-awareness is illuminating. This kind of consciousness has ap­
peared only recently among members of the New Class. Some intellectuals
 
and bureaucrats have always behaved like the New Class, but-perhaps only
 
within the past decade have they had sufficient numbers to achieve the
 
critical mass to break out of subordination to other groups and strike
 
out on their own.
 
A case can be made that the New Class largely controls or-dominates
 
the following groups and institutions: the humanities and social science
 
faculties of almost all prestige and many state universities, professional
 
schools, and teachers colleges; most of the national media organizations-­
the prestigious daily newspapers, much of the periodical press, the book
 
publishing industry, the commercial television networks, recording, films,
 
and most educational media; the fine arts; the establishment foundations
 
and other non-profit eleemosynary institutions concerned with influencing
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public opinion; research organizations; a good part of congressional
 
staff; the federal social welfare bureaucracy; and the government regu­
latory apparatus. Furthermore, New Class values and sensibilities are
 
tending to penetrate: natural science faculties; business schools;
 
rank and file school teachers; state and local government bureaucracies;
 
the clergy; advertising; trade union staff; salaried professionals of
 
all kinds; and even business corporations, especially in public relations,
 
long-range planning, and internal education programs. These disparate
 
groups have this in common: they are in staff Cas contrasted to "line"
 
or substantive) positions, and they produce or deal in ideas or words,
 
holding their jobs because of analytical and literary skills usually ob­
tained through formal education, Thus we do not think of the chief execu­
tive officers of these organizations as necessarily being of the New Class.
 
The words "largely controls or dominates" imply that the New Class sets
 
the basic tone of the organization and its basic policies with regard to
 
the information it deals with, but this need not apply to the commercial
 
and administrative aspects of the operation,
 
Most analysts concerned with the future of the advanced nations
 
believe that these "brain workers" will becqme even more important in
 
the next century and will play central roles in influencing the general
 
milieu in which space projects will be undertaken. We append a series of
 
more or less self-explanatory charts which will- give the interested
 
reader a synoptic overview of the characteristics and issues currently
 
associated with the New Class.
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We believe that this phenomenon of the New Class is tuite real and
 
that it might play a very important role in the future of space develop­
ment-- as some of our sceiarios ard socko-political contexts attempt to
 
suggest.
 
A-6
 
ISSUES
 
A. 	ORIGINS OF PRIVILEGED RADICALISM
 
ADVERSARY CULTURE
 
LIBERAL ETHOS
 
B. CONCERN WITH COMPETENCE OF SOCIETY, ECONOMY, AND
 
GOVERNMENT
 
C. 	WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT BRAIN WORKERS WILL BE DOMINANT
 
CLASS OF FUTURE
 
BACKGROUND OF THE IDEA OF THE NEW CLASS
 
I:' NEED TO DEFINE AND EXPLAIN GROUPS WITH."POWER WITHOUT
 
PROPERTY"
 
2. 	TERM "NEW CLASS" EMPLOYED IN 1956 BY MILOVAN DJILAS TO
 
LABEL COMMUNIST RULERS
 
3. TERM FIRST APPLIED TO U.S, BY DAVID T. BAZELON IN 1967
 
4. 	TERM USED IN "RIGHT" SENSE BY D.P. MOYNIHAN AND NORMAN
 
PODHORETZ IN 1972. CIRCULATED BY IRVING KRISTOL.
 
TWO DEFINITIONS OF THE NEW CLASS
 
"LEFT" "RIGHT" 
INCLUDES ALMOST ALL RESPONSIBLE EXCLUDES "LINE" OFFICIALS 
WHITE COLLAR WORKERS, INCLUDING AND PRACTICAL BRAIN WORKERS 
ENGINEERS AND CORPORATE AND INCLUDES PUBLIC SECTOR 
MANAGERS. ENTREPRENEURS. 
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Business and 'The New Class'
 
By IRVING. KuiTrnii A Preference for Fant9a5y 
Everyone wants to be loved, and it al- Nor, Itmust be said, are their teachers, Board of Contributors 
ways comes a a shock to discover that 
there are people who dislike you for what 
you really are rather than for what they 
mistakenly think you are. Indeed,, most of 
us desperately resist such a conclusion. We 
keep inslsting, to ourselves and others, 
that those people out there who are- !aying 
nasty things about us are rnezely ill-in-
formed, or milsgulded, or have been se- thrits or whatever; or that multinational 
duced by rrischievous propaganda on the corporations "really" make or unmake 
part of a handful of Irredeemably perverse American foreign policy; or that "big bust. 
spi-its. And we remain confident, In our nes" actually welcomes a depression be-
heart of hearts, that if they only under- cause it creates a "reserve army of the un-
stood us better, they would certainly diq- employed" from which it can recruit more 
like us less. docile workers. 
Inthis respect businessmen are at hit- So there is certainly room for all kinds 
man-and are as capable of self-deception of educational endeavors on the part of the 
-as anyone else. On any single day, all business community, and I do not wish to 
over the country, there are'gathe~ing'a of be interpreted as in any way discouraging 
corporate executives in which bewilder- ther.. The fact that they seem so relatively 
mont and vexation Is expressad at the a41-ineffectual In not nece.awil aJ-argu4Rlyt, 
mate of hostility toward busines to be 
found In Washington, or in the media, or In 
academia-or even, incredibly, among 
their own children. And, quickly enough, 
the idea is born that something oughc to be 
done to create a better understanding 
(and, of course, appreciation) of "the free 
enterprise system." A television series an 
economice and business for the high
schools? Space advertising In the print 
media? Face-to-face encounters between 
buslnessman and college students? Lng 
and serious luncheons with the editors of 
major newspapers and newsmagazines? In 
the end, many of these Ideas come to frul-
tion, at substantial costs in money and . lar. In truth, one can pi'operly put that 
time-but with depressingly small effect, question in a much stronger form: Why do 
Now, I do not wish to seem to be under- so many intelligent people seem deter-
estimating the degree of Ignorance about n(ied,to boIll those ideas and to resis-t ay.bitlous and frustrated class.business and economics which does in fact correction of them? Such determination Kevin Phillips calls this class "the me­
exist in the United States today. ItIs in- there must be, because mere error and Ig-- -icei Ifffev-boW d&tlih titI --Y,

deed amazing that, in a society in which 
business plays so crucial a role, so many
people come to understand so little about it 
-and, at the mine time, to know so much 
about it which isn't so. We hav,,, for in-
stanue, managed to produce a generation
of young people which, for all the educa-
tion lavished on It. knows less about the 
world of work-even the world their 
fathers' work-Than any previous genera-
Lion in American history. 'They fantasize 
easily. disregard common observation. ap-
pear to be radically deficient in that fac-
ulty we call common sense. 
In a much better condition. The average, 
college professor of history, sociology, lit. 
erature, political science, sometimes even , 'here are people "out 
econonies, is just as inclined to prefer fan-
tasy over reality. On every college campus 
one can hear it said casually by faculty 
members that the drug companies are 
busy suppressing cures for cancer or ar. 
aginst them. Education is at best a slow * 
and tedioUs process, and that kind of adu-
cation which tries to counteract a massive, 
original miseducation'is even slower slid 
more tedious. Too many businessmen con-
fuse education with advertising, and R1V 
most unconsciously impose the short time-
horison of the latter on the former- The 
unit of thne appropriate to the process of 
education is not a year but a generation. 
Having said this, however, I should like 
to pursue the truly interesting question of' 
ty so many intelligent people manage to 
entertain so many absurd Ideas about eco-' 
nomics in general and business In particu-
there" who find it conve­
nient to believe the worst 
about business because they 
have certain adverse inten­
tons toward the business 
community to begin with.They dislike business for 
whiit it is;not Jor what -they 
mistakenly think it is.
 
is. These people constitute what one may 
simply call, for lack of a better name, "the 
new class." 
This "new class" is not easily defined 
but may be vaguely described. It consists 
of a goodly proportion of those college­
educated people whose skills and vocations 
proliferate In a "post-Industrial society"(to use Daniel Bell's convenient term). We 
are talking about scientists, teachers and 
educational administrators, journalists and 
others in the communications industries, 
psychologists, social workers, those law­
yetn and doctors who make their careers 
in the expanding public sector, city plan­
nets, the staffs of the larger foundations, 
the upper levels of the governnmenlbureau­
cracy, etc., etc. It is, by now, a quite nu­
mercus class; it is an indispensable class 
for our kind of society: it is a dispropor­
tionately powerful class; it is also an am­
norance are not of themselves so obdurate. Though the book has many shrewd Coser-
When they are, it is usually because they vations, the term he chooses seems to me 
also w.aan Integral part of an ideology to be unfortunate, It helps prolong what 
which serve, dome deeper passion or inter-' might be called the "Agnew illusion"-i.e.,
let, that much of our troubles derive from the 
And the more attentively one studies fact that a small and self-selected group,
'the problem, the clearer it becomes that whose opinions are unrepresentative of the 
.Whatis commonly called a "bias" or an! American people, have usurped control of 
"nihimin" against business Is really a by-
tProduct of a larger purposiveness. There 
are people "out ther" who find Itconves 
nient to believe the worst about business 
because they have certain adverse linten-
-tions toward the business comnunity to 
begin with. They dislike business for what 
it is, not for, what they mistakenly think it 
,~~ 
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our media and use their strategic positions
to launch an assault on our traditions and 
institutions. Sudh a populist perspective is 
misleading and ultimately self-defeating.
Members of'the new class do not "control" 
tlhe media, they are the media-just as 
ci 
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they areour educational system, our pub: 
lie health and welfare systems, and much 
else. Even if the president of CBS or the 
publisher of Time were to decide tomorrow 
that George Wallace would be the ideal 
President, it would have practically no of-
feet on what is broadcast or published, 
These executives have as much control 
over "their" bureaucracies as the Seere-
tfltrY'f-fltW has over his, or as the aver-
age college president has over his facuilty. 
What does this "hew class" want and 
why should it be so hostile to the business 
community? Well, one should understand 
that the members of this class are "ideal-
tlae" in the 1e0s seme of that term-
i.. they arc not much interested in 
money, but are keenly Interested In power. 
Power for what? Well, the power to shape 
our civilization-a power which, in a capi-
system, Is supposed to reside In tle 
free market. The "new clas" wants to see 
much of this power redistributed to gov. 
erment, where they will then have a 
major say in how it is exercised. 
From the very beginnings of capital-
iBm, there has always existed a small 
group of men and women who disapproved 
ad the pervasive influence of the free mar-
ket on _iseiviliation-thhe in wn live, 
One used to call this group "the intellec- 
tuais," and they are the ancestors of our 
own "new elms," very few of whom are 
intellectuals but all of whom inherit the at-
tUtudes toward capitalism that have flour-
ished among Intellectuals for more than g
century-and-a-half. This attitude maay ae-
curately be called "elitist"-though eople
who are convinced they Incarnate "the. 
public I erest," a distinct ,rm all theprivate iterests of a tree' eO.y, -are i&L 
likelytothlnkofthemselvesInsuchaway. 
It is basically suspicious of, and hostile to; 
the market precisely because the market 
is so vulgarly democratic-one dollar, one, 
vote. A civilization shaped by market 
transactiois is a civilization responsive to 
the common appetites, preferences, and, 
aspIrations ot conison people. The "new, 
c a"-telllgent,' educated,- energetic-
has lile respect tr such a eommn place 
,civillzation. 'It wishes to nee Its ",ialn 
more effectual than the market is likely to 
permit them to be. And so it tries always 
to supersede economics by politics-an a. 
tt'ity in which it is most competent, since 
it has the talents and the implicit authrity 
to shape public opinion on all larger Issues, 
Its Own Gravdiftgr? 
-
So there as sene in which capitaliim 
May yet turi ol -to be its own gravofm ­
ger, since.it Is Ctpltaism Jhat createiikith 
"new cias''-thrwOili ecbnomic growth, 
affluence; mahbigber oducation, tM- pro-
liferation of now technologies of conununi-
t alion, and in a hundred other ways. More. 
over, It must be said that the "idealism 
of this "new class," though in all respect 
self-serving, Is nat for that reason msin-
cere. It really 1 true that a civilization-
shaped predominantly by a free market-' 
by the preferences and appetltes of ordli 
nary men and womer-hano a "quality of 
life" that is likely to bo regarded as leA 
than wholly admirable by the better-edu.. 
cated classes. To be sure, these classes' 
could try to improve.,thingo by elevating
-and refining the preferemes of ail those 
ordinary people: That, supposedly, is the 
liberal and democratic tay. But it s so 
much eazler to mobilloe the active layers, 
of public opinion behind such Issues as en. 
vironmentLima, ecology, consumer pro*
tecton, and eonoin(Aplanning, to give thet to c-n-l" the 
governmental bureaucracy the power to, 
rist and ,,and e ei talyegulate coerce 
,,, .~ ~.' ~. .. t 
"politicize" the ccnoiul decsulo-makng 
process. And this 'is, "of course, exactly' an educational task of no small proportioes; 
what ies been happenia-. 
- There can be little doubt that if these Mr. Krtstol Is Henry Luce Professor of 
new Imperialistic impulses 6n the part of' Urban Values at New York University and 
"the public sector" (i.e., the politcal se-: co-editor of the quarterlyThe PublicInter­
torf are 'restrattiudwe shell 'r-ove. to- eat. He is also a ,nembar of the tournal'a 
ward some version 4 state capitalism in Board of 6ontrtieniore, fivs distinguished 
'which the citizen's Individual liberty would professors who contribute ieriodicarti lks 
be rendered ever mole insecure. But It Is reflectin a OOtoad range of views. 
Important not to have any lldusons about 
how much can be done to cope with this 
situntlon. The "new class" in hre,. It id 
firmly established in Its own societal see--
tore, and it Is not going to go away. It. is 
idle, therefore, to talk about returning to a 
"free enterprise" system in which govern­
ment will play the modist-,role it used to. 
The Idea of such A cotmter1reformaton is
utopian. Ronald Reag" was a two-term 
governor o ' ora, and whatever his 
accomplishrmnt, the restoration of "free, 
enterprise" was not one of them, Were he 
to become' atwoteot' PrWldent, he (and 
we) would find thatj after the Ideologiftl 
smoke had clead, Mot all that much had' 
changed. 
No Hopeless, Buat. . . 
Not that the situton is hopeless-it's 
just that ce hs to recognize the lltnitb'4 
range of the posisib It is possible, I think, 
at least to preserve a substantial and vi 
orous private secisr-not only a busfleS 
sector, but alto a non-governmental not­
for-profit sector-in the United States. This' 
can happen, not because of the self-evident 
virtues of business, but because.of the pro­
found appeal of individual liberty to a. 
Americans, and because of the equally 
profouhd distrust of big government by alr 
Americans. In this appeal and this distrust 
even members of the "new- clas" share 
to one degree or another. It ts our good fo6 
tune that they are not doctrinlre social­
isti, as i Britiln, even if they anmetimei" 
look and sound like it. They have lon' 
' wanted ther, "place In the sucm," they are 
in the process of selzing and consolidating 
It-and Tiw they have to be asminhiated 
into the 'systm (even as the system wilt 
have to change to assimlate them). II will 
be a slow and painful business, but need 
not end In calamity. 
A good part of this process of assimila­
tion will be the education of this "new 
class" In the actualities of business and 
econoseics-nt their conversion to "free 
entrprolse"-o that they can teoe"ree 
their power responsibly. It Will be an im­
mens educationa task in which the bust. 
ness community certainly canplay an im, 
tat role. .tbefore t can IV this 
. .-__... _R- . 
.. -usnes first to undrsand th 
W mel nfias toc rsanwthe 
new so oogic ain political reality withIn which It is now operating. That, too, ie 
"-', "". 
The Wall Street Journal, 
May 19, 1 75. Reprinted 
with permission of The 
Wall Street Journal, © 
tDow Jones & Company, nc. 
( 75) A rights
reserved. 
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THE NEW CLASS
 
(POSSESSES KNOWLEDGE, LANGUAGE SKILLS, AND FORMAL EDUCATION
 
RATHER THAN PRIVILEGED FAMILY, PROPERTY, 0I9 ENTREPRE-

NEURIAL SKILLS)
 
ACADEMICS, ESPECIALLY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY THE HUMANITIES
 
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND VERY RARELY ENGINEERS AND
 
GEOLOGISTS
 
TEACHERS, ESPECIALLY NON-SCIENTISTS
 
SOCIAL WELFARE BUREAUCRATS
 
GOVERNMENT UNIONS
 
PROFESSIONALS, ESPECIALLY SALARIED
 
NATIONAL MEDIA
 
ADVERTISING
 
FOUNDATIONS
 
RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS
 
GOVERNMENT STAFF
 
UNION STAFF
 
MAINSTREAM PROTESTANT CLERGY
 
MANY CORPORATE PLANNERS AND P.R. TYPES
 
PUBLIC, SECTOR ENTREPRENEURS
 
SOME LABELS OF THE NEW CLASS
 
INTELLECTUALS
 
INTELLIGENTSIA
 
BRAIN WORKERS
 
KNOWLEDGE WORKERS
 
CLERISY
 
TECHNOSTRUCTURE
 
EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC ESTATE
 
MERITOCRACY
 
MEDIACRACY
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ETHNIC ORIGINS OF MOST OF NEW CLASS
 
(GROUPS WITH HIGH REGARD FOR EDUCATION)
 
OLD YANKEE ELITES, ESPECIALLY THE DECLINING EX-RICH
 
"MAINSTREAM" PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS
 
CONGREGATIONALISTS
 
PRESBYTERIANS
 
REFORMED
 
QUAKERS
 
UNITARIANS
 
EPISCOPALIANS
 
NORTHERN METHODISTS
 
JEWS, ESPECIALLY REFORM AND SECULARIZED
 
HAUTE-EMBOURGEOISED ROMAN CATHOLICS
 
E.G. JESUITS
 
IF THERE IS AN EMERGING NEW CLASS
 
IT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED BY:
 
HIGH FORMAL EDUCATION
 
RESPECTABLE SOCIAL ORIGINS
 
"PROFESSIONAL" OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
 
HIGH (BUT NOT HIGHEST) INCOME
 
NON-MARKET INCOME
 
GOVERNMENT SALARY
 
NON-PROFIT SALARY
 
CONTRACTS AND GRANTS
 
RELATIVE YOUTH
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KEY NEW CLASS INSTITUTIONS
 
UNIVERSITIES
 
RESEARCH INSTITUTES
 
GOVERNMENT STAFFS
 
PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBYS
 
OTHER NON-PROFIT ORANIZATIONS
 
MEDIA CONGLOMERATES
 
SOME "NEW CLASS" ORGANIZATIONS
 
ACLU
 
ADA
 
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
 
COMMON CAUSE
 
NADERITES
 
CONSUMERS UNION
 
SIERRA CLUB
 
FORD FOUNDATION
 
NEW CLASS ALLIES AND CO-BELLIGERENTS
 
DECADENT OLD RICH
 
MORE RADICAL TRADE UNIONS
 
OLD LEFT
 
NEW LEFT REMNANTS
 
MILITANT FEMINISTS
 
ORGANIZED MINORITY GROUPS
 
BLACKS
 
OTHER NON-WHITES
 
PSEUDO-ETHNICS
 
(LEFT) PSUEDO-POPULISTS
 
"TREND IES"
 
THE UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IN GENERAL
 
szI 
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A PARADIGM OF'UPPER-MIDDLE-CLASS LIFESTYLES
 
-TRADITIONAL 

MODEST STATUS 

I OR 2 SERVANtS 

CRUDE SERVANTS 

EXPENSIVE GOODS 

FEW SERVICES 

NO CARS, LITTLE OR 

NO COMMUTING 

URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 

UNNOTICED POLLUTION 

LIMITED TRAVEL 

EARLY INDUSTRIAL 

HIGH STATUS 

2-5 SERVANTS-

SKILLED SERVANTS 

CHEAP GOODS 

MANY SERVICES 

CARS, OPEN ROADS, 

EASY PARKING 

SUBURBS 

LESS POLLUTION 

TOURISM 

MATURE INDUSTRIAL
 
NO SPECIAL STATUS
 
I OR NO SERVANTS
 
INSOLENT SERVANTS
 
SHODDY GOODS
 
SERVICE "RIP-OFFS"
 
LONG DISTANCE COMMUT-

ING, TRAFFIC JAMS
 
SUBURBAN SPRAWL
 
POLLUTION SENSITIVITY
 
TOURIST POLLUTION
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NEW CLASS AGENDA
 
EXPANSION OF SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
 
EXPANSION OF POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
 
HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE SALARIES
 
EXPANDED RESEARCH BUDGETS
 
EXPANDED EDUCATION
 
CREDENTIALISM
 
"ACADEMIC FREEDOM"
 
"CIVIL LIBERTIES"1
 
EGALITARIANISM
 
BLOCKING ECONOMIC GROWTH
 
OTHER ATTACKS ON RIVAL ELITES
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NEW CLASS IDEOLOGY
 
1, 	PERSONAL SELF-FULFILLMENT, HAPPINESS, COMFORT, FUN,
 
FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE
 
2. 	LIFE MAXIMIZATION, RISK AVOIDANCE
 
NEAR PACIFISM
 
HEALTH
 
SAFETY
 
ANTI-CREATIVE DESTRUCTION
 
3. 	"NATURISM"
 
ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTALISM
 
ANTI-INDUSTRIALIZATION
 
ANTI-MACHINERY
 
ANTI-TECHNOLOGY
 
4. 	ANTI-ORGANIZATION
 
ANTI-CORPORATION
 
ANTI-NATION-STATE
 
LOCALISM
 
SMALL IS BETTER'
 
5. 	ANTI-TRADITIONS AND TABOOS
 
RELIGION
 
SEX
 
FAMILY
 
SOCIAL RULES
 
ADVERSARY CULTURE
 
6. INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE STANDARD
 
Appendix B
 
A MINI-SCENARIO IN WHICH THE LUNAR COMMAND
 
BECOMES THE MAJOR WAR-DETERRING ORGANIZATION
 
In the year 2000, as part of the 'millenium celebrations," the
 
Americans, the Russians, and the Chinese agreed to install a cooperative
 
lunar military command headquarters in order to assure its survivability;
 
45 percent of the costs were borne by the Americans and their allies, 30
 
percent by the Soviet group and 25 percent by the Chinese. The lunar
 
complex was large and very elaborate and by 2007'had cost about $150 bil­
lion. After about 10 years the cooperative spirit which had attended its
 
earlier development began to disintegrate but it was not feasible to
 
separate the complex into completely separate functioning sections for
 
each nation, though an attempt was made to do this partially. Still the
 
lunar inhabitants (who were composed of Russians, Americans, Chinese,-

Japanese, French; and Germans) tended to work together quite-well indeed.
 
The members of this lunar group had come to like and appreciate each
 
other--a relationship which could not be di~solved by "orders" from earth.
 
Moreover in their relationship they strongly preferred to emphasize a
 
non-military orientation--only partly because it would improve their
 
security.
 
A renewed 3-way arms race among the Americans, the Russians and the
 
Chinese, started even before the lunar installation was completely operational,
 
and after 2010 each power started putting up many military satellites.
 
At one point in the year 2018 the Soviets and the Chinese began shooting
 
down each other's satellites. By chance or error (or possibly deliber­
ately) a few American satellites-were also destroyed. The Americans,
 
B-2
 
fearing the worst, retaliated and the situation deteriorated rapidly
 
into an extended space war as satellites were shot down both openly and
 
clandestinely. The three nations started to build and deploy many more
 
military satellites. Although the Chinese were at a relatively great
 
economic disadvantage they did manage a significant amount of space
 
defense capability through some uniquely effective technological designs.
 
All three countries understood .that if any one of them could get effec­
tive control of space first, it could dominate the subsequent space war.
 
The tension grew into a very serious crisis threatening an escalation to
 
a nuclear exchange on earth, and included accusations that the other
 
sides had sent nuclear weapons into orbit. Actually it would not have
 
,made much difference, militarily, if they had or not; but there would
 
be ominous strategic and political precedents in breaking the treaty;
 
During the tension'an "accidental" launch of a few nuclear weapons did
 
occur (some analysts deemed it a test of resolve). Two small cities in
 
each of the three nations were.destroyed as a result of a tit-for-tat
 
retaliation policy. At this point a general paralyzing fear gripped
 
every nation. At first nobody knew quite how to resolve the dead center
 
paralysis, but the status quo had also become intolerable. Luckily at
 
this point the idea of using the services ofia new Lunar Command emerged.
 
At unusual speed for such negotiations a tripartite decision was made for
 
each of the belligerents to turn over the bulk of their space defense
 
satellites to control by a department of the Lunar Authority. The Lunar
 
Command, as this peace keeping group was then designated, was put together
 
hastily and given a firing doctrine which could almost certainly destroy
 
any subsequent small attack and probably would be effective against most
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big attacks which could be anticipated. Of course, it was not possible
 
to have a high confidence in the latter situation.
 
The Lunar Command, today, is only a shell of its earlier organiza­
'tion. It served to resolve an enormously dangerous situation and earned
 
a permanent place in history. A decade from now we expect that it will
 
only be a museum to remind us of one of our inherent potential dangers.
 
Appendix C
 
THE PROBLEM OF WAR AND OTHER
 
LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE
 
Although since World War II, the world has been much preoccupied
 
with war and threats of war, violence and the threats of violence, com­
pared to almost any other period of history it has actually been a rela­
tively non-violent world. War, especially the threat of a large war,
 
increasingly appears to play a smaller role. Compared to the 21 years
 
between World War I and II, 32 years have passed since the end of World
 
War It and few observers feel that a very threatening situation exists
 
or is likely to occur that could soon lead to World War 111, or any
 
similar large scale conflict.
 
Hudson Institute has long had a professional interest in writing
 
scenarios which lead to the outbreak of "World War Ill." These are useful
 
in order to test various military programs, such as strategic or arms
 
control plans and preparations, and to give analysts, staffs, and Pentagon
 
decision-makers a context in which they can exercise and test tactical and
 
strategic concepts. However, we have found it increasingly difficult to
 
write plausible scenarios for the outbreak of such a war--though not for
 
the evolution of a reasonably intense crisis. The outbreak scenarios we
 
do write almost invariably arise out of intense political crises in cen­
tral Europe. In many ways this area is somewhat unstable (though it is
 
not a tinderbox). It is also an area in which the interests of the Soviet
 
Union, the United States and the European countries suggest a great reluc­
tance to accept risks of serious escalation rather than to back down
 
during a crisis.
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In this appendix we discuss the likelihood and effects of large
 
scale violence or threats of such violence. However, in our scenarios,
 
except for the Great Space War, and its antecedents-and aftermath, we
 
have not let space development be strongl't affected by war and threats
 
of war.
 
This will seem quite unreasonable to almost any historian, and to
 
-some degree, also to the authors. However, because analysis shows that
 
many wars or threats of war can occur with little effect upon the prin­
cipal basic long-run trends--and thus the evolution we are trying to
 
depict--it becomes reasonable to ignore most such potential conflicts
 
although they might make the detailed scenarios more interesting (but
 
considerably more difficult to write). Thus in the year 2000 it should
 
not surprise many people to find that a 1975 map of the world was still
 
quite good--that the national boundaries might be unchanged in any major
 
respect. Even the boundary changes from 1950 to 1975 have been mostly
 
the result of internal wars--that is, violent civil wars. The number of
 
regions where future international wars could plausibly occur appear to
 
be decreasing, not ihcreasing--though there are still some sensitive
 
situations--e.g., the Middle East. Thus, it wouldn't surprise us if
 
relatively little violence occurred between 1975 and 2000. It would
 
surprise us, however, if any violence significantly changed either the
 
map of the world or the basic trends of our time. Still, it is clear
 
that the technological potential for violence is increasing rapidly and
 
must be considered. However, the world's tolerance of violence appears
 
to be decreasing and this could lead to important changes in methods of
 
dealing with violence or the threat of violence--at both low and high
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levels. If this remains true it should be a very useful trend for the
 
world as a whole.
 
In the future we do not expect to have any kind of serious world
 
government beyond that already represented by the U.N. Security Council.
 
Technically the-U.N. Charter (in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter 7).. does
 
give to the Security Council (if they Unaninously agree) the power to
 
control violence in the world. Since they seldom agree this power is
 
basically moot.
 
We are not likely to achieve, voluntarily, a more effective form of
 
world government than this (usually moribund) potential one of the U.N.
 
Security Council. For example, it is almost impossible to think of an
 
effective world legislature that could be acceptable. A one-man one-vote
 
arrangement would be dominated by a struggle between India and China to
 
run the world, a situation which the powerful wealthy nations would not
 
tolerate, much less create. A one-nation bne-vote arrangement--or any­
thing similar--would probably be much like the current U.N. assembly,
 
The U.N. is seldom thought of as a world government by many people,
 
even though in 1945 the small and medium nations of the world consciously
 
ceded control over many important world operations to the five big powers.
 
These articles read as follows:
 
Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involv­
ing the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its deci­
sions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of econ6mic
 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
 
Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures pro­
vided for in Article 51wouldbe inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
 
it may take such action by air, sea,, or landforces as may be necessary to
 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
 
land forces of Members of the United Nations.
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which today, even more than when De Gaulle first made the remark, is a
 
"continuing scandal" as far as it purports to be a world government. (Of
 
course, the assembly does perform useful functions, particularly as a
 
forum and as an international debating society.) Finally, few nations
 
would be interested in a bicameral legislature which very likely would
 
unite the worst features of the above two systems. Moreover, almost all
 
complex weighted voting schemes which have been suggested seem to founder
 
on the above considerations or other similar ones.
 
Someone suggested a scheme might work that in effect was one-dollar,
 
one-vote; that this might be acceptable seems quite dubious. However, it
 
would have the great virtue of being dominated by the nations of the
 
European Economic Community, the U.S., Japan and to a lesser-degree by
 
the Soviet Union; nations in which the real power of the world in fact
 
resides. Any workable legislative arrangements presumably would need to
 
reflect this reality.
 
